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In an increasingly mobile world, the taxation of
citizens living abroad has taken on increased importance.
Recent international administrative developments-most
notably, the weakening of foreign bank secrecy and
expansion of global information sharing norms-have
further raised the profile of this issue. While US. law
traditionally has taxed U.S. citizens living abroad in the
same general manner as citizens living in the United States,
a number of scholars have proposed abandoning the use of
citizenship as a jurisdictional basis to tax. In its place, they
would apply residence-based principles (i.e., exercising full
taxing rights over U.S. citizens only if the citizens reside in
the United States). Citizens residing outside the United
States would be taxed in the same limited manner as
noncitizens residing outside the United States.
This Article examines the impact of the recent
international administrative developments on proposals to
eliminate citizenship-based taxation and replace it with
residence-based taxation. It also discusses a number of
substantive concerns with the residence-based taxation
proposals. While the Article concludes that the United States
should retain its citizenship-based taxation regime, it
acknowledges that a number of practical steps could be
taken to ameliorate unnecessary burdens faced by overseas
citizens.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B., Cornell University,
1985; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1988; LL.M., New York University School of
Law, 1989. I would like to thank Yariv Brauner, Omri Marian, Marty McMahon,
Ekkehart Reimer, Stephen Shay, and the participants in the 9th Annual University of
Florida International Taxation Symposium for their comments on an earlier draft.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In general, citizenship status in a country not only entitles the holder
to certain rights, but also imposes upon the holder certain obligations. As far
back as the Civil War, and continuing throughout the 100-year history of the
modem income tax,' one such obligation imposed on U.S. citizens is the
requirement to pay income taxes.2 The United States uses a person's
citizenship status as a jurisdictional basis upon which to impose tax. Thus,
subject to some significant exceptions, a U.S. citizen is subject to U.S.
income tax liability even if she resides outside the United States, and even if
all of her income arises outside the United States. The United States also
uses residence as a jurisdiction to tax, so that noncitizens who reside in the
United States generally are subject to tax on all of their income, even if it
arises outside the United States.3 In contrast to the United States' use of
either citizenship or residence, almost all other countrieS4 use only residence
(although sometimes broadly defined) as a basis to assert full taxing
jurisdiction over an individual.
1. Congress enacted the first "modem" income tax law in 1913, shortly
after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, §
II(A)(1), 38 Stat. 114, 166. Even under the temporary Civil War-era income tax that
expired in 1872, and the 1894 income tax that was declared unconstitutional and
never enforced, income tax obligations were imposed based on U.S. citizenship
status, even if the citizen resided outside of the United States. See Michael S. Kirsch,
Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 449-56 (2007)
[hereinafter Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy] (providing detailed
explanation and analysis of citizenship as a jurisdictional basis to tax under the Civil
War-era and 1894 income taxes).
2. The extent to which a citizen is actually liable for any income tax
depends on a myriad of factors, including the amount of her gross income and the
extent to which she qualifies for various deductions and credits.
3. The United States as well as other countries also exercise source-based
jurisdiction over income that arises within their jurisdiction, even if earned by a
foreign person. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 871(a). This source-based jurisdiction is not
directly relevant to the residence- and citizenship-based jurisdiction that is the focus
of this Article.
4. Eritrea, North Korea, and Vietnam are the other countries that are
sometimes cited as attempting to assert citizenship-based taxing rights. See Kirsch,
Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 445 n.5 (citing sources). The
Philippines imposed citizenship-based taxation prior to 1997 on its citizens abroad,
as did Mexico prior to 1981. See id
5. See infra notes 396-98 and accompanying text. The United States and
other countries also exercise "source"-based jurisdiction to tax certain income that is
viewed as arising within that country, even if the taxpayer has no citizenship or
residence ties to the country. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 871(a), (b) (taxing nonresident alien
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As a practical matter, many nonresident citizens will not actually
owe any U.S. income tax on income arising abroad. The foreign earned
income exclusion permits qualifying individuals to exclude up to $97,600 of
foreign earned income, along with up to $13,664 (and possibly more in
certain high-cost foreign areas) attributable to housing expenses. In order to
claim these benefits, nonresident citizens must comply with various reporting
requirements. Nonresident citizens may further reduce their U.S. tax
liability with the foreign tax credit to the extent they paid foreign income
taxes on foreign source income that is otherwise subject to U.S. tax.
A citizen residing abroad is also subject to U.S. transfer tax liability
in the same manner as an individual (whether a citizen or not) residing in the
United States. Accordingly, all lifetime gifts, as well as the entire estate, are
subject to U.S. transfer tax, regardless of where in the world the assets are
located.9 Like a citizen residing in the United States, an overseas citizen
generally is exempt from tax on the first $5,250,000 (indexed for inflation)
of aggregate lifetime gifts and taxable estate.
In contrast, nonresident noncitizens are subject to the U.S. estate or
gift tax only with respect to assets situated in the United States. 0 Lifetime
transfers of intangible assets (including stock in a domestic corporation) by a
nonresident noncitizen are not subject to the gift tax (although stock in a
domestic corporation held by a nonresident noncitizen decedent is subject to
individuals on certain U.S.-source investment income and income connected to a
U.S. business).
6. See I.R.C. § 911(a) (providing exclusion); see also Rev. Proc. 2012-41 §
3.17, 2012-45 I.R.B. 539, 541 (providing foreign earned income exclusion amount
for 2013); Notice 2013-31, 2013-21 I.R.B. 1099 (providing housing cost amounts for
2013).
7. See generally I.R.S. Publication 54, Tax Guide for US. Citizens and
Resident Aliens Abroad (2013) (containing summaries of the special tax provisions
applicable to overseas citizens, including the various filing requirements). In general,
citizens abroad are subject to the same Form 1040 tax return filing requirements as
citizens residing in the United States. In order to elect the foreign earned income
exclusion and housing exclusion, a taxpayer must file a Form 2555 with his tax
return no later than the time specified in regulations. See Reg. § 1.911-7(a)(2). For
overseas citizens whose total foreign earned income does not exceed the excludible
amount, are not claiming the foreign housing exclusion, and who meet certain other
requirements, a simplified Form 2555-EZ is available. Once an election is made, it
generally remains in effect for subsequent taxable years unless it is revoked. See
Reg. § 1.911-7(a)(1).
8. See I.R.C. § 901.
9. In addition, the donee-beneficiary is not subject to income tax upon
receiving the gift or bequest. See I.R.C. § 102(a). But see I.R.C. § 2801 (imposing
tax on U.S. recipients of gifts or bequests from certain former citizens who are
"covered expatriates").
10. See I.R.C. §§ 2103 (estate tax), 2511(a) (gift tax).
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the estate tax)." A nonresident noncitizen's estate is allowed a $60,000
exemption for purposes of the estate tax imposed on U.S. situs assets. 12
Special rules apply in the case of a U.S. citizen who renounces or
otherwise loses her U.S. citizenship if, at the time of the renunciation, her net
worth or average income tax liability exceeds specified thresholds. 13 Such a
person is treated as having sold all of her assets (subject to some exceptions)
on the date of citizenship loss and must recognize this deemed gained to the
extent it exceeds $668,000.14 In addition, if the former citizen subsequently
makes a gift or bequest to a U.S. citizen or resident, that U.S. recipient is
liable for a 40 percent tax (assuming the gift or bequest is not otherwise
subject to U.S. estate or gift tax).15 This provision is intended to eliminate
any estate or gift tax advantages in a circumstance where the former citizen
retains a particular tie to the United States (i.e., a U.S. child or other
beneficiary who will receive her assets).
Legal scholars have long debated what role, if any, citizenship
should play in taxing citizens who live abroad.16 A broad range of
approaches have been offered regarding the taxation (or nontaxation) of
citizens who reside abroad. Some scholars have defended the general
approach of current law-subjecting citizens to broad U.S. taxing
jurisdiction even when they reside outside of the United States (so-called
11. Compare I.R.C. § 2501(a)(2) (exclusion of intangibles from gift tax),
with I.R.C. § 2104(a) (treating stock in a domestic corporation as a U.S.-situs asset if
held by a nonresident alien decedent).
12. See I.R.C. § 2102(b)(1) ($13,000 credit corresponds to $60,000
exemption under I.R.C. § 2001(c) rate schedule). This exclusion does not apply to a
nonresident alien's lifetime gifts.
13. In 2013, these thresholds were $155,000 average income tax liability for
the prior five years, or $2 million net worth. See I.R.C. § 877A(g)(1)(A); I.R.C. §
877(a)(2); Rev. Proc. 2012-41 § 3.16, 2012-45 I.R.B. 539, 541 (inflation adjustment
for average income tax liability). These rules also generally apply to long-term (i.e.,
eight of the prior 15 years) lawful permanent residents who lose resident status. See
I.R.C. §§ 877A(g)(2)(B), 877A(g)(2)(E), 877(e)(2). If the former citizen or long-
term lawful permanent resident lost such status prior to June 17, 2008, a different
regime applied. See I.R.C. § 877. That regime, rather than marking assets to market,
instead purported to continue taxing the former citizen (or long-term lawful
permanent resident) on an expanded scope of U.S.-source income for the ten-year
period following loss of U.S. status.
14. This reflects the 2013 inflation-adjusted threshold under I.R.C. §
877A(3). See Rev. Proc. 2012-41 § 3.17, 2012-45 I.R.B.
15. See I.R.C. § 2801.
16. For a summary of the issues surrounding the taxation of overseas
citizens in the context of the first modem income tax in the early 20th century, as
well as the legislative debate regarding the enactment of the foreign earned income




citizenship-based taxation).' 7 At the other extreme, some scholars have
argued that citizenship should not be relevant in asserting taxing jurisdiction
and that a U.S. citizen should be taxed on her worldwide income only if she
resides in the United States (so-called residence-based taxation). Under a
residence-based approach, a U.S. citizen living abroad would be treated no
differently than a nonresident alien (i.e., subject to U.S. tax only to the extent
of U.S.-source investment income or U.S.-connected business income).
Lobbying groups representing overseas citizens generally have supported
residence-based taxation. Proponents of residence-based taxation have
suggested that a mark-to-market exit tax (similar to the exit tax currently
imposed on individuals who lose citizenship) should apply when a citizen
ceases to be a tax resident, but thereafter the nonresident citizen should be
treated no differently than a nonresident alien.
Important developments in the past few years have raised the profile
of this issue. In particular, the landscape of international tax enforcement has
undergone sweeping changes in the past half-decade, with the United States
taking steps that promise to give the IRS unprecedented access to overseas
financial account information. Most notably, the United States' success in
targeting Swiss banks and bankers has led to a significant weakening of
traditional foreign bank secrecy regimes, and the upcoming implementation
of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA") may bring a broad
scope of foreign financial institutions within the U.S. information reporting
system. While these measures were primarily targeted at citizens living in the
United States but hiding income abroad, they have had a significant impact
on citizens living abroad. In the shadow of these expanded enforcement
tools, large numbers of citizens (both those living in the United States and
abroad) have attempted to clean up past compliance problems, including
failures to file information-reporting forms that carry potentially large
penalties, by participating in various voluntary disclosure programs
established by the IRS. Others (to a much smaller degree) have surrendered
their U.S. citizenship."
This Article examines the impact of these recent developments on
proposals to eliminate citizenship-based taxation and replace it with
residence-based taxation. Part II summarizes the range of proposals. Part III
17. The author advocated this approach in Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a
Global Economy, supra note 1. Another scholar who generally supports the taxation
of U.S. citizens living overseas does so not based on the individual's citizenship per
se, but based on the view that a person's citizenship can be viewed as an
administrable proxy for the person's domicile. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship
and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96
IOWA L. REv. 1289 (2011) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide
Taxation].
18. See infra notes 292-314 and accompanying text.
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summarizes the recent U.S. enforcement and compliance initiatives and their
impact on global information sharing norms.
Part IV discusses the impact of these administrative developments on
overseas citizens, concluding that they increase the practicability of
citizenship-based taxation. It also highlights a number of enforcement and
compliance issues that would exist under the residence-based taxation
proposals. Part V then raises a number of substantive concerns with the
residence-based taxation proposals-in particular, their potential influence
on citizens' choice of residence and their impact on the estate and gift tax.
While the Article concludes that the United States should retain its
citizenship-based taxation regime, it acknowledges that a number of practical
steps could be taken to ameliorate unnecessary compliance and other burdens
faced by overseas citizens. Part VI summarizes potential areas for
improvement in this regard.
II. THE SPECTRUM OF VIEWS
In an earlier article, I defended the United States' use of citizenship
as a jurisdictional basis to tax individuals in a modem, global economy.' 9 I
rejected arguments that recent economic, technological, and other
developments require the abandonment of citizenship-based taxation,
concluding instead that these modem developments might strengthen the
case for using citizenship as a basis for taxing individuals who live outside of
the country.
In response to that analysis, a number of scholars have published
articles challenging the continued use of citizenship as a jurisdictional basis
to tax.20 These other viewpoints range from general agreement that overseas
citizens should be taxed (but for reasons based on concepts of proxy
domicile, rather than citizenship per se), to complete rejection of citizenship-
based taxation. Among the latter group, there is some disagreement over the
19. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1.
20. Several other analyses of citizenship-based taxation predate the author's
earlier work. Compare, e.g., Philip F. Postlewaite & Gregory E. Stem, Innocents
Abroad? The 1978 Foreign Earned Income Act and the Case for Its Repeal, 65 VA.
L. REv. 1093 (1979) (arguing that special exclusions and deductions for citizens
residing overseas should be repealed), and Ren6e Judith Sobel, United States
Taxation of Its Citizens Abroad: Incentive or Equity, 38 VAND. L. REv. 101 (1985)
(questioning foreign earned income exclusion for citizens abroad), with Pamela B.
Gann, The Concept of an Independent Treaty Foreign Tax Credit, 38 TAX L. REv. 1,
58-69 (1982) (questioning the use of citizenship-based taxation), and Brainard L.
Patton, Jr., United States Individual Income Tax Policy as It Applies to Americans
Resident Overseas: Or, If I'm Paying Taxes Equal to 72 Percent of My Gross
Income, I Must be Living in Sweden, 1975 DUKE L.J. 691 (1975) (advocating the
elimination of U.S. tax on the income of overseas citizens).
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reasoning for rejecting citizenship-based taxation and also over the details of
the residence-based regime that would be implemented in place of
citizenship-based taxation. The following paragraphs briefly summarize this
range of views.
A. Tax Overseas Citizens Like Residents
1. The Importance of Citizenship
Perhaps the most frequently invoked reason for taxing citizens
abroad relates to the benefits of citizenship (i.e., those who enjoy the benefits
of citizenship should share in its burdens). 21 This benefits theory was offered
as a justification for citizenship-based taxation under both the Civil War-era
income tax and the 1894 income tax, as well as the Supreme Court's Cook v.
22.Tait decision, in which the Court upheld Congress's right to tax the foreign
income of citizens abroad. Among the more significant benefits of U.S.
citizenship is the ability to enter the United States at any time.23 While this
benefit may have different subjective value to different citizens, depending,
for example, on how frequently a citizen living abroad plans to visit the
United States and the likelihood that he might return permanently, the high
demand by noncitizens to enter the United States suggests that this benefit
undoubtedly has some significant objective value. Additional benefits of
citizenship include, inter alia, the right to vote and potential personal and
property protection.24
There are, however, limits to the use of a benefits rationale to justify
the income taxation of citizens abroad. As I previously observed,
In the context of an income tax, where the tax level does not
directly depend on the benefits received, there is no
necessary correlation between the benefits and the taxes
paid. Accordingly, while the existence of significant benefits
might provide a strong basis to claim that the overseas
citizen should pay some level of tax by reason of his
21. See generally Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note
1, at 470-79.
22. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) ("[T]he government, by its very
nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and therefore has the
power to make the benefit complete.").
23. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 476.
24. For a discussion of the practical and theoretical limits of these benefits,
see id. at 471-76 (concluding that these benefits retain value even in a modem
world).
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citizenship, it might not dictate the form or amount of that
tax.25
Of course, this same concern arises (perhaps to a lesser extent) in the purely
domestic context, where a benefits rationale is sometimes invoked to support
an income tax, even though not all citizens residing within the country enjoy
identical benefits from the federal government.26
The income tax is also sometimes justified based on ability-to-pay
principles.2 7 In the context of overseas citizens, this principle raises the
question of whose ability to pay. Given that U.S. tax policymakers generally
take a national perspective, the question is whether
citizens residing outside the United States fit within this
national perspective[.] Is their connection to "U.S. society ...
so substantial that fundamental fairness requires their net
incomes to be compared with the net incomes of . . . U.S.
residents for purposes of making an equitable allocation of
the tax burden under an ability-to-pay system[?]" 2 8
I previously noted that "[t]here are strong arguments for treating
citizens abroad as members of U.S. society for purposes of the distributional
equity analysis." 2 9 For example, a citizen living overseas who retains his
U.S. citizenship is, at least indirectly, expressing a voluntary identification
with the United States, and "[a]ccordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that
[this retention] reflects a self-identification with the population of the United
States (or the belief that the benefits of citizenship are worth the tax cost)."30
Moreover, recent technological developments further reinforce the ties
between citizens residing abroad and those in the United States. Whereas a
citizen living abroad in the early 20th century might have gone years without
having meaningful connections with U.S. society or contact with persons
living in the United States, the growth of the Internet has enabled citizens
abroad to stay up-to-date with national and local news in the United States,
and to communicate with family and friends in the United States via Skype
video calls, text messages, email, and other fons of instantaneous
communication, thereby strengthening potential ties to U.S. society.
25. Id. at 470-71 (footnotes omitted).
26. See id. at 478.
27. For a more thorough discussion of the ability-to-pay analysis in the
context of overseas citizens, see id. at 479-88.
28. Id. at 480 (second through fourth alterations in original) (quoting J.
Clifton Fleming et al., Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case





In addition, citizens living within the United States often view U.S.
citizens living overseas as part of the United States. Particularly in times of
crisis overseas, media in the United States often focus on the plight of U.S.
citizens, thereby strengthening the view that overseas citizens remain a part
of U.S. society.31 As noted previously, "[t]his tendency of citizens in the
United States to consider citizens abroad to be part of their society might, at
least in part, be due to the country's history as a nation of immigrants,"
rather than a country with a long history of citizens permanently
-32emigrating.
To the extent that citizenship reflects membership in U.S. society, a
citizen living abroad could be expected to help support that society apart
from any direct benefits she may or may not receive. After all, even a
domestically resident citizen may receive no immediate direct benefit from a
significant portion of federal outlays (e.g., education and social-welfare-
related expenditures), yet we expect her to support (through her taxes) those
expenditures determined by Congress to be beneficial to society as a whole.
To the extent citizenship makes someone a part of U.S. society even while
abroad, she could also be expected to provide support for these expenditures,
despite the lack of immediate direct benefit. This argument has added
strength in the case of (the many) overseas citizens who might return to the
United States at some point in the future, given that many federal
31. See id. at 483.
32. Id.
33. This observation also provides a response to those who suggest that
citizenship-based taxation is undermined by the fact that two nonresident citizens
living in different countries may pay "radically different" taxes to the United States.
See Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 17, at 1322. More
generally, a nonresident citizen's U.S. tax liability could be radically different from
the U.S. tax liability of a resident citizen. See infra note 57. Such differences are
likely to result from the foreign tax credit-to the extent a U.S. citizen resides in a
country that finances its expenditures through relatively high income taxes, the
United States will generally cede taxing rights to that country. Such a result,
however, does not necessarily undermine the argument that U.S. citizens abroad
should pay U.S. taxes at least in part to support U.S. society. Instead, in this context
the foreign tax credit, in addition to alleviating double taxation, could be viewed as
an acknowledgement by the United States that the citizen living abroad is a part of
two societies, with the United States ceding primary taxing rights to the country
where the individual has the more immediate current connection. But to the extent
that the foreign country finances its activities with a level of income tax that is lower
than that imposed by the United States, the residual amount of taxes should be paid
to help support the United States, where the individual also maintains a voluntary
societal connection.
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expenditures could be viewed as maintaining the general stability and upkeep
34
of the country even while the citizens are overseas.
The taxation of citizens abroad can also be supported based on
neutrality concerns-in particular, the effect of tax rules on where a citizen
chooses to live. As I previously observed:
A citizenship-based tax regime minimizes the role of
taxes in a citizen's residency decision. If a citizen is subject
to U.S. tax regardless of where he lives, his residency
decision will be governed primarily by ... nontax factors....
In contrast, a tax system that does not use citizenship as a
basis to tax might significantly impact a U.S. citizen's
choice of where to live.35
2. Alternative Justifications
At least one other legal scholar has agreed with the general position
that the United States should tax citizens living abroad, but for reasons that
differ from those I have previously defended. According to Professor Edward
Zelinsky, "The United States' worldwide taxation of its citizens is less
different from international, residence-based norms than is widely believed
and is sensible as a matter of tax policy." 36 However, rather than justifying
citizenship-based taxation on a benefits theory or other basis directly
connected to citizenship, Zelinsky justifies citizenship-based taxation by
bootstrapping it to domicile-based taxation:
An individual's citizenship is an administrable, if sometimes
overly broad, proxy for his domicile, his permanent home.
Both citizenship and domicile measure an individual's
permanent allegiance rather than his immediate physical
presence. Because citizenship and domicile resemble each
other, and because other nations often define residence for
34. While a citizen abroad-just like a domestic citizen-might disagree
with the efficacy of a particular federal program in ensuring the long-term health and
stability of the country, that is a separate question from whether one should pay taxes
to support decisions that have been made by governing officials. Cf infra notes 357-
68 and accompanying text (critiquing the suggestion that Tiebout sorting principles
support a shift to residence-based taxation).
35. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 490. See
generally id. at 488-95 (discussing details of the neutrality argument, both with
respect to an individual's decision of where to live and, if living abroad, whether to
retain U.S. citizenship). This issue is discussed in greater detail in Part V.A in the
context of residence-based taxation proposals.
36. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 17, at 1291.
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tax purposes as domicile, the U.S. system of citizenship-
based taxation typically reaches the same results as the
residence-based systems of these other nations, but reaches
these results more efficiently by avoiding factually complex
inquiries about domicile."
Despite his general rejection of a benefits-based rationale, Zelinsky
falls back on one of the principal benefits of citizenship-the right to return
to the United States-to support his domicile-based argument. In response to
concerns that a longtime foreign resident who plans to live abroad for the rest
of her life should not be viewed as domiciled in the United States (and thus
should not be taxed under a domicile-focused approach), Zelinsky suggests
that the citizen's right to return could be considered evidence that she
remains domiciled in the United States.3 8 Thus, while situating this right to
return within a domicile-based argument rather than a benefits-based
argument, he nonetheless places significant emphasis on this important
citizenship benefit as a justification for imposing tax.
B. Tax Overseas Citizens Like Other Nonresidents
Several legal scholars recently have argued that the United States
should abandon its longstanding tradition of taxing nonresident citizens.
There is some disagreement among this group over the reasoning for
rejecting citizenship-based taxation, with some scholars basing their
objections on practical problems associated with taxing overseas citizens and
others relying on theoretical concerns, and also some disagreement over the
details of the regime that would replace citizenship-based taxation. The
following discussion summarizes the principal arguments and proposals for
eliminating citizenship-based taxation.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 1345.
39. See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58
TAX NOTES INT'L 389, 394 (May 3, 2010) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, The Case Against
Taxing Citizens]; Cynthia Blum & Paula N. Singer, A Coherent Policy Proposal for
US. Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 705
(2008) [hereinafter Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation];
Bernard Schneider, The End of Taxation without End: A New Tax Regime for US.
Expatriates, 32 VA. TAX REv. 1, 17-39 (2012) [hereinafter Schneider, The End of
Taxation without End]. For earlier articles criticizing the use of citizenship as a basis
to tax, see supra note 20.
128 [Vol. 16:3
Revisiting the Taxation of Citizens Abroad
1. Practical Objections to Citizenship-Based Taxation
Cynthia Blum and Paula Singer argue that the United States should
abandon citizenship-based taxation on practical administrative grounds.40
They acknowledge:
In theory, citizenship-based taxation may have merit: it is
arguable that U.S. citizens living abroad generally do receive
significant benefits from their status as citizens, and fairness
suggests that they should be taxed differently from a
nonresident alien. Ideally, the U.S. tax system should not
operate to provide a tax incentive for a citizen (or an alien)
to reside abroad.4 1
They then emphasize, however, that "practicality also needs to be taken into
account."4 2 Blum and Singer highlight a number of practical difficulties
associated with the existing tax regime, such as the difficulty overseas
taxpayers face in filing accurate U.S. tax returns and the enforcement
problems faced by the IRS in this area,43 concluding that "[o]ur disagreement
with Professor Kirsch about the wisdom of citizenship-based taxation centers
on issues of compliance and administrability."44 Because of these concerns,
Blum and Singer suggest that the United States abandon its current regime
for taxing overseas citizens, and instead tax nonresident citizens in the same
general manner that nonresident aliens are taxed.4 5
Lobbying groups representing U.S. citizens abroad often raise
similar arguments against citizenship-based taxation. For example, American
Citizens Abroad ("ACA"), 46 in a submission to the House Ways & Means
40. See Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra note
39.
41. Id. at 716 (footnotes omitted).
42. Id. at 716-17.
43. See id. at 711-16.
44. Id. at 710-11 (footnotes omitted).
45. Nonresident aliens generally are taxed only on certain U.S.-source
investment income and income that is connected to the conduct of a U.S. trade or
business. See supra note 5.
46. American Citizens Abroad ("ACA"), based in Geneva, Switzerland,
with offices in Washington, D.C., is "a non-profit, non-partisan, volunteer
association whose mission is to defend the rights of Americans living overseas."
About ACA, Inc., AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, last accessed Mar. 22, 2014,
http://www.americansabroad.org/about/. The elimination of citizenship-based
taxation (and its replacement with residence-based taxation) is a principal goal of the




Committee International Reform Working Group, argues that overseas
citizens face "a legislative straightjacket caused by the toxic combination of
citizenship-based taxation . . . [and related] reporting requirements."4 7 The
organization argues that the tax revenue collected by the current regime is
"absolutely insignificant in the U.S. budget,',4 while at the same time the
regime imposes significant compliance costs on overseas citizens.4 9 More
importantly, the organization emphasizes that recent statutory and
administrative initiatives-particularly those associated with FATCA and the
Foreign Bank Account Report ("FBAR")-by conflating Americans abroad
with (frequently U.S.-based) tax evaders, have interfered with the ability of
overseas citizens to lead a normal life. In particular, the organization notes
that the complicated nature of overseas filing and the significant penalties
that can apply force overseas citizens to enlist expensive attorneys and
accountants, while the FATCA obligations imposed on foreign financial
institutions lead many such institutions to refuse to do business with overseas
citizens.s0
The tax compliance burdens faced by overseas citizens are echoed by
a more neutral observer-the National Taxpayer Advocate at the IRS. In her
2012 report to Congress, Nina Olson (the National Taxpayer Advocate)
noted that the "one-size-fits-all" approach to enforcement of the FBAR
reporting requirement, with its potentially draconian penalties, often ensnares
"benign actors" living overseas in addition to the "bad actors" (who might
live either in the United States or abroad).5 ' That report also identified a
47. AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION: A NECESSARY
AND URGENT TAX REFORM I (Mar. 2013), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/americancitizensabroadwgsubmission.pdf [hereinafter Am.
CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION]. This group also argues that
taxing U.S. citizens abroad harms United States economic competitiveness in the
world. I have addressed, and largely rejected, this argument elsewhere. See Kirsch,
Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 511-23.
48. AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note 47,
at 3.
49. See id. at 5.
50. See id. at 5-7 (citing these and other difficulties faced by overseas
citizens).
51. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
134, http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/offshore/ [hereinafter
NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS]. The "bad
actors" for whom FBAR was intended include those (whether located in the United
States or abroad) engaged in tax evasion, money laundering, and terrorism, while the
"benign actors" include
those who have dual citizenship but have never lived or filed tax
returns in the U.S., people who inherited an overseas account or
opened one to send money to friends or relatives abroad, refugees
or immigrants from totalitarian countries who felt compelled to
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number of compliance difficulties faced by overseas citizens, and noted that
"the IRS has been slow in taking specific steps to meet their needs and ease
their compliance burdens [and] saving enforcement resources to address
egregious noncompliance."52
2. Substantive Objections to Citizenship-Based Taxation
Other scholars have objected to the taxation of overseas citizens on
more substantive grounds. For example, Reuven Avi-Yonah, while noting
that "administrability is perhaps the strongest argument for not taxing
nonresident citizens," also asserts a number of other arguments for
eliminating the taxation of nonresident citizens.54 For example, he argues that
the historical reason for originally implementing citizenship-based
taxation-a symbolic gesture aimed at citizens living overseas and not
participating in military service during the Civil War-is no longer relevant,
given that the United States is not currently facing a national crisis and no
longer has a draft.55 He also rejects benefits-based arguments, asserting that a
citizen's right to enter the United States "seems a weak basis for such a
heavy price as worldwide taxation," and that the right to vote argument "is
upside down."56 Avi-Yonah also rejects ability-to-pay arguments. He notes
that through the foreign earned income exclusion and the foreign tax credit
we concede the primary right to tax overseas citizens to their country of
residence, resulting in little or no U.S. tax collected on U.S. citizens residing
conceal their assets from the governments they fled, and Holocaust
survivors and their children who are frightened that persecution
based on national origin could happen again.
Id.
52. Id. at 262-80.
53. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, supra note 39, at 394.
54. Avi-Yonah raises similar arguments more recently as the coauthor of a
report prepared for the International Committee of the State Bar of California's
Taxation Section. See REUVEN AvI-YONAH & PATRICK W. MARTIN, TAX
SIMPLIFICATION: THE NEED FOR CONSISTENT TAX TREATMENT OF ALL INDIVIDUALS
(CITIZENS, LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS AND NON-CITIZENS REGARDLESS OF
IMMIGRATION STATUS) RESIDING OVERSEAS, INCLUDING THE REPEAL OF U.S.
CITIZENSHIP BASED TAXATION (2013), http://www.procopio.com/userfiles/file/
assets/filesl/tax-simplification-2658.pdf [hereinafter AVI-YONAH & MARTIN, TAX
SIMPLIFICATION].
55. See Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, supra note 39, at
390.
56. According to Avi-Yonah, "It is legitimate to argue that nonresident
citizens must be given the right to vote because they are subject to U.S. tax . . . .




in relatively high-tax countries. As a result, "[w]e should not base a broad
rule such as ability-to-pay taxation of nonresident citizens on the relatively
few cases of citizens living overseas in countries that have no or low income
taxes.""
Avi-Yonah explicitly avoids basing his position on efficiency or
neutrality grounds, concluding that such arguments "cut both ways-
neutrality is violated when tax influences either the decision to move
overseas or the decision to abandon U.S. citizenship; and in the case of
individuals ... the decision to move is usually motivated primarily by nontax
considerations."59 Avi-Yonah briefly addresses Zelinsky's argument that
citizenship-based taxation can be justified as an administrable proxy for
domicile, rejecting it "because it is so clearly overbroad."60
More recently, Avi-Yonah suggested that citizenship-based taxation
should be eliminated because of the increased mobility of individuals in the
modem world and the resulting availability of Tiebout sorting.6' According
to Avi-Yonah:
We should go back to Charles Tiebout's famous conclusion
from 1956 that if people are mobile, countries should set tax
rates to reflect the taste of their residents, and those residents
that do not like the resulting choice (which is established by
democratic elections) should be free to move to other
countries whose choices they like better. . . . [L]et people
who do not like the result [of tax rates set by quadrennial
elections] move overseas, and stop taxing them there even if
they retain US citizenship, since they no longer obtain
significant services from the US government.6 2
Bernard Schneider raises a number of administrative and substantive
arguments against citizenship-based taxation that are similar to those raised
by the above-cited commentators. Several of Schneider's arguments are
57. See id. at 393. But see supra note 33 (responding to this concern).
58. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, supra note 39, at 393.
59. Id. at 390 n.5.
60. Id. at 393. Avi-Yonah notes that "[fjor nonresident citizens, citizenship
is a poor proxy for domicile because so many of them live permanently overseas and
do not have any of the other indicia of U.S. domicile other than citizenship... . If we
are looking for an administrable definition of residency, we already have one in the
physical presence test." Id
61. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, And Yet it Moves: A Tax Paradigm in the 21st
Century (U. Mich. L. & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12-008),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2055160 [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, And Yet it Moves].
62. Id. at 10-11. Avi-Yonah also recommends an exit tax on such migrants,
as discussed below in note 92 and the accompanying text. See id at 10.
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based on administrative concerns, particularly the "headaches" and
compliance costs experienced by U.S. citizens living abroad.63 A significant
portion of his analysis is based on the concerns of particular groups of U.S.
citizens living overseas who have little connection to the United States:
individuals who were born in the United States to noncitizen parents
temporarily present in the country on a short-term basis and who left the
country soon thereafter (so-called accidental citizens), and individuals who
were born abroad to a U.S.-citizen parent (or parents) and acquired
citizenship by descent, even though the individuals may have little or no
connection to the United States and may never have lived here, held a U.S.
passport, or otherwise derived any benefit from U.S. citizenship status (so-
called nominal citizens) and, in extreme cases, may not even be aware of
their status as a U.S. citizen (so-called unaware citizens).M
Schneider ultimately concludes that citizenship-based taxation
should be abandoned, rejecting ability-to-pay and benefits concerns. He
concludes that, as a general matter, overseas citizens should not be
considered part of the "community" for ability-to-pay purposes. He argues
that the strength of the ability-to-pay argument for a particular individual
depends on how closely the person is tied to the United States. Accordingly,
he concludes that
short-term expatriates clearly should be considered members
of U.S. society for purposes of this analysis, [but] the
argument will generally be much weaker with reference to
long-term expatriates, depending on their ties to the United
States. The argument for comparison falls apart completely
in connection with accidental, nominal, and unaware
citizens, whose connection to the United States is typically
minimal to nonexistent.
Schneider also rejects benefits-based arguments for taxing overseas
citizens. In this context he again focuses primarily on the plight of
accidental, nominal, and unaware citizens. After noting that "[t]he right to
move or visit the United States without restriction is probably the only
63. See Schneider, The End of Taxation of without End, supra note 39, at
17-39. Schneider cites a number of compliance problems faced by overseas citizens,
including the FBAR regime, the new FATCA regime and its impact on the
relationship between foreign financial institutions and U.S.-citizen clients, the
reporting requirements associated with the foreign earned income exclusion and
foreign tax credit, phantom gains from foreign exchange rate variations, and the lack
of coordination between U.S. and foreign retirement plans and social security
systems.
64. See id. at 7-8.
65. Id. at 45.
1332014]
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substantial benefit to long-term citizen expatriates and is the only one that is
relevant to most accidental, nominal, and unaware citizens," 6 he observes
that the value of this right to a particular individual depends on a number of
factors. Ultimately, he concludes:
Some long-term expatriates, accidental citizens, and citizens
by descent will value it little. Although it is fair to say that
U.S. citizenship is likely to have some value for most U.S.
expatriates, this value is impossible to quantify. An
unquantifiable, even inchoate right is a very weak peg on
which to hang the heavy hat of worldwide taxation... .67
3. Proposed Rules to Replace Citizenship-Based Taxation
These opponents of citizenship-based taxation argue that the United
States should, at least as a general matter, treat citizens in the same manner
as aliens, taxing them on their worldwide income only if they reside in the
United States. In order to implement such a standard, they propose new rules
that address two principle areas: (i) the definition of a citizen's residence for
tax purposes, and (ii) special tax consequences upon a citizen's loss of U.S.
tax residence.
a. Definition of Tax Residence
Several opponents of citizenship-based taxation would determine a
U.S. citizen's tax residence using the same "substantial presence" test
currently used to determine an alien's tax residence status.68 Accordingly, a
citizen generally would be considered a tax resident for the year if she is
physically present in the United States for 183 days under the three-year
weighted test of Code section 7701(b) (provided that she is actually present
for at least 31 days during the year in question).6 ' Avi-Yonah apparently
66. Id. at 50.
67. Id.
68. See I.R.C. § 7701(b).
69. More specifically, an alien (and, under the proposal, a citizen) is
considered a tax resident for the current tax year if (i) the individual is physically
present in the United States on at least 31 days in the calendar year, and (ii) is
physically present in the United States for at least 183 days under a formula that
counts 100 percent of the days of presence in the current year, 1/3 of such days in the
immediately preceding year, and 1/6 of such days in the second preceding year.
I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A). As a practical matter, this formula allows an alien to spend
an average of 122 days (four months) in the United States each year without being
treated as a tax resident (122 + 1/3 x 122 + 1/6 x 122 = 183).
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would extend the existing test to citizens with no modifications.70 Thus,
various special rules that currently apply to aliens (e.g., the exclusion of days
of presence for certain students or commuters from Mexico or Canada,7 ' as
well as a tax residence exception for individuals who spend fewer than 183
days in the United States in the current year and have a closer connection to a
foreign country in which they have a tax home 72) might also apply to
citizens.
In contrast, Blum and Singer merely suggest that "[t]he substantial
presence test can serve as the basic criterion for a workable definition of 'tax
residence' that would apply to citizens as well as aliens in a new tax
system,"73 further observing that some modifications to the substantial
presence test may be appropriate in the case of citizens (although admittedly
at the cost of additional complexity).74 Blum and Singer propose one explicit
modification to tax residence in the case of U.S. citizens: once a citizen met
the definition of U.S. tax resident for any tax year, she would be deemed to
have U.S. tax residence for the subsequent three tax years.75 Thus, even if a
citizen-resident moves abroad and cuts all physical ties with the United
States, she will remain a U.S. tax resident for the three years after she last
satisfied the 183-day weighted residence test. During that period, she would
continue to be taxed on worldwide income in the same manner as a U.S.
resident. Schneider explicitly rejects this sticky concept of residence, where a
citizen would continue to be taxed on worldwide income for several years
following departure.
70. See AvI-YONAH & MARTIN, TAX SIMPLIFICATION, supra note 54, at 8
("The test to determine whether U.S. citizens . . . residing overseas would be taxed
as a 'resident alien' would be the same definition as currently exists in
7701 (b)(1)(A)(ii).").
71. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(7)(B).
72. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B).
73. Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra note 39,
at 720.
74. Blum and Singer suggest that the "closer connection" exception might
be appropriate for citizens under their proposal, but then observe that "[i]t is not
clear, however, that the need for such an exception is great enough to justify the
additional efforts required on the part of the taxpayer and the IRS to administer it."
Id. at 722-23. Although they mention the exclusion of certain days of physical
presence under current law regarding aliens, see id. at 720, they do not explicitly
address whether these excluded days would apply to citizens under their proposal.
75. See id. at 724-25. Although Blum and Singer do not include a
comparative analysis, it should be noted that some other countries, while foregoing
citizenship-based taxation, apply "sticky" residence rules to their citizens, thereby
retaining taxing jurisdiction over their citizens for a number of years after they lose
residency status. See Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 17,
at 1323-41 (discussing several countries' rules).
76. See Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 66.
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Schneider is more equivocal regarding the definition of tax residence
that should apply to citizens, suggesting that Congress could either extend
the substantial presence test currently applicable to aliens, or implement a
more subjective "bona fide residence" test based on a number of subjective
factors." To the extent the substantial presence test is extended to citizens,
Schneider, too, would modify certain aspects of it in order to prevent
perceived abuses."
The ACA proposal for determining a U.S. citizen's residence relies
on a self-certification process. Under that proposal, once a U.S. citizen
establishes residence abroad, she must apply for a "departure certificate"
from the IRS.79 Thereafter, if she runs afoul of the 183-day weighted
substantial presence test, she will be considered to have reestablished U.S.
residence.80 The ACA proposal also suggests that if the IRS designates a
foreign country as a "tax haven," U.S. citizens residing there will be
considered U.S. tax residents.8' By its terms, however, the scope of this
purported anti-abuse provision would be severely limited, and the ACA
report admits that "[c]lassification of countries as tax havens should be the
,,82rare exception.
b. Exit Tax Upon Loss ofResidence
The opponents of citizenship-based taxation acknowledge that, if the
United States were to tax nonresident citizens in the same limited way that
nonresident aliens are taxed, resident citizens might be able to undertake
various strategies to limit or eliminate U.S. tax liability in ways that may be
considered inappropriate. For example, in the absence of citizenship-based
77. See id at 69-71.
78. According to Schneider, "[I]n order to prevent abuse, individuals who
departed the United States to take up residence in Canada or Mexico but then
commuted daily to their work in the United States from their new home . . . would
continue to be liable for tax on a worldwide basis." Id at 71.
79. AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note 47,
at 8. The ACA proposal does not explicitly define the circumstances under which a
U.S. citizen will be deemed to have established residence abroad.
80. See id.
81. See id at 9.
82. Id. After stating that the designation "should include only countries
where the tax laws have been designed to attract rich foreigners with fiscal
privileges," the proposal lists a number of factors that should not necessarily cause a
country to be treated as a tax haven, including low taxes and the absence of a U.S.
tax treaty. See id. Prior experience suggests that political and diplomatic
considerations might significantly constrain the likelihood that the IRS will
designate countries as "tax havens." This is particularly the case when a country with
a favorable tax regime for foreign citizens does not couple those low taxes with bank
secrecy, which itself has been viewed as one of the hallmarks of a tax haven.
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taxation, a resident U.S. citizen who intends to sell corporate stock at a
significant gain could establish non-U.S. residence, then sell the stock and
recognize the gain while outside of U.S. taxing jurisdiction. The United
States would not collect any tax on the gain, even though the gain accrued
entirely during the period when the citizen resided in the United States.84
To address this issue, Blum and Singer would impose a mark-to-
market exit tax when the citizen's tax residency ends.85 This exit tax would
be similar to the Code section 877A mark-to-market tax currently applicable
to citizens who lose their citizenship. The principal difference is that, in the
case of a U.S. citizen, "the event triggering the proposed tax would be
termination of an individual's residency status," rather than termination of an
individual's citizenship status."
Blum and Singer acknowledge that their proposed exit tax could
impose significant burdens on taxpayers and the IRS, given that (unlike
citizenship status, which is the triggering consideration under current law and
which typically can be lost only once) residency status might change
frequently, resulting in potentially repeated application of the exit tax to
certain citizens. They suggest that these compliance and administrative
83. In general, the United States does not tax nonresident aliens on gain
from the sale of corporate stock, even stock of a domestic corporation. See I.R.C. §
871(a)(1). If, however, the individual reestablishes U.S. tax residency within three
years, the special rule of I.R.C. § 7701(b)(10) might apply.
84. Because the Internal Revenue Code generally taxes an asset's gain only
upon a realization event (e.g., a sale), the gain would not have been taxed during the
years that it was accumulating. Cf I.R.C. § 1001 (gain is realized upon the sale or
other disposition of property).
85. See Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra note
39, at 731-32. In the context of Blum and Singer's proposal for a sticky definition of
residence, the exit tax would be triggered at the end of the three-year period after no
longer satisfying the 183-day weighted test.
86. Id. at 734 (citing I.R.C. § 877A, which imposes an exit tax on
individuals whose loss of citizenship occurred on or after June 17, 2008). While the
current law is sometimes referred to as an "exit tax," it is not triggered by a U.S.
citizen physically leaving the United States. Rather, it applies only if the U.S. citizen
surrenders or otherwise loses her citizenship (the law also applies to certain long-
term permanent residents who lose that status). Accordingly, the relevant "exit" is
the exit from citizenship status, rather than physical exit from U.S. territory. Under
current law, a U.S. citizen who lives abroad, even for an extended period, remains
within the regular United States tax system and is not subject to the special mark-to-
market regime. As noted above, the citizen residing abroad may be eligible for
certain U.S. tax benefits that are not available to U.S.-resident citizens, such as the
foreign earned income exclusion. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.





burdens might be mitigated by exempting a certain amount of gain from
taxation8 9 and focusing only on gain that accrues during the residency
period. 90
Schneider proposes a similar mark-to-market exit tax upon a
citizen's loss of U.S. resident status. However, unlike Blum and Singer's
proposed three-year residence status taint (and its resulting three-year
postponement of the exit tax following a citizen's actual departure from the
United States), Schneider's proposed exit tax would apply in any year in
which a citizen shifts from tax resident to nonresident status.9'
Avi-Yonah also advocates a mark-to-market regime for departing
citizens based on current Code section 877A. However, unlike Schneider or
Blum and Singer, Avi-Yonah would not trigger the mark to market whenever
a resident citizen loses tax residence status. Rather, his proposal would only
mark gains to market if the citizen, upon losing U.S. tax residence, had been
a U.S. tax resident for at least eight of the immediately preceding fifteen
years.92 In combination with the substantial presence (i.e., 183-day three-year
weighted formula) test for determining a citizen's tax residence, this might
provide citizens with planning opportunities for spending significant time in
the United States without being subject to the proposed mark-to-market
regime.
The ACA proposal also includes a mark-to-market exit tax if certain
thresholds of assets or average income tax liability are met.9 3 However, the
proposal contains a number of exceptions. For example, a U.S. person born
89. They refer to the $600,000 gain exclusion provided under current law
for individuals who lose citizenship status. See I.R.C. § 877A(a)(3). Presumably, this
$600,000 gain exclusion would be available for each period of residence. See Blum
& Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra note 39, at 735 ("[O]nly
taxpayers whose assets appreciated by $600,000 during their period of residence
would be subject to the tax." (emphasis added)).
90. In general, the individual's basis would equal the property's fair market
value at the time the person became a resident. See id. at 734-35. The proposal
would also incorporate other aspects of current Code section 877A, such as an
exclusion for certain types of U.S. property interests that already are subject to tax in
the hands of a nonresident, and the ability to defer payment of the mark-to-market
tax liability until the earlier of the taxpayer's death or sale of the assets, provided
adequate security is given. See id at 735.
91. See Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 66-
67.
92. See AvI-YONAH & MARTIN, TAX SIMPLIFICATION, supra note 54, at 9.
This eight-of-15-year rule is based on current Code section 877A, which triggers
mark-to-market in the case of a lawful permanent resident (i.e., "green card" holder)
who had such status for at least eight of the 15 years prior to losing such status. See
id
93. See AM. CITIzENs ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note
47, at 9-11.
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with dual nationality and who returns to the country of her other nationality
would be exempt from the exit tax.9 4 More importantly, the ACA proposal
contemplates that U.S. citizens who, at the time of the proposal's enactment,
had lived outside the United States for at least two years and who are
compliant with their U.S. tax filing obligations "are fully exempted" from the
exit tax.95
c. Estate and Gift Taxes
Proponents of residence-based taxation give less attention to the
estate tax consequences of their proposals. The ACA proposal generally
would treat nonresident citizens in the same manner as nonresident aliens for
transfer tax purposes.96 Accordingly, a nonresident citizen would be subject
to U.S. estate taxes at death only to the extent she held U.S. situs assets in
excess of the exclusion amount applicable to nonresident aliens. To the
extent the nonresident U.S. citizen held foreign assets, she would not be
subject to the U.S. estate tax at death. The proposal includes a self-described
"anti-abuse" provision that would treat a decedent who became a nonresident
within two years of death in the same manner as a resident citizen (i.e.,
taxable on worldwide assets, subject to the regular exemption amount).98
Otherwise, the proposal contemplates that a citizen would be treated as a
nonresident for estate tax purposes based on the existing facts-and-
circumstances test currently applicable to determining an alien's estate tax
residence status.99
94. See id. at 9. Also, certain U.S. citizens born in the United States to
foreign parents and who left while minors, and U.S. citizens "whose parents are both
American but who have lived essentially all their lives overseas" would be exempt.
Id.
95.Id. at 11.
96. The ACA proposal contemplates some differences between the estate
taxation of nonresident citizens and nonresident aliens, particularly with respect to
the definition of nonresidence. Current estate tax law, which the ACA proposal does
not purport to change, does not apply the income tax's 183-day weighted test for
determining residence. Instead, it relies on a facts and circumstances inquiry into the
alien's domicile to determine if she is a resident for estate tax purposes. See infra
note 392. The ACA proposal would not rely on this domicile test in determining the
estate tax residence of a U.S. citizen. Instead, it would treat a citizen as a nonresident
once she acquired a departure certificate. See AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-
BASED TAXATION, supra note 47, at 11.
97. Id. at 8, 11. The proposal recommends that the $60,000 exclusion
amount currently applicable to nonresident aliens be substantially increased. Id. at
11.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 30 n.25 (noting that the current domicile-based estate tax
residence test applicable to aliens "would have to be changed to include American
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While the report does not explicitly address the proposed gift tax
treatment of overseas citizens, it implies that the gift tax will apply to them in
the same manner as currently applied to nonresident aliens. 00 Accordingly, a
nonresident citizen, while still living, could make unlimited gifts (including
gifts to a resident citizen) of foreign situated assets free of U.S. gift taxes or
income taxes.o'0 In this context, as with nonresident noncitizens, gifts of
stock of U.S. corporations would not be taxed.102
III. THE NEw ERA IN GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT AND
INFORMATION SHARING
Having summarized the different proposals in the prior Part, this Part
summarizes recent enforcement and compliance initiatives and their impact
on global information sharing norms. It then analyzes the effect of these
administrative developments on the arguments for citizenship-based and
residence-based taxation regimes.
A traditional criticism of citizenship-based taxation is that the United
States faces significant obstacles in enforcing citizenship-based taxation. A
century ago, Professor Seligman observed that, as a practical matter, it might
be "virtually impossible" to collect tax on the foreign income of a
nonresident citizen. 0 3 As discussed above, more recent critics of citizenship-
based taxation also cite administrative concerns in arguing against
citizenship-based taxation. Indeed, Blum and Singer cite administrative
concerns (involving both the IRS's ability to enforce the law and taxpayers'
ability to comply) as the principal justification for abandoning citizenship-
based taxation. 104 I have even acknowledged that "concerns about
citizens who reside overseas"); see also supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text
(describing the current estate tax residence test).
100. See AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note
47, at 14, 25 (suggesting that the estate and gift tax provisions of the Code should be
amended to conform with the proposal). The report characterizes Code section 2801,
which currently imposes a special tax on gifts made to U.S. citizens by certain
former U.S. citizens, as a "punitive measure" that should be repealed. Id. at 30 n.35.
101. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing gift-tax
provisions for nonresident aliens). As a practical matter, this would be most
advantageous in the case of assets (including cash) that do not have significant built-
in gain, because, unlike property passing at death, gifted property would not receive
a fair-market-value basis step-up; but note that, in combination with the proposed
exit tax, there might not be much untaxed appreciation after becoming a nonresident.
102. See id.
103. EDwiN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 517 (2nd ed.
1914).
104. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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enforcement might provide the strongest argument against taxing the foreign
source income of citizens residing abroad." 05
However, in the past few years, significant changes have occurred in
the context of international tax enforcement that strengthen the potential for
enforcing U.S. tax laws against overseas U.S. citizens. While these changes
were largely instigated by U.S. enforcement initiatives and U.S. legislation,
they have impacted global enforcement norms across a broad range of
countries and within important multinational institutions. As a result,
enforcement opportunities-such as obtaining information on accounts held
by U.S. citizens in Swiss banks and other foreign financial institutions-that
seemed beyond the realistic reach of U.S. tax administrators at the time that
Seligman (100 years ago) and even Blum and Singer (a mere six years ago)
were writing, might now be possible. Opponents of citizenship-based
taxation, however, note that this enforcement expansion comes with a
potential cost to overseas taxpayers, both with respect to increased
complexity and cost of compliance, and through interference in their
relationship with local (foreign) financial institutions.
The following paragraphs consider the relationship between this
potential expansion of the IRS enforcement abilities and its potential cost to
overseas taxpayers, and the resulting implications for citizenship-based
taxation. The discussion also observes that, despite the administrative issues
raised by the current system of citizenship-based taxation, the residence-
based proposals of opponents of citizenship-based taxation raise a number of
administrative problems of their own.
A. Attack on Bank Secrecy
During the past five years, the United States has implemented
enforcement initiatives and enacted legislation that has significantly
impacted overseas tax enforcement. The enforcement initiatives include
leveraging the prosecution of Swiss bankers and banks to weaken bank
secrecy, increased focus on taxpayers' reporting of overseas accounts, and
several rounds of offshore voluntary disclosure programs ("OVDP"), while
the legislative action focuses on compelling foreign financial institutions to
report information on U.S. accountholders. These initiatives were not
directly targeted at citizens living abroad. Rather, they were intended to
increase compliance by all U.S. citizens (including, perhaps primarily, those
living in the United States) who hold assets, and generate income, abroad. 10 6
105. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 496.
106. See AM. CITIZENs ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note
47, at 1 (complaining that the FATCA legislation and IRS enforcement efforts reflect
an "unjustified bundling" of citizens abroad with rich domestically resident tax
evaders who have assets hidden abroad).
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Nonetheless, these efforts, both in and of themselves and through their
impact on global norms, increase the potential ability of the United States to
enforce U.S. tax laws against the subset of U.S. citizens living abroad who
are not compliant.
Among the most significant developments are those involving Swiss
banks and Switzerland's famed bank secrecy. In 2008, the United States
indicted Bradley Birkenfeld, a private banker at UBS, a major Swiss bank.'o7
Birkenfeld pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government based
on his actions in helping a wealthy U.S. citizen (living in the United States)
conceal millions of dollars of income in UBS accounts.' 08 More importantly,
Birkenfeld provided U.S. authorities with details surrounding UBS's efforts
to assist American clients evade taxes, and thereby "blew a hole in the wall
of secrecy surrounding the world of Swiss banking."l 09 As a result of this
disclosure and subsequent investigations by the Justice Department, in 2009
UBS entered a deferred prosecution agreement and admitted guilt on charges
of conspiring to defraud the United States." 0 As part of that agreement, and
following subsequent negotiations among the United States, UBS, and the
Swiss government, the IRS received "account information about thousands
of the most significant tax cheats among the U.S. taxpayers who maintain
secret Swiss bank accounts.""' Although Birkenfeld served more than two
years in prison for his actions, the IRS recently agreed to pay him a $104
million whistle-blower award for revealing the information about the UBS
activities," 2 which his lawyers noted will encourage other whistle-blowers
around the world.' 13 In a related development, the Department of Justice has
begun targeting offshore financial advisors who have helped U.S. taxpayers
hide money in foreign accounts. For example, Edgar Paltzer, a U.S.-trained
107. See Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Evasion,




I10. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, UBS Enters into Deferred
Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv09136.htm.
UBS agreed to pay $780 million in fines, penalties, interest, and restitution, and "to
expeditiously exit the business of providing banking services to United States clients
with undeclared accounts." Id.
111. Offshore Compliance Initiative, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, last accessed
May 10, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/tax/offshorecompliance intiative.htm; see
also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Discloses Terms of Agreement with
Swiss Government Regarding UBS (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/tax/
txdv09818.htm.
112. The award was authorized under Code section 7623(b).
113. David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/business/whistle-
blower-awarded- 104-million-by-irs.html.
142 [Vol. 16:3
Revisiting the Taxation of Citizens Abroad
lawyer working for a Swiss law firm, recently pled guilty to conspiring with
U.S. taxpayers to evade income taxes on assets held in foreign accounts." 4
According to a former government prosecutor, "Now it's clear that the U.S.
will make deals with advisers who come clean, not just with individual
taxpayers and banks.""' As a result, U.S. taxpayers holding secret foreign
accounts are under additional pressure, given the possibility that their
advisers might choose to protect themselves by giving client names to
prosecutors.116
The actions against UBS had a cascading effect on U.S. enforcement
efforts against other Swiss banks. For example, following news reports that
UBS was being investigated by U.S. authorities, Wegelin & Co.,
Switzerland's oldest bank, "opened and serviced dozens of new undeclared
accounts for U.S. taxpayers in an effort to capture clients lost by UBS."" 7 As
a result of these and other actions, Wegelin eventually pled guilty to
facilitating tax evasion by U.S. taxpayers and agreed to pay $74 million in
restitution, fines, and forfeitures."'8 Shortly thereafter, Wegelin shut down
operations after more than 270 years in business." 9 As a Wall Street Journal
article observed, "In the span of just one year, Wegelin & Co. went from
being one of the most prestigious banks in Switzerland to . . . becoming
essentially defunct. .. . That rapid demise is a lesson in how quickly the rules
114. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. N.Y., Swiss Lawyer
Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Conspiring with U.S. Taxpayers to
Evade Federal Income Taxes and File False Tax Returns (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Augustl3/EdgarPaltzerPleaPR.php.
115. Laura Saunders, Offshore-Adviser Plea Marks Shift in Tax Crackdown,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl0001424127
887323980604579029124124818620 (quoting Jeffrey Neiman).
116. See id. (quoting a criminal tax lawyer's observation that "[i]f I were
one of [Mr. Paltzer's] clients, I'd be having a heart attack").
117. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. N.Y., Swiss Bank
Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Conspiracy to Evade Taxes (Jan. 3,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Januaryl3/WegelinPleaPR.php
[hereinafter Press Release, Jan. 3, 2013]. Although Wegelin had no branches outside
of Switzerland, "it directly accessed the U.S. banking system through a
correspondent bank account that it held at UBS AG ("UBS") in Stamford,
Connecticut." Id. For additional details regarding the actions of Wegelin bankers to
capture business from U.S. citizens fleeing UBS, see Indictment, U.S. v. Wegelin &
Co., No. SI-12-Cr.02, http://www.justice.gov/tax/2012/Wegelin%20S1 %20
indictment.PDF.
118. See Press Release, Jan. 3, 2013, supra note 117.
119. See John Tagliabue, Swiss City Fears for Cultural Legacy in Wake of
Bank's Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/
world/europe/swiss-city-fears-for-cultural-legacy-in-wake-of-a-banks-fall.html. The
bank's valuable assets were placed with another Swiss bank, while its bad assets
remained with Wegelin under another name. See id.
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have changed in global banking, and an illustration of the U.S. Justice
Department's increasing reach." 20
Enforcement actions have not been limited to UBS and Wegelin.
According to the Department of Justice:
Since 2009, the department has charged more than 30
banking professionals and 68 U.S. accountholders with
violations arising from their offshore banking activities.
Fifty-four U.S. taxpayers and four bankers and financial
advisors have pled guilty, and five taxpayers have been
convicted at trial. One Swiss bank [UBS] entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement, and a second Swiss bank
[Wegelin] was indicted and pleaded guilty.' 2'
In addition, the department currently is actively investigating fourteen other
financial institutions regarding their Swiss-based activities.122 More
importantly, the Department of Justice and the Swiss Federal Department of
Finance recently released a joint statement stating that Switzerland will
encourage its banks to participate in a new Department of Justice program.
That program, aimed at incentivizing Swiss banks to cooperate in the
investigation of U.S. persons using foreign bank accounts to commit tax
evasion, promises nonprosecution agreements and penalty caps for those
Swiss banks that satisfy detailed information cooperation requirements
regarding accounts in which U.S. taxpayers have a direct or indirect
interest. 123
120. Reed Albergotti, Wegelin's Fall to Tax-Haven Poster Child, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 3, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732329370457833
4310421785672.html.
121. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States and Switzerland
Issue Joint Statement Regarding Tax Evasion Investigations (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/August/13-tax-975.html.
122. See id.
123. See id. Participating banks seeking nonprosecution agreements must
agree to pay a 20 percent penalty (based on the maximum aggregate dollar value of
all nondisclosed U.S. accounts held on August 1, 2008). See id. Because of concerns
that accounts opened after the UBS affair reflect a greater degree of bank culpability
(as reflected in the prosecution of Wegelin), accounts opened between August 2008
and February 2009 are subject to a 30 percent penalty, and accounts opened after
February 2009 are subject to a 50 percent penalty. See id. According to the
Department of Justice:
The program is intended to enable every Swiss bank that is not
already under criminal investigation to find a path to resolution. It
also creates significant risks for individuals and banks that
continue to fail to cooperate, including for those Swiss banks that
facilitated U.S. tax evasion but fail to cooperate now, for all U.S.
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Commentators have noted that the Department of Justice's success in
obtaining information and cooperation from Swiss banks, with the
involvement of the Swiss government, impacts not only tax-motivated Swiss
bank secrecy, but also tax-motivated bank secrecy in other countries where
U.S. taxpayers may try to hide income. For example, a prominent tax
attorney and contributor to Forbes observed:
Some said it would never happen. They were wrong.
The U.S. and Swiss reached a deal that punishes Swiss
banks and paves the way for even more transparency. ...
And it takes little imagination to know this will impact even
obscure and far-flung countries too. After all, just remember
the past and Switzerland's long tradition of bank
confidentiality.
The watershed deal to punish Swiss banks truly
closes the door on bank secrecy and a bygone era of tax
evasion.
[F]or Americans holding undisclosed funds in
Switzerland or anywhere else, with FATCA and now the
capitulation of what amounts to all of Switzerland, it seems
clear that disclosure-everywhere and of everything-is
inevitable.12 4
Another international tax attorney, writing in a tax practice journal, similarly
concluded:
Anyone familiar with the recent U.S. activity
surrounding foreign accounts knows that the [handwriting]
on the wall is very clear: Swiss bank secrecy, indeed bank
secrecy worldwide, is a thing of the past . . . . These
developments [including the globalization of the economy,
technological developments regarding information sharing,
and concerns over financial secrecy associated with
international terrorist financing] signal the beginning of the
taxpayers who think that they can continue to hide income and
assets in offshore banks, and for those advisors and others who
facilitated these crimes.
Id.
124. Robert W. Wood, Every American with Money Abroad-Anywhere





end of bank secrecy around the world. Of course, bank
secrecy laws will still exist, and depositors will still be able
to hide financial information from other individuals, such as
business partners, spouses and litigation adversaries.
However, the day has come when individuals can no longer
hide certain financial details from governments.12 5
B. Heightened Focus on Reporting Requirements
Concurrently with the Department of Justice's efforts against Swiss
banks, the IRS increased its enforcement efforts against U.S. citizens in the
international context. As with the Swiss bank situation, these efforts did not
focus exclusively (or even primarily) on overseas citizens. Rather, they
focused on overseas financial accounts held by U.S. persons, including U.S.
citizens (regardless of whether the citizen lived in the United States or
abroad). A principal focus of these efforts has been the FBAR.
The FBAR arose in 1970 under the Bank Secrecy Act.12 6 This
legislation requires certain U.S. persons to report their foreign bank and
financial accounts each year.127 The reporting is made on Treasury Form TD
F 90-22.1,128 and is required only if the aggregate balance in the foreign
accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year.12 9 The FBAR
is not an IRS form, and perhaps more importantly, it is not filed with a
person's income tax return and does not have the same due date as a tax
return." 0 However, Schedule B of IRS Form 1040 asks the taxpayer whether
125. Bryan C. Skarlatos, The IRS Continues to Attack Unreported Foreign
Bank Accounts by Criminally Indicting Three Swiss Bankers, 13 J. TAX PRAC. &
PROC. 17, 57 (Dec. 2011/Jan. 2012).
126. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a).
127. For an overview of the historic evolution of the FBAR, see Hale E.
Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, and Why it
Matters, 7 Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Sheppard, Evolution of the
FBAR].
128. Effective July 1, 2013, FBARs must now be filed electronically. See
IRS, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), IRS, last accessed
Feb. 3, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-
Employed/Report-of-Foreign-Bank-and-Financial-Accounts-%28FBAR%29.
129. See General Instructions, Dep't of Treas. Form TD F 90-22.1 (Rev. 1-
2012) [hereinafter FBAR Instructions].
130. An individual's income tax return generally is due by April 15
following the close of the calendar tax year. See I.R.C. § 6072(a). However, the tax
return of a U.S. citizen whose tax home and abode is outside the United States is not
due until June 15. See Reg. § 1.6081-5(a)(5). In contrast, the FBAR is due by June
30 immediately following the calendar year being reported. See FBAR Instructions,
supra note 129. Whereas a taxpayer generally can receive an automatic six-month
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she had a financial interest in, or signatory authority over, a foreign financial
account and, if so, instructs the taxpayer to file the FBAR form in accordance
with the FBAR instructions.13 '
Attention to the FBAR has increased significantly in recent years.
Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the
USA Patriot Act.13 2 In an effort to prevent, detect, and prosecute those
involved in money laundering and terrorist financing, the USA Patriot Act
instructed the Treasury department to "study methods for improving
compliance with the [FBAR] reporting requirements." 3 3 In order to allow
better enforcement of the FBAR requirement, in 2003 the Treasury
Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), which
previously had been responsible for FBAR examination and penalty
assessment, delegated these responsibilities to the IRS, with its more
extensive resources. 134
Because of concern about the low level of FBAR compliance, in
2004 Congress increased the penalties for willful failure to file, added a new
penalty for nonwillful failures, and shifted the burden of proof onto the
individual in certain situations.'3 5 The maximum civil penalty for a willful
violation of FBAR reporting is the greater of $100,000 or 50 percent of the
balance of the account at the time of the violation.136 Because the penalty
might apply for each year that the form is not filed, the total penalties could
exceed the balance in the foreign account.13 7 Even if the failure to file was
extension for filing an income tax return, no extension of time is allowed for filing
the FBAR. See Reg. § 1.6081-4(a); see also FBAR Instructions, supra note 129.
131. See I.R.S. Form 1040, Sched. B (Interest and Ordinary Dividends),
line 7a (2012).
132. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
133. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 361(b), 115 Stat. 272,
332.
134. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.56(g).
135. See generally Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR, supra note 127, at 17-
19 (describing changes made by the 2004 legislation).
136. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5). In addition, criminal penalties of up to
$500,000 and ten years in prison may apply. 31 U.S.C. § 5322; 31 C.F.R. §
1010.840.
137. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Carl R. Zwerner, Case No. 1:13-
cv-22082-CMA (So. Dist. Fla., Miami Div. June 11, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/CivilFBARLawsuit07122013.pdf (Treasury Department
assessed cumulative penalties of more than $3 million for four annual FBAR
reporting failures, although the highest balance in the account during the four-year
period was less than $1.7 million). This assessment of cumulative penalties appears
to be an exception to the more-typical IRS practice of seeking only a single 50
percent penalty. See I.R.M. 4.26.16.4.7(4) ("Given the magnitude of the maximum
penalties permitted for each violation, the assertion of multiple penalties and the
assertion of separate penalties for multiple violations with respect to a single FBAR
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not willful, the account holder may be subject to a $10,000 penalty per
violation.138 Because each account that is not reported is viewed as a separate
violation, more than $10,000 of penalties might accrue each year.139
C FATCA and Intergovernmental Agreements
FATCA,14 0 enacted as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment Act of 20 10,141 established another significant mechanism for
form, should be considered only in the most egregious cases."); see also Laura
Saunders, When Are Tax Penalties Excessive, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424127887324694904578598230978458720.h
tml [hereinafter Saunders, Penalties Excessive] (citing tax attorneys who have
handled numerous FBAR cases). The IRS National Taxpayer Advocate and others
have argued that these cumulative penalties may violate the "excessive fines"
prohibition in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See NAT'L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 51, at 147 ("The
National Taxpayer Advocate is concerned that such a disproportionate civil penalty
amount, particularly in the absence of clear limits on the situations in which it can be
applied, is excessive to the point of possibly violating the U.S. Constitution.... In
any event, it is certainly a scary prospect for taxpayers."); see also Marie Sapirie, Do
FBAR Fines Violate the Eighth Amendment?, 71 TAX NOTES INT'L 499 (Aug. 5,
2013) (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1988), which held that a
punitive forfeiture of 100 percent for failing to file a Customs currency report was
grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense); Saunders, Penalties Excessive,
supra (same).
138. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5).
139. According to the IRS, taxpayers who reported and paid all tax on their
income for prior years, but did not file FBARs, should go ahead and file delinquent
FBARs and the IRS will not impose the failure-to-file penalty, provided the taxpayer
has not yet been contacted regarding an income tax examination or request for
delinquent returns. See Options Available to Help Taxpayers with Offshore Interests,
IRS, last accessed Jan. 2, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Instructions-for-New-
Streamlined-Filing-Compliance-Procedures-for-Non-Resident-Non-Filer-US-Taxpay
ers; Q&A 17, 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Frequently Asked
Questions and Answers, IRS, last accessed Mar. 19, 2014, http://irs.gov/
Businesses/International-Businesses/20 11-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-
Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers. But see, e.g., Amy Feldman, The Perils
of Overseas Tax Disclosure: An Immigrant's Story, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/28/us-column-feldman-immigrants-idUSBR
E90RIOQ20130128 (describing penalty concerns of a resident alien who failed to
report income or file FBAR forms on foreign accounts inherited from his sister, even
though the foreign tax credit allegedly would have eliminated any U.S. residual tax
had the account income been reported).
140. FATCA is codified in Code sections 1471-74.
141. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147,
124 Stat. 71 (2010).
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overseas enforcement. As a general matter, the United States does not have
direct enforcement authority over foreign financial institutions. However, the
enforcement efforts against Swiss banks, discussed above, demonstrate that
the United States can exercise some indirect enforcement influence over
foreign banks that have connections to the U.S. financial system.142 The
FATCA legislation goes a step further, leveraging the fact that many foreign
financial institutions ("FFIs") hold at least some U.S. investments. As
summarized in the Treasury Decision publishing the final FATCA
regulations:
U.S. taxpayers' investments have become
increasingly global in scope. FFIs now provide a significant
proportion of the investment opportunities for, and act as
intermediaries with respect to the investments of, U.S.
taxpayers. Like U.S. financial institutions, FFIs are generally
in the best position to identify and report with respect to
their U.S. customers. Absent such reporting by FFIs, some
U.S. taxpayers may attempt to evade U.S. tax by hiding
money in offshore accounts. To prevent this abuse of the
U.S. voluntary tax compliance system and address the use of
offshore accounts to facilitate tax evasion, it is essential in
today's global investment climate that reporting be available
with respect to both the onshore and offshore accounts of
U.S. taxpayers. This information reporting strengthens the
integrity of the U.S. voluntary tax compliance system by
placing U.S. taxpayers that have access to international
investment opportunities on an equal footing with U.S.
taxpayers that do not have such access or otherwise choose
to invest within the United States.
To this end, [FATCA] extends the scope of the U.S.
information reporting regime to include FFIs that maintain
U.S. accounts. [FATCA] also imposes increased disclosure
obligations on certain [nonfinancial foreign entities
("NFFEs")] that present a high risk of U.S. tax avoidance. 43
Under FATCA, if an FFI fails to report certain information to the
IRS on accounts held by U.S. persons, or if certain NFFEs do not provide
information on their substantial U.S. owners to withholding agents, a 30
142. See, e.g., supra note 117 (noting that Wegelin had no branches outside
of Switzerland, but "it directly accessed the U.S. banking system through a
correspondent bank account that it held at UBS AG ("UBS") in Stamford,
Connecticut").
143. T.D. 9610, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874 (Jan. 28, 2013).
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percent withholding tax is imposed on U.S.-source payments made to that
FFI or NFFE, regardless of who is the ultimate beneficial owner of the
payments.144 The foreign entities are required to exercise due diligence in
determining which accounts are held by U.S. persons, including an inquiry
into whether an individual account holder was born in the United States or
otherwise has indicia of U.S. status.14 5 The final FATCA regulations provide
a phased-in implementation, beginning on January 1, 2014, and continuing
through 2017,146 although the IRS subsequently delayed the implementation
of FATCA withholding until July 1, 2014.147
In order to overcome concerns that some FFIs are prevented by their
countries' laws from reporting FATCA information directly to the IRS
(thereby exposing the FFIs to withholding on U.S. investment income), the
Treasury Department has signed intergovernmental agreements ("IGAs")
with a number of foreign countries, and is negotiating IGAs with a
significant number of additional countries.14 8 These IGAs are based on two
different models. Under Model 1 IGAs, the FFIs in the partner jurisdiction
report specified information about U.S. accounts to the partner jurisdiction's
tax authorities, which then exchange this information with the IRS on an
automatic basis.14 9 Thus, the partner jurisdiction acts as the intermediary
144. See id.
145. For example, an FFI generally must review its existing individual
accounts for U.S. indicia, including designation of the account holder as a U.S.
citizen or resident, a U.S. place of birth, a current U.S. residence or mailing address,
a current U.S. telephone number, standing instructions to make payments to an
account maintained in the United States, or a current power of attorney or signatory
authority granted to a person with a U.S. address. See Reg. § 1.1471-4(c)(5)(iv)(B).
This suggests that, once FATCA is implemented, the IRS may be in a stronger
position to identify citizens living overseas. If so, this would address one of the
administrative criticisms raised by Schneider regarding citizenship-based taxation-
the inability of the foreign countries to identify U.S. citizens and provide information
on them to the IRS under existing exchange-of-information provisions of treaties.
See Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 56.
146. See Notice 2013-43, 2013-31 I.R.B. 113, at 2.
147. See id at 6.
148. For a general discussion of the issues arising in the implementation of
FATCA, see Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L.
REv. 304, 334-39 (2012) [hereinafter Grinberg, Battle Over Taxing Offshore
Accounts]. See also infra note 244 (discussing legal and practical issues that might
arise from the implementation of FATCA).
149. See T.D. 9610, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874 (Jan. 28, 2013). The Model 1 IGA is
drafted in both a reciprocal form (in which the United States also promises to gather
and transmit FATCA-compliant information to the partner country) and a
nonreciprocal form (in which the United States does not make this reciprocal
promise). However, "[iut is hard to imagine any country signing [the nonreciprocal
version]"). Lee A. Sheppard, Will U.S. Hypocrisy on Information Sharing
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between its FFIs and the IRS. Under Model 2 IGAs, the partner jurisdiction
agrees to direct and enable all nonexempt FFIs in its jurisdiction to register
with the IRS and report specified information about U.S. accounts directly to
the IRS. 50 Government-to-government exchange of information can be used
under a Model 2 IGA to provide supplemental information in the case of
recalcitrant account holders. 5'
Given the broad extent to which FFIs hold at least some U.S.-source
investments, the FATCA regime holds the potential to significantly widen
the scope of the IRS's ability to collect information on foreign accounts,
whether held by U.S. citizens residing in the United States or those residing
abroad. Both versions of the Model IGA contemplate that financial
institutions, as part of their due diligence, will look for indicia of U.S.
citizenship in their account records.15 2 The potential real-life impact of
FATCA is evidenced by the significant number of foreign jurisdictions that
have either agreed to, or are negotiating, IGAs, rather than have their FFIs
exposed to the withholding tax.
Continue?, 69 TAX NOTES INT'L 320, 323 (Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Sheppard,
Hypocrisy on Information Sharing].
150. See T.D. 9610, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874 (Jan. 28, 2013).
15 1. Id.
152. Under the Model 1 IGA, for preexisting "lower value accounts"
(typically those greater than $50,000, but less than $1 million) the reporting FFI
must search its electronic records for identification of the account holder as a U.S.
citizen or for an unambiguous indication of the holder's U.S. place of birth. See U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, MODEL 1 IGA ANNEX I, DUE DILIGENCE OBLIGATIONS FOR
IDENTIFYING AND REPORTING ON U.S. REPORTABLE ACCOUNTS AND ON PAYMENTS
TO CERTAIN NONPARTICIPATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS § II.B.1 (rev. Jul. 12,
2013) [hereinafter MODEL 1 ANNEX]. However, an account is not reportable based
on the U.S. place of birth if the FFI obtains a self-certification from the account
holder that she is not a U.S. citizen or tax resident, the account holder's non-U.S.
passport showing citizenship or nationality in a country other than the United States,
and a copy of the account holder's Certificate of Loss of Nationality (or a reasonable
explanation of why she does not have such a certificate). See id. § II.B.4. For
preexisting "high-value accounts," the FFI may need to perform not only an
electronic search for this information, but also a manual search of paper records. See
id. § II.D. For new accounts, the reporting FFI must obtain a self-certification from
the account holder that allows the FFI to determine whether the account holder is a
"resident in the United States for tax purposes," which is defined to include a U.S.
citizen even if she is also a tax resident of another jurisdiction. See id § III.B. The
FFI must confirm the reasonableness of the self-certification under standards set
forth in the Model 1 Annex. See id. The Model 2 IGA contains similar due diligence
requirements regarding the identification of U.S.-citizen account holders. See U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, MODEL 2 IGA ANNEX I, DUE DILIGENCE OBLIGATIONS FOR
IDENTIFYING AND REPORTING ON U.S. REPORTABLE ACCOUNTS AND ON PAYMENTS
TO CERTAIN NONPARTICIPATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (rev. Jul. 12, 2013)
[hereinafter MODEL 2 ANNEX].
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In addition to the reporting requirements imposed on FFIs, FATCA
imposes additional reporting requirements on U.S. residents and citizens,
including citizens residing abroad, who hold specified foreign financial
accounts."' This reporting is done on IRS Form 8938.154 In general, a U.S.
resident or citizen must file Form 8938 if the total value of her foreign bank
and investment accounts is $50,000 on the last day of the tax year or more
than $75,000 at any time during the tax year."5 However, if the individual
resides outside the United States, the filing thresholds are significantly
higher-a U.S. individual residing abroad needs to file the form only if her
foreign accounts exceed $200,000 on the last day of the tax year or more
than $300,000 at any time during the tax year (these thresholds are $400,000
and $600,000, respectively, for qualified married couples residing abroad
and filing ajoint return).156
Although there may be significant overlap between the accounts
reported on Form 8938 and the FBAR report, individuals must file both
forms if applicable.' Unlike the FBAR report, which is filed with FinCEN
no later than June 30, the Form 8938 is filed with the IRS at the time the
individual's income tax return is filed.'58 A taxpayer who fails to file the
Form 8938 may be subject to a $10,000 penalty.' 59 In addition, she may be
subject to an additional $10,000 penalty if she does not file a correct and
complete form within 90 days after being notified by the IRS of her failure to
file (and an additional $10,000 for each 30-day period, or part of a period,
153. See I.R.C. § 6038D.
154. See I.R.S. Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets
(rev. Nov. 2012).
155. See I.R.S., Instructions for Form 8938, at 2 (rev. Nov. 2012)
[hereinafter I.R.S., Form 8938 Instructions]. The thresholds for married taxpayers
filing jointly are double these amounts (i.e., $100,000 on the last day, or $150,000 at
any time during the year). See id. In contrast, the FBAR form's $10,000 threshold
applies regardless of whether the U.S. citizen resides in the United States or abroad.
156. See Reg. § 1.6038D-2T(a)(3), (4).
157. The IRS website warns taxpayers that "[tihe new Form 8938 filing
requirement does not replace or otherwise affect a taxpayer's obligation to file [the
FBAR form]. Individuals must file each form for which they meet the relevant
reporting threshold." Comparison of Form 8938 and FBAR Requirements, IRS, last
accessed Feb. 10, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Comparison-of-Form-8938-
and-FBAR-Requirements. The website contains a detailed comparison chart
explaining the differences and similarities between the two forms' filing
requirements. See id.
158. See I.R.S., Form 8938 Instructions, supra note 155, at 1.
159. See I.R.C. § 6038D(d)(1).
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during which the failure to file continues after the initial 90-day period.1
6 o
The maximum penalty for continuing failure to file is $50,000.161
D. Overseas Voluntary Disclosure Program
These enforcement developments generated significant attention not
only among tax practitioners, but also in the mass media. The combination of
significant penalties for failure to properly report, and the heightened
possibility of detection as a result of the new enforcement developments,
generated significant concern among noncompliant taxpayers. Even those
U.S. citizens whose interest in a foreign bank account was benign had reason
for concern. For example, a U.S. citizen might have inherited the account
from a foreign relative or established the account as a routine banking matter
while living overseas. Although she did not report the account's income on
her U.S. tax return, that income might not have been subject to U.S. tax even
if reported, to the extent the income was taxed in the foreign country and was
eligible for a foreign tax credit. Nonetheless, by failing to disclose the
account on an FBAR form, the taxpayer could be subject to significant
penalties.
Given the heightened interest among taxpayers and their advisors to
"come clean" in anticipation of the IRS's enhanced enforcement tools, and
the IRS's incentives to encourage previously noncompliant taxpayers to enter
the system, 162 the IRS has implemented several iterations of an Overseas
Voluntary Disclosure Program ("OVDP"): in 2009, 2011, and in 2012
(which is still ongoing).163 Perhaps not surprisingly, given the publicity
160. See I.R.C. § 6038D(d)(2).
161. See id. This $50,000 penalty for continuing failure to file is in addition
to the initial $10,000 penalty for failure to file. See id. (noting that the $50,000 cap
applies to "this paragraph" (i.e., the "continuing failure to file" paragraph)).
162. A voluntary disclosure program helps the IRS, given that the IRS
"doesn't have the resources, the time, or the ability to locate all noncompliant U.S.
taxpayers. Thus, a voluntary disclosure policy that encourages those persons to
confess-and that fairly addresses individual circumstances-is absolutely essential
if the Service is to meet its mission . . . ." Thomas Zehnle, Rethinking the Approach
to Voluntary Disclosures, 134 TAx NOTES 575 (Jan. 30, 2012).
163. The 2009 program allowed disclosures between March 23 and October
15, 2009. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE
2009 OFFSHORE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE INITIATIVE INCREASED TAXPAYER
COMPLIANCE, BUT SOME IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED 2 (REF. No. 2011-30-118 )
(2011) [hereinafter TIGTA 2009 REPORT]. The 2011 program allowed disclosures
between February 8 and September 9, 2011. See 2011 Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Initiative, IRS, last accessed Nov. 4, 2013, http://www.irs.gov/uac/2011-
Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative. The 2012 program, which began on
January 9, 2012, is still in effect as of September 2013. See 2012 Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Program, IRS, last accessed Jan. 24, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/uac/2012-
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surrounding the UBS enforcement action, almost half of the disclosures in
the 2009 OVDP involved accounts in Switzerland. 164 The IRS has publicized
the success of these programs, noting that between 2009 and 2012:
[The OVDPs] resulted in the collection of more than $5.5
billion in back taxes, interest, and penalties from
approximately 38,000 applicants. In addition, the programs
provided the IRS with a wealth of information on various
banks and advisors assisting people with offshore tax
evasion, which the IRS is using to continue its international
enforcement efforts. 6 5
Each of the OVDPs has utilized a stick-and-carrot approach to
encourage taxpayers to come forward before the government discovers their
wrongdoing.16 6 The "stick" involves the threat of criminal prosecution and
maximum statutory penalties, including fraud penalties and the information
return-related penalties described above, in the context of weakening foreign
bank secrecy regimes and increased IRS access to foreign account
Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program (noting that the IRS may end this open-
ended disclosure program at any time). The IRS had tried an earlier offshore
voluntary disclosure initiative in 2003, related to an offshore credit card enforcement
project, but the initiative had only limited impact. See Leandra Lederman, The Use
of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57
VILL. L. REV. 499, 504-08 (2012) [hereinafter Lederman, Voluntary Disclosures].
164. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFSHORE TAX EVASION[:] IRS
HAS COLLECTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, BUT MAY BE MISSING CONTINUED EVASION
14 (GAO-13-318, 2013) [hereinafter Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFSHORE
TAX EVASION].
165. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
supra note 51, at 144; see also Press Release, IRS, IRS Says Offshore Effort Tops $5
Billion, Announces New Details on the Voluntary Disclosure Program and Closing
of Offshore Loophole, IR-2012-64 (June 26, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-
Says-Offshore-Effort-Tops-$5-Billion,-Announces-New-Details-on-the-Voluntary-
Disclosure-Program-and-Closing-of-Offshore-Loophole. For the first 10,000 cases
closed under the 2009 OVDP, the median foreign account balance was
approximately $570,000, with a median FBAR-related penalty of $108,000. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFSHORE TAX EVASION, supra note 164, at 13 tbl. 2. The
90th-percentile account balance was $4 million, while the 90th-percentile FBAR-
related penalty was $793,000. Id.
166. A disclosure is not considered "voluntary," and thus not eligible for
the OVDP, if the IRS has already initiated a civil examination of the taxpayer,
regardless of whether or not the examination relates to undisclosed foreign accounts.
See Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, IRS, last accessed Mar. 19, 2014,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Voluntary-Disclosure:-Questions-and-Answers.
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information.167 The "carrot" involves the elimination of criminal exposurel68
and caps on civil penalties, although this latter aspect of the carrot has
become less tasty with each OVDP iteration. The 2009 program contained
the most taxpayer-favorable terms: in general, a taxpayer who voluntarily
disclosed offshore accounts and fully cooperated was (i) assessed all taxes
and interest going back six years, (ii) assessed either an accuracy or
delinquency penalty on underpaid tax for all those years, and (iii) in lieu of
FBAR and other penalties, assessed a penalty equal to 20 percent of the
highest aggregate amount in the foreign accounts.169
Following the success of the 2009 program, the IRS implemented the
2011 OVDP. However, its terms were not as taxpayer-favorable. Rather than
a six-year lookback, taxpayers disclosing under the 2011 program were
required to pay back taxes, interest, and an accuracy or delinquency penalty
for the past eight years. 170 Moreover, the penalty in lieu of FBAR and related
penalties was raised to 25 percent (rather than 20 percent) of the highest
aggregate amount in the accounts during the eight-year period (this penalty
was capped at 12.5 percent if the offshore accounts did not exceed $75,000
in any relevant year).
167. See TIGTA 2009 REPORT, supra note 163, at 2; see also Q&A 5-6,
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,
IRS, last accessed Aug. 26, 2013, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-
Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and
-Answers [hereinafter IRS, OVDP Q&A] (containing an extensive list of potential
criminal and civil penalties that might apply if a taxpayer does not disclose foreign
accounts); Lederman, Voluntary Disclosures, supra note 163, at 502 (concluding
that the offshore voluntary disclosure programs have "encouraged quite a number of
taxpayers to make voluntary disclosures, but . . . the IRS's repeated use of offshore
voluntary disclosure initiatives may have diminishing returns unless the government
continues to engage in well-publicized criminal prosecutions of tax evaders").
168. See TIGTA 2009 REPORT, supra note 163, at 1 & n.1 (noting that the
OVDP is an extension of the IRS's longstanding Voluntary Disclosure Practice,
which generally allows taxpayers to eliminate the risk of criminal prosecution by
voluntarily disclosing in a truthful and complete manner before certain events occur
that might otherwise allow the IRS to discover the potential wrongdoing); see also
2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers, IRS, last accessed Mar. 19, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
Intemational-Businesses/20 11-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-Frequently-
Asked-Questions-and-Answers (stating that the Department of Justice takes
voluntary disclosure into account in deciding whether to criminally prosecute a
taxpayer, and that the IRS will not recommend criminal prosecution to the
Department of Justice when a taxpayer truthfully, timely, and completely complies
with the voluntary disclosure practice).
169. See TIGTA 2009 REPORT, supra note 163, at 2.




The 2012 program, which is still in effect,172 ratchets the potential
penalties higher than the earlier programs. In particular, the FBAR-related
penalty is raised to 27.5 percent (rather than 25 percent) of the highest
aggregate amount in the accounts during the eight-year period.'73 As with the
2011 program, the penalty is capped at 12.5 percent if the offshore accounts
did not exceed $75,000 in any relevant year. 17 4 Taxpayers can opt out of the
OVDP and have their cases handled under normal examination procedures,
but the IRS Taxpayer Advocate has warned taxpayers about the potential
risks of this approach.' 75
Three categories of taxpayers are eligible for a five percent (rather
than 27.5 percent) offshore reporting penalty under the OVDP. The first
category includes taxpayers who inherited or otherwise acquired the foreign
account from another person and who had only specified limited contact with
the account. The second category includes foreign-resident citizens who
were "unaware" citizens (e.g., those who were born in the U.S. to foreign-
citizen parents but who were raised in a foreign country and had been
unaware of their U.S. citizenship status). 177 The third category includes
foreign-resident citizens who timely complied with the tax requirements in
their country of residence and who had no more than $10,000 of U.S.-source
income in each year. 78
The increased enforcement environment may have also encouraged
significant numbers of U.S. citizens with foreign accounts to reenter the tax
172. See supra note 163.
173. See IRS, OVDP Q&A, supra note 167, Q&A 8.
174. See id. Q&A 53.
175. See Kristen A. Parillo, Taxpayer Advocate Urges U.S. Taxpayers to
Use Caution on Offshore Voluntary Disclosure, 2013 TAx NoTEs TODAY 186-1
(Sept. 25, 2013). Taxpayers might consider opting out if they had minimal
underpayment of tax and believe their failure to file the FBARs was not "willful."
See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, Taxpayers Face Hurdles and Risks When Opting Out of
OVDP, 2013 TAx NOTES TODAY 12-4 (Jan. 17, 2013) (discussing potential benefits
and risks of opting out). A recent unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion may give
taxpayers pause regarding the "willfulness" standard. See United States v. Williams,
489 F. App'x 655 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court clearly erred in
finding that a taxpayer did not willfully fail to file the FBAR form, given that the
taxpayer had checked "no" on the Schedule B, Form 1040, question asking whether
he had any interest in a foreign financial account).
176. See IRS, OVDP Q&A, supra note 167, Q&A 52.
177. See id Schneider refers to this category of citizens as "accidental"
citizens. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The IRS site does not explicitly
address those "unknowing" or "unaware" citizens who were born and raised abroad
and obtained citizenship through descent from a citizen-parent. However, the site
makes clear that a person who knew she was a citizen but did not inquire as to U.S.
tax obligations is not eligible for this lower penalty rate.
178. See IRS, OVDP Q&A, supra note 167, Q&A 52.
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system through another route-a "quiet disclosure."" 9 Under this approach,
the taxpayer merely files late FBARs and an amended tax return reporting
offshore income from prior years, and generally pays the tax deficiency
along with interest and either an accuracy-related or delinquency penalty, but
this approach attempts to avoid FBAR-related penalties that would have been
owed in the OVDP.180 A more extreme approach would be to ignore prior
years and merely begin filing FBARs and reporting income in the current
year from foreign accounts that had been in existence for many years, in the
hope that the prior years' omissions would not be detected by the IRS.1 8'
Taxpayers attempting either of these approaches, rather than the OVDP, take
the risk of maximum FBAR penalties and, depending on the circumstances,
criminal prosecution.182
The Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), in a recent report
on the general success of the OVDPs, noted that there may have been a very
significant number of quiet disclosures during the years of the OVDPs and
that such disclosures undermine the incentive to participate in the OVDPs.183
The GAO report recommended that the IRS increase its efforts to detect
quiet disclosures and suggested new methodologies that the IRS might use to
do so.1 84 The IRS announced that it is taking steps to implement the GAO's
recommendations. 8
E. Impact on Global Information Sharing and Cooperation Norms
The foregoing summary indicates the significant changes that have
taken place-and continue to take place-in U.S. overseas tax enforcement
during the past five years. As important as these developments may be from
the perspective of U.S. tax administrators, they are just as important in the
impact they have had on global information sharing and tax enforcement
norms. Perhaps in combination with the global economic downturn and the
resulting efforts of national governments to find additional sources of
revenue, the softening of Swiss bank secrecy, upcoming implementation of
FATCA IGAs, and other aspects, the U.S. enforcement efforts have
179. See Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFSHORE TAX EVASION, supra
note 164, at 11.
180. Id.
18 1. See id.
182. See id.; see also IRS, OVDP Q&A, supra note 167, Q&A 15.
183. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFSHORE TAX EVASION, supra
note 164, at 23. The GAO, using a more comprehensive methodology than the IRS
had been using, identified more than 10,000 potential quiet disclosures for the period
examined. See id. at 24-26.




significantly strengthened the willingness of other countries to expand
information sharing to combat cross-border tax evasion.186
For example, Angel Gurria, the Secretary-General of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"),
recently observed that "[t]he political support for automatic exchange of
information on investment income has never been greater,"' attributing this
in part to the U.S. efforts to cooperate with other countries in implementing
FATCA. In 2013, the OECD released a report describing its efforts to
improve information exchange, highlighting its efforts to establish a global
standard on automatic information exchange,' 8 and in early 2014 it
published new standards for automatic information exchange.189 In addition,
the leaders of the Group of Twenty ("G20") recently issued a declaration
strongly supporting increased information sharing, concluding that "[w]e
look forward to the practical and full implementation of the new standard on
a global scale." 90
186. See generally Grinberg, Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, supra
note 148 (describing how recent developments in the United States and elsewhere
reflect an emerging international consensus to have financial institutions act as cross-
border tax intermediaries using an automatic information reporting model, rather
than an anonymous withholding model).
187. Kristen A. Parillo & Stephanie Soong Johnston, G-20 Seeks Global
Action on Automatic Information Exchange, 70 TAX NOTES INT'L 386, 386 (Apr. 29,
2013).
188. See OECD, OECD SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORT TO THE G20
FINANCE MINISTERS, 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 77-33 (Apr. 19, 2013).
189. See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNT INFORMATION[:] COMMON REPORTING STANDARD (2014), http://www.
oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Automatic-Exchange-Financial-Account-
Information-Common-Reporting-Standard.pdf. The introduction of this document
highlights the role that FATCA and the IGAs played in spurring OECD countries to
support these new standards. See id. at 5.
190. G20 Leaders' Declaration, 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 174-39 (Sept. 6,
2013). Shortly before the G20 meeting, the United States and five other countries
issued a joint statement expressing support for the OECD's efforts on automatic
information exchange and encouraging the G20's engagement in this issue. See Press
Release, U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by
Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of Finland, Republic of Iceland, Kingdom of
Norway, Kingdom of Sweden, and the United States of America (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/04/joint-statement-kingdom-
denmark-republic-finland-republic-iceland-kingdo; see also Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, Joint Communique by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United
Kingdom and the United States on the Occasion of the Publication of the "Model
Intergovernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and Implement FA TCA,"
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/j oint%20communiq
ue.pdf (describing the new IGA model as "an important step forward in establishing
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Similarly, leaders of the G-8 nations recently expressed their support
for the OECD information exchange efforts, stating, "We commit to
establish the automatic exchange of information between tax authorities as
the new global standard, and will work with the [OECD] to develop rapidly a
multilateral model which will make it easier for governments to find and
punish tax evaders."' 91 An OECD report prepared for the recent G-8 summit
notes that the U.S. Department of Treasury's Model 1 IGA is "a logical basis
on which to build" a global standard of automatic information exchange. 192
Furthermore, a proposal was recently introduced for an EU Council Directive
to implement a FATCA-like initiative among the EU Member States. 193
Perhaps even more important than the buy-in by the larger global
economies, recent U.S.-led developments have affected traditional tax
havens and secrecy jurisdictions beyond Switzerland. A number of other
traditional offshore financial centers have signed, or are currently
negotiating, IGAs with the United States to implement FATCA. For
example, the Cayman Islands, recently ranked as the second-most-secretive
jurisdiction in the world (behind Switzerland), announced that it has
concluded negotiations and will sign a Model 1-based IGA with the United
States.194 Commenters suggested that the Model 1 IGA, which centralizes
financial institutions' reporting through their government, was chosen by the
Cayman Islands in anticipation that other countries might have some version
of FATCA in the future, which would make future compliance easier.' 9
Among other offshore financial centers, the United States has initialed an
agreement with Bermuda,19 6 is in final negotiations with Guernsey, the Isle
a common approach to combat tax evasion based on automatic exchange of
information").
191. G-8, 2013 Lough Erne Communiqud, 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 118-21
(June 18, 2013).
192. See OECD, A STEP CHANGE IN TAX TRANSPARENCY[:] OECD REPORT
FOR THE G8 SUMMIT, LOUGH ERNE, ENNISKILLEN, JUNE 2013, at 10,
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/taxtransparencyG8report.pdf.
193. See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive
Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of
Information in the Field of Taxation, 2013/0188 (CNS),
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/resources/documents/taxation/taxcooperation/
mutual assistance/direct tax directive/com_2013_348 en.pdf.
194. See Andrew Velarde, US., Caymans to Sign Milestone FATCA
Agreement, 71 TAX NOTES INT'L 679 (Aug. 19, 2013).
195. See id. (quoting tax attorney Jonathan Jackel).
196. See Laura Saunders, Offshore Accounts: No Place to Hide?, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 20, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/artivles/SB10001424127887732480
7704579085511331606786 [hereinafter Saunders, No Place to Hide].
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of Man, and Jersey,1 97 and has begun negotiations with the British Virgin
Islands.' 98
A number of prominent tax attorneys, including former government
officials, have observed that this response by traditional secrecy jurisdictions
reflects an awareness that global norms have changed. For example, one
attorney concluded that
2013 may very well be the watershed year resulting in the
final pathway to global tax compliance and the elimination
of offshore tax abuse facilitated by bank secrecy. At the
bilateral and multinational levels and the statutory,
legislative, and administrative levels, the many global tax
initiatives are seemingly converging on the same
landscape.' 99
Similarly, another practitioner observed that "[t]he Caymans have
traditionally been thought of as a secrecy jurisdiction, as was Switzerland,
[but now] [t]hey're falling like dominoes." 20 0 Another noted that he advises
197. See id.
198. See Kristen A. Parillo, B.VI. Premier "Sets Record Straight" on
FATCA, 71 TAx NOTES INT'L 962 (Sept. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Parillo, B.VI.
Premier]. The BVI negotiations, like the Cayman Islands agreement, centers on the
Model 1 IGA. See id.
199. William M. Sharp Sr., Navigating Offshore Tax Hazards: An Update,
70 TAX NoTEs INT'L 695, 706 (May 13, 2013) [hereinafter Sharp, Navigating
Offshore Tax Hazards].
200. See Alison Bennett, U.S.-Caymans FATCA Agreement Signals
Growing Tax Transparency, Practitioners Say, BNA DAILY TAX REPORT (Aug. 19,
2013); see also id. (quoting numerous other practitioners and former government
officials regarding the global shift toward transparency). One attorney explained the
participation of Caribbean and other financial centers in the FATCA process by
noting,
In today's world, counterparties don't want to deal with
noncompliant entities, regardless of whether they're deriving U.S.-
source income.... With the trend toward eliminating bank secrecy
and enhancing transparency, you either join in or become an
outlier. Jurisdictions that depend on the attractiveness of their
business environment need to be very sensitive to what the trends
are.
Parillo, B. VI. Premier, supra note 198, at 962 (quoting Alan Granwell of DLA
Piper). Similarly, another attorney observed that China's signing of the Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, and the recent
agreement between the United States and Switzerland, "show that even large and
politically powerful jurisdictions have to find the proper balance between
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clients with offshore accounts that "tax havens where people can hide money
are a thing of the past. . .. Forget about confidentiality. Transparency is here
to stay."2 0 1 Even the Premier of the British Virgin Islands, D. Orlando Smith,
observed that because automatic information exchange is becoming the new
global standard, it is "incumbent on any responsible person to be straight
with our people and offer solutions, not create confusion by misleading them
[about the need to cooperate with the United States]."202
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Disproportionate Impact on Overseas Citizens
1. Impact ofEnforcement Initiatives
The recent expansion in overseas enforcement was not driven by
concerns over citizens residing abroad. Rather, its focus is principally
individuals living in the United States who are hiding income in foreign
accounts.203 Nonetheless, in a citizenship-based taxing system, enforcement
actions targeting foreign accounts will, by their very nature,
disproportionately impact citizens living abroad. Whereas it might be
relatively unusual for a citizen living in the United States to have signatory
authority over a foreign bank account, such authority is relatively routine for
a citizen residing abroad. Just as a person living in New York for an
extended period of time might be expected to open a local bank account in
New York for her routine financial transactions, a U.S. citizen living in
London or Paris might be expected to open a local bank account in that
city.2 04 A citizen abroad might also be more likely to open investment
accounts abroad and, to the extent she has family ties in the foreign country,
inherit or otherwise acquire a foreign account from a family member.
In addition, although foreign-resident citizens generally are subject
to U.S. taxation, it is possible that a foreign-resident citizen might not owe
U.S. income tax on investment income earned from the foreign account.205 In
particular, if the individual lives in a foreign country that taxes the income,
cooperation and financial confidentiality to remain viable in today's world." Id.
(paraphrasing Bruce Zagaris).
201. Saunders, No Place to Hide, supra note 196 (quoting Henry
Christensen of McDermott, Will & Emery in New York).
202. Parillo, B. V.I. Premier, supra note 198.
203. See supra notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
204. Of course, the citizen abroad might also open a foreign bank account
in a foreign city or country in which she does not reside, which may or may not be
used for routine banking activities.




the foreign tax credit might eliminate much or all of the U.S. tax on the
income.206 In order to claim the credit, however, the individual is required to
file a U.S. income tax return, which many overseas citizens might not do.207
In the context of a domestic citizen, a foreign account might be
viewed (whether accurately or not) as a signal for potential tax evasion that
historically has been outside of the practical enforcement reach of the IRS. 208
Of course, in the context of a foreign-resident citizen, a foreign account
might also reflect tax evasion activity. However, for the reasons just noted, it
might often merely reflect routine banking and investment activity.
Nonetheless, at least as a general matter, citizens living abroad who have
foreign accounts are subject to the same administrative and legislative
enforcement activity that initially envisioned domestic citizens with foreign
209accounts.
Of course, the IRS does not know ex ante which citizens abroad fall
within the most sympathetic group (e.g., foreign accounts opened for benign
reasons, with no residual U.S. tax owed because of foreign taxes paid on the
income), 210 and which fall within some variation of a more worrisome group
(e.g., residual U.S. tax would have been owed on the foreign income). Even
within this latter group, there might be varying degrees of culpability, such
as a U.S. citizen who had not been aware of her citizenship status, a citizen
who had been aware of her status but not her filing and tax payment
obligations, and a citizen who willfully disregarded known obligations with
intent to evade taxes.
The recent developments in offshore enforcement raise the stakes in
this context, increasing the chances of detection and potentially significant
penalties.2 1 1 Citizens abroad who negligently failed to report foreign source
206. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
207. See generally I.R.S. Form 1116, Foreign Tax Credit.
208. Not every foreign account held by a domestic citizen is evidence of tax
planning (e.g., many such accounts might have been inherited from, or had the
domestic citizen's name added by, a nonresident noncitizen relative).
209. See Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 32
(the FBAR "is a good example of a requirement that may be reasonable in regards to
U.S. taxpayers but that falls disproportionately on and unfairly burdens U.S. persons
abroad").
210. At the extreme, one individual alleged that she felt threatened by the
reporting requirements "even if she did everything to fulfill her responsibilities....
A simple loyalty card at the local grocery store caused her anxiety when she realised
it was linked to a bank account she never knew she had." Tom Geoghegan, Why Are
Americans Giving Up Their Citizenship?, BBC NEWS, Sept. 27, 2013,
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24135021.
211. Another possible point of detection arises in the context of U.S.
passport applications and renewals. Under Code section 6039E, a passport applicant
(including a renewal) is required to furnish her social security number and, if
residing abroad, the name of the foreign country in which she lives. I.R.C. § 6039E;
162 [Vol. 16:3
Revisiting the Taxation of Citizens Abroad
income (or file an FBAR report) face much greater concerns than those faced
by similarly situated domestic citizens who, with the same level of
culpability, fail to report U.S.-source income or file a required information
return regarding U.S.-source income.2 12 For example, if a U.S.-resident
citizen negligently fails to report income from a domestic investment, she
may be subject to a negligence penalty (typically 20 percent of the
underreported tax liability) plus interest. In contrast, because a foreign-
resident citizen's local bank or investment account will typically be a
"foreign" account, her negligent failure could result not only in a negligence
penalty plus interest, but also an FBAR-related penalty of at least $10,000 (if
the IRS agrees that the failure was not willful),2 13 and up to the greater of
$100,000 or 50 percent of the balance in the account if the IRS determines
the failure was willful. 2 14
While the OVDPs were intended to encourage taxpayers with past
compliance failures to enter the system, the programs-particularly some
aspects of the initial programs-might have discouraged taxpayers from
doing so. For example, Nina Olson, the IRS National Taxpayer Advocate,
noted in her 2012 annual report to Congress that some Q&As on the IRS
website implied that the IRS would often seek maximum FBAR penalties,
regardless of the situation, thereby discouraging some "benign" taxpayers
see also U.S. Dep't of State, Form DS-11, Application for a U.S. Passport. The
Department of State, upon collecting this information, is required to furnish it to the
Department of Treasury, and it is also required to furnish the name of any passport
applicant who refuses to furnish this information. See I.R.C. § 6039E(d). A person
who fails to furnish the information (other than for reasonable cause and not willful
neglect) may be subject to a $500 penalty (although the statute does not contemplate
that the passport application will be denied for such failure). See id § 6039E(c); see
also Prop. Reg. § 301.6039E-1, 77 Fed. Reg. 3964 (Jan. 26, 2012) (proposing the
requirement that applicants include, and the Department of State transmit to
Treasury, the applicant's date of birth); Sharp, Navigating Offshore Tax Hazards,
supra note 199, at 702 (suggesting that the publication of these proposed regulations,
which replaced proposed regulations published in 1992, "provide a strong signal that
the IRS will begin matching up passport applications" to U.S. citizens' tax returns);
see generally GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL TAX
COLLECTION[:] POTENTIAL FOR USING PASSPORT ISSUANCE TO INCREASE
COLLECTION OF UNPAID TAXES (GAO- 11-272, 2011) (discussing legal and practical
issues arising from proposal to condition passport issuance or renewal on
compliance with tax laws).
212. Of course, given the more sophisticated system of information
reporting in a wholly domestic context, it is less likely that a domestic-based
citizen's failure to report domestic investment income would continue for an
extended period of time.
213. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
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from participating.2 15 Moreover, she asserted that "some benign actors were
so fearful of opting out [of OVDP] that they accepted the IRS settlement and
paid more than they owed." 2 16
The IRS has, to some extent, acknowledged the potentially disparate
impact of its enforcement initiatives on citizens residing abroad.
Accordingly, it has implemented special provisions for nonresident citizens
in certain circumstances. For example, as noted above,2 17 it has lowered the
FBAR-related penalties under the OVDP from 27.5 percent to five percent
for overseas citizens in two categories: first, "unaware" citizens (e.g., those
who were born in the U.S. to foreign-citizen parents but who were raised in a
foreign country and had been unaware of their U.S. citizenship status) and
second, foreign-resident citizens who timely complied with the tax
requirements in their country of residence and who had no more than
$10,000 of U.S.-source income in each year.
Last year, the IRS also established "streamlined" filing compliance
procedures outside of the OVDP designed for nonresident taxpayers deemed
to be a "low compliance risk."2 18 Under these procedures, eligible U.S.
persons219 living abroad file delinquent tax returns for the past three years
(with payment of past taxes due, plus interest), and delinquent FBARs for the
past six years.2 20 All submissions will be reviewed by the IRS, although "the
intensity of review will vary according to the level of compliance risk
presented by the submission."22 1
For those taxpayers presenting low compliance risk, "the review will
be expedited and the IRS will not assert penalties or pursue follow-up
actions."222 A submission will generally be treated as "low risk" if the
215. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 51, at 136-37.
216. Id. at 137.
217. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
218. See Instructions for New Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures
for non-Resident, Non-Filer US. Taxpayers, IRS, last accessed Jan. 2, 2014,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Instructions-for-New-Streamlined-Filing-Compliance-Proced
ures-for-Non-Resident-Non-Filer-US-Taxpayers [hereinafter IRS, Instructions for
New Filing Procedures]. A commentator noted that these streamlined rules "came
long after taxpayers, their representatives, and IRS agents had spent much time and
money navigating" the 2009 and 2011 OVDP and other possible solutions. Marie
Sapirie, The Personal Impact of Offshore Enforcement, 71 TAX NOTES INT'L 199,
203 (July 15, 2013) [hereinafter Sapirie, Personal Impact of Offshore Enforcement].
219. The streamlined procedure "is available for non-resident U.S.
taxpayers who have resided outside of the U.S. since January 1, 2009, and who have
not filed a U.S. tax return during the same period." IRS, Instructions for New Filing
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taxpayer has less than $1,500 of tax due in each of the years.223 Submissions
that exceed the $1,500 threshold are not automatically disqualified from the
streamlined program, but they will be subject to additional scrutiny to
determine whether they present a higher risk. Relevant factors include the
amount of tax due, indications of sophisticated tax planning, material
economic activity in the United States, and any additional history of
224noncompliance with U.S. tax laws. A taxpayer determined to be higher
risk may be subject to additional penalties and may be subject to a full
examination (perhaps for more than three tax years) in a manner similar to
opting out of the OVDP.22 5
The streamlined procedures have been welcomed by those who fit
within its $1,500 "low risk" threshold.226 For those who do not meet that
threshold but may be close, IRS officials have encouraged them to consider
participating,227 but practitioners caution that such taxpayers should carefully
weigh the possibility of being labeled "higher risk" and should consider the
possibility of using the OVDP instead.228
223. Id. Even if this $1,500 threshold is satisfied, the submission might not
be treated as "low risk" if it shows any "high risk factors." Id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See Sharp, Navigating Offshore Tax Hazards, supra note 199, at 701
(noting that the streamlined procedure "has been very popular").
227. See Shamik Trivedi, Low-Risk Offshore Account Holders Urged to
Use Streamlined Filing, 68 TAx NOTES INT'L 1121 (Dec. 17, 2012) (summary of
American Bar Association conference discussion between IRS official and
practitioner, in which IRS official encouraged taxpayers who are slightly over the
threshold to consider participating in the streamlined process, noting that the IRS
"will not necessarily beat up on a taxpayer just because he's a little bit over or
doesn't meet one of the criteria. . . . It's just we're not guaranteeing that the returns
will just be processed without any further inquiry from the Service."). Id.
228. See Sharp, Navigating Offshore Tax Hazards, supra note 199, at 702;
Shamik Trivedi, Streamlined FBAR Filing Procedures Might Have Limited
Application, 67 TAX NOTES INT'L 1013 (Sept. 10, 2012) (noting that taxpayers
residing in Europe often have an account outside their country of residence due to
geographic factors, thereby giving them one of the potential risk factors); Q&A 2,
Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Streamlined Filing Compliance






As with the recent expansion of enforcement initiatives, the
enactment of FATCA was not principally driven by concerns over U.S.
citizens abroad, but it instead focused on individuals in the United States
hiding assets in foreign accounts.2 29 Yet, it too may have a disproportionate
impact on overseas citizens, given the fact that they are more likely to hold
foreign financial accounts. One significant complaint of overseas citizens
concerns the impact of FATCA on their daily banking activities. The tax
press, as well as the ACA report, contains numerous stories of overseas
citizens complaining that foreign banks and financial institutions, which they
rely on for local banking and investment activities, no longer will conduct
business with customers who are U.S. citizens.2 30 According to these reports,
the FFIs fear that having U.S. clients will expose the institutions to unwanted
administrative and legal entanglement with the IRS, so the institutions are
terminating relationships with existing U.S.-citizen customers and are
refusing to open new accounts for U.S. citizens. 2 3 1 This, in turn, allegedly
has made it very difficult for U.S. citizens living overseas to engage in
routine, local banking activities.
To the extent this phenomenon occurs, it should be of some concern
to U.S. policymakers, particularly if nonengagement by FFIs became so great
that overseas residents in a particular locale are left with no reasonably
available banking or investment institution options. It is understandable that,
229. See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Congress, Baucus, Rangel, Kerry, Neal
Improve Plan to Tackle Offshore Tax Abuse Through Increased Transparency,
Enhanced Reporting and Stronger Penalties (Oct. 27, 2009) ("Many U.S. individuals
looking to evade their tax obligations in the United States have sought to hide
income and assets from the [IRS] by opening secret foreign bank accounts with
foreign financial institutions.").
230. For example, the ACA report states that
Americans abroad have become pariahs in the international world
of finance; foreign banks do not want them as clients because of
FATCA legislation. . . . Bank accounts of Americans abroad are
being forcibly closed, mortgages are being denied, securities have
to be parked in expensive SEC registered ghettos, and Americans
are excluded from joint bank accounts with foreign spouses ....
AM. CITIzENs ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note 47, at 6; see also
J. Richard Harvey Jr., FA TCA-a Report from the Front Lines, 136 TAX NOTEs 713
(Aug. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Harvey, A Report from the Front Lines] (describing
initial reaction to FATCA by Swiss banks against U.S. citizen account holders).
231. According to Dick Harvey, "A more Machiavellian explanation might
be that Swiss FIs are purposely . . . [making U.S. citizens'] lives difficult as a way of
punishing the United States, or more likely, in an effort to get U.S. citizens to
advocate the repeal of FATCA." Harvey, A Report from the Front Lines, supra note
230, at 715.
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as an initial reaction to FATCA and in the absence of further guidance
regarding its implementation, some FFIs might have taken steps to try to
avoid its reach (e.g., attempting to eliminate all U.S. citizen clients) rather
than face the possibility of having to interact with the IRS and face potential
sanctions under U.S. law. 232 However, more-recent developments suggest
that this initial reaction by FFIs, to the extent it occurred, may have been an
overreaction.
There are several reasons why, once FATCA is implemented, FFIs
should not be expected to abandon U.S.-citizen clients (and their deposits
and investments) in large numbers (certainly not to the extreme extent
posited by opponents of FATCA). The principal factor that will bring an FFI
within the reach of FATCA is whether or not the FFI holds U.S. investments,
either on its own behalf or for customers (regardless of whether those
customers are U.S. citizens or not). If it holds U.S. investments, the FFI
generally will be required to comply with FATCA in order to avoid the 30
percent withholding on U.S. investment income, even if it has no U.S
customers. Once FATCA is implemented, such an FFI will (in the absence of
a Model 1 IGA that provides otherwise), at a minimum, need to register with
the IRS, obtain a Global Intermediary Identification Number from the IRS,
and comply with FATCA due diligence requirements to determine whether it
has any account holders that are U.S. persons.233 The Department of Treasury
makes a similar point on its website.234 After noting that "[s]ome claim that
U.S. citizens living overseas will become outcasts in the international
financial world," the website counters that "FATCA withholding applies to
the U.S. investments of FFIs whether or not they have U.S. account holders,
so turning away known U.S. account holders will not enable an FFI to avoid
FATCA." 2 35
An FFI will be able to ignore FATCA only if it is willing to forego
all U.S. investments and, therefore, is not concerned about U.S. withholding.
232. Some of this initial reaction by foreign banks may have been due to a
lack of understanding about FATCA and how it would be implemented. See Marie
Sapirie & Stephanie Soong Johnston, Solving the Expatriation Enigma, 71 TAX
NOTES INT'L 766, 768 (Aug. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Sapirie & Johnston, Solving the
Expatriation Enigma] (citing attorney Andrew Mitchel).
233. See T.D. 9610, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874, 5875-77 (Jan. 28, 2013); see also
Sheppard, Hypocrisy on Information Sharing, supra note 149, at 323 ("[FFI]
agreements will only be for banks in non-IGA countries that have U.S. investments.
It is important to note that the mere absence of U.S. customers does not let a bank off
the hook.").
234. See Robert Stack, Myth vs. FATCA: The Truth About Treasury's Effort
to Combat Offshore Tax Evasion, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Sept. 20, 2013,
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Myth-vs-FATCA.aspx (statement by




Indeed, in the (unlikely) event it has no U.S. investments potentially subject
to FATCA withholding, the FFI should not be worried about whether or not
its customers are U.S. citizens and should have no need to terminate
relationships with U.S. citizens. But as long as the FFI holds some U.S.
investments, it must undertake at least some interaction with the IRS. 236 The
only potentially significant benefit gained by forcing out all U.S. customers
is that the FFI would not have any customer account information that it
might need to disclose to the IRS after registration (potentially in violation of
local law),2 37 and the FFI would not need to potentially withhold on
payments to recalcitrant U.S. account holders.23 8
These concerns-especially the concern about an FFI potentially
violating local law by disclosing account information 239-are being
significantly mitigated by the increasing trend toward Intergovernmental
Agreements-in particular, the Model 1 IGA. As discussed previously, 240 a
number of countries-including Switzerland and other offshore financial
centers-have concluded (or anticipate concluding) IGAs based on Model 1.
The implementation of these IGAs will not only allow FFIs to avoid
problems with local secrecy laws, but also will allow FFIs to avoid dealing
directly with the IRS, something that most would prefer not to do. The
Model 1 IGA also contains explicit language intended to prevent FFIs from
discriminating against U.S. citizens.241 Moreover, the Model 1 IGA
236. As Avi-Yonah notes, it is increasingly difficult for an FFI to avoid all
connections to the U.S. markets and financial system. See Avi-Yonah, And Yet it
Moves, supra note 61, at 6 (stating that it is "hard to find" a foreign "financial
institution that has no connections to the US and therefore is not intimidated by the
30% levy").
237. See T.D. 9610, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874, 5877 (Jan. 28, 2013) (noting that
"[i]n many cases, foreign law would prevent an FFI from reporting directly to the
IRS the information required by the FATCA statutory provisions and
regulations, thus potentially exposing the FFI to withholding").
238. See id. at 5875 (describing I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(D) and the requirement
of participating FFIs to potentially withhold on payments to recalcitrant U.S. account
holders).
239. See id. at 5877 (noting that a significant purpose of the IGA regime is
to allow FFIs to overcome disclosure limitations of local law).
240. See supra notes 148-149, 194-198 and accompanying text.
241. Annex II of the Model 1 IGA allows certain FFIs with a local client
base to be treated as nonreporting foreign financial institutions that are deemed to be
compliant with FATCA. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MODEL 1 IGA ANNEX II, T
III.A (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/
Documents/FATCA-Annex-II-to-Model- 1-Agreement-11-4-13.pdf. In order to meet
this standard, "[t]he Financial Institution must not have policies or practices that
discriminate against opening or maintaining Financial Accounts for individuals who
are Specified U.S. Persons and residents of' the FATCA partner jurisdiction. Id.
III.A.10. It is unclear how effectively this requirement will be enforced once an IGA
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approach, with its focus on an FFI providing the information to its own
government, could be a scalable template as more countries embrace the
growing global norm of automatic information sharing.242 As more countries
move to this approach, FFIs might become more accustomed to the need to
cooperate in furnishing information (directly or indirectly) to foreign
governments.2 43
Accordingly, while the initial response of some FFIs may have
adversely impacted overseas U.S. citizens, this response can be expected to
lessen over time. Moreover, it is very unlikely that the United States will
abandon the FATCA approach, at least without first continuing the
significant efforts to implement it. As discussed above, the United States has
had significant initial success in negotiating IGAs, including with traditional
financial centers, and is unlikely to back away from that success. Moreover,
FATCA (along with the United States' enforcement efforts against Swiss
banks) has been the impetus in a global shift toward broader cross-border
information sharing. Accordingly, absent a major problem with FATCA
implementation,244 the United States is unlikely to back away from FATCA
containing the language becomes operational. See Jared Bums et al., FATCA Now a
Reality-What This Means for Those Doing Business in Japan and Australia, 70
TAX NOTEs INT'L 1205, 1207 (June 17, 2013) (after noting the IGA language,
observing that "it is yet to be seen how seriously the new FATCA regime will affect
the ability of U.S. persons living abroad to secure banking services").
242. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
243. See Harvey, A Report from the Front Lines, supra note 230, at 716.
244. Some commentators have raised questions regarding the legal validity
of IGAs under U.S. law. Compare, e.g., Allison Christians, The Dubious Legal
Pedigree of IGAs (and Why It Matters), 69 TAx NOTEs INT'L 565 (Feb. 11, 2013)
(arguing that IGAs may not be valid under U.S. law, thereby putting FFIs who rely
on them at risk of the 30 percent withholding tax in FATCA and undermining the
rule of law), with Susan Morse, Why FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements Bind
the US. Government, 70 TAX NOTES INT'L 245 (Apr. 15, 2013) (countering
Christians's arguments and asserting that IGAs have binding legal force). Another
potential implementation problem concerns reciprocity-in particular, the legal
authority and practical ability of the IRS providing U.S. financial account
information to foreign governments under a reciprocal Model 1 IGA. See, e.g.,
Colleen Graffy, How to Lose Friends, Citizens and Influence, WALL ST. J., July 17,
2013, http://online.wsj/com/news/articles/SB1000142412788773238488045786074
72987119796 [hereinafter Graffy, How to Lose Friends] (citing letter from Rep. Bill
Posey to Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew alleging that Treasury has exceeded its
authority in promising reciprocal financial reporting to foreign countries); Sheppard,
Hypocrisy on Information Sharing, supra note 149, at 324-25 (describing practical
problems with the United States providing information to Latin American countries
on a reciprocal basis). Moreover, some commentators have expressed concern that, if
the United States were to offer U.S. financial account information to foreign
countries under IGAs, large amounts of money might be withdrawn from U.S.
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or IGAs that strengthen the IRS's enforcement ability abroad, including
enforcement against overseas citizens.
B. Implications for Citizenship-Based Taxation
The dramatic shifts in cross-border enforcement during the past half-
decade have important implications for citizenship-based taxation. Critics
have often argued against citizenship-based taxation because of the
administrative impracticability of the IRS enforcing the law, as well as
difficulties faced by overseas citizens in complying with the law. The
concerns regarding the impracticability of enforcement go back at least a
century.245 More recently, in 2008 Blum and Singer argued against
citizenship-based taxation due, in significant part, to the IRS's inability to
enforce the law.246 They observed that "[t]he IRS is at a serious disadvantage
in monitoring compliance by U.S. citizens overseas because of the lack of
many of its usual sources of information," including information on income
derived from foreign financial assets. 2 47 This lack of enforcement, in effect,
allowed significant numbers of overseas citizens (whether due to lack of
knowledge or willful evasion) to implement a self-help version of residence-
based, rather than citizenship-based, taxation.
Because the Blum and Singer article was written shortly before
Birkenfeld plead guilty,2 48 the authors would not have been aware of the
significant changes on the horizon regarding Swiss bank secrecy, increased
FBAR enforcement, FATCA, and voluntary compliance programs. As a
result of these developments, the IRS's potential enforcement ability in this
area is significantly stronger. The developments suggest that the IRS will
have access to information on offshore investments that would not have been
envisioned even a half-decade ago. Accordingly, arguments against
banks. See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Bill Posey et al. to President Barack Obama (Mar.
2, 2011), http://posey.house.gov/uploadedfiles/irs-delegationletter-march3-2011 .pdf
(letter signed by 26 members of Congress asserting that reciprocal information
sharing will cause hundreds of billions of dollars held in the United States by
nonresident aliens to flee to foreign financial institutions).
245. As noted above, in 1914 Professor Seligman observed that it is
"virtually impossible" to collect tax on the foreign income of a nonresident citizen.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
247. Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra note
39, at 713-14. Indeed, I previously acknowledged that "concerns about enforcement
might provide the strongest argument against taxing the foreign source income of
citizens residing abroad." See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra
note 1, at 496.
248. Their article was published in May 2008, the same month that the
Birkenfeld indictment was unsealed.
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citizenship-based taxation due to the IRS's inability to enforce the law are
much weaker than they previously were, particularly once FATCA
enforcement begins.
A related practical concern, expressed by Blum and Singer and
others, involves the ability of overseas citizens to understand and comply
with U.S. tax obligations.24 9 For example, critics noted that many U.S.
citizens living overseas might not be aware of their status and, even if they
are, may not be aware of their obligations to file U.S. tax returns, FBARs,
and otherwise comply with U.S. tax law. 2 50 The recent developments-in
particular, the widespread publicity surrounding FATCA-have also had a
significant impact on this concern. FATCA has received widespread
attention abroad among the overseas citizen community, in large part due to
concerns, discussed above, that FFIs might discriminate against U.S. citizen
account holders. As a result, even FATCA's critics acknowledge that one
side effect is that many more citizens abroad have become aware of their
U.S. tax and reporting obligations.2 5'
High compliance costs are another frequent complaint of overseas
taxpayers.2 52 In this regard, the widespread publicity surrounding new
enforcement initiatives and FATCA may have an unintended benefit. As this
area becomes more important, additional tax preparers might enter the field,
thereby increasing the availability of professional help and lowering its cost.
For example, H&R Block recently issued a press release highlighting its
availability to assist overseas citizens in complying with new reporting
requirements and launched a "microsite" to assist overseas taxpayers. 2 53
249. See Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra
note 39, at 711-12.
250. See, e.g., supra note 64 and accompanying text (arguments of Bernard
Schneider); AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note 47, at
15.
251. See, e.g., Steven J. Mopsick, Tax Justice for Americans Abroad, 136
TAX NOTES 189, 189 (July 9, 2012) ("Because of [FATCA], many Americans who
have chosen to live abroad are only now learning that they should have been filing
U.S. income tax returns all along."); Sapirie, Personal Impact of Offshore
Enforcement, supra note 218, at 199-202 (providing anecdotal descriptions of
several overseas U.S. citizens who learned of U.S. reporting obligations through
news reports about IRS enforcement efforts).
252. See Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra
note 39, at 712 ("[O]verseas citizens find it harder and more expensive to obtain
private tax preparation services .. . .").
253. See Press Release, H&R Block Launches Remote Service, Augments
In-Office Tax Prep for US. Citizens Living, Working Abroad, H&R BLOCK, May 30,
2013, http://newsroom.hrblock.com/hr-block-launches-remote-service-augments-in-
office-tax-prep-for-u-s-citizens-living-working-abroad/; U.S. Expat Tax Services,
H&R BLOCK, last accessed May 11, 2014, http://expats.hrblock.com.
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While these recent developments support the increased practicability
of citizenship-based taxation, they also heighten the importance of ensuring
that the compliance requirements imposed on overseas citizens are
reasonable. In the past, the reporting and other compliance requirements,
while technically relevant, may have been of lesser practical concern for
many overseas citizens, at least to the extent they were unaware of, or
underappreciated, the rules. However, now that the IRS plans to increase
enforcement in the overseas area, and citizens abroad have become more
aware of the need to comply, it is important that the IRS provides clear
guidance and attempts to simplify the compliance burden as much as
possible (consistent with the underlying law), so that overseas taxpayers can
both understand the requirements and comply with them without the need to
incur unreasonable professional expenses. Perhaps it is understandable that
during the current transition period, as the IRS implements the new FATCA
regime and overseas taxpayers transition into a world where compliance is
fully expected and enforcement is possible, there might be one-time
transition costs. As discussed above, the IRS has attempted to address at least
some of the problems overseas citizens face during this transition. But the
IRS must also ensure that practical ongoing issues unique to overseas
citizens are also addressed. This concern is discussed in more detail in Part
VI below.
C Implications for Residence-Based Proposals
So far, Part IV has focused on administrative concerns surrounding
citizenship-based taxation, concluding that recent developments have
increased the enforceability of U.S. tax laws against overseas citizens. This
subpart briefly addresses some of the administrative concerns arising from
the residence-based taxation regimes that others have proposed as a
replacement for the current regime applicable to U.S. citizens.2 54 In
particular, it illustrates that those proposals, although based in part on
possible administrative problems with citizenship-based taxation, raise
significant administrative problems of their own.
The administrative problems associated with residence-based
taxation proposals center, in large part, on the need to define a citizen's
residence and the tax consequences associated with a change in residence.
Some proposals suggest determining a citizen's tax residence (and hence, her
general taxability) using the 183-day weighted "substantial presence" test
that currently applies to aliens.25 5 As noted above, that test allows an
254. See supra notes 69-102 and accompanying text (describing residence-
based proposals).
255. Avi-Yonah apparently would extend the test to citizens with no
modifications, see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text, while Blum and
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individual to spend, on average, approximately four months per year in the
United States without being considered a tax resident.256
The substantial presence test, although centered on an objective day-
counting test, incorporates some subjective elements that would complicate
both taxpayer compliance and IRS enforcement. For example, under current
law applicable to aliens, an individual who runs afoul of the 183-day
weighted test can, nonetheless, be treated as a nonresident if he is present in
the United States for fewer than 183 days during the year and has a tax home
in a foreign country to which he has a "closer connection" than to the United
States.2 57 Not only would this exception add administrative complexity to the
determination of a citizen's tax residence, but it increases the planning
flexibility for a citizen who wants to spend significant amounts of time in the
United States (potentially up to half the year) while still remaining a
nonresident for tax purposes.258
Apart from the closer-connection exception, even the objective day-
counting aspect of the substantial presence test may raise significant
enforcement problems for the IRS with respect to citizens. While the
individual will have direct knowledge of the number of days she is present in
the United States, the IRS will not have ready access to this information.
Even Blum and Singer, who advocate residence-based taxation of citizens,
acknowledge that this lack of information "would appear to place a
considerable burden on the IRS, which would have to rely on taxpayers to
provide information in each case about the number of days that they have
been present." 259 They note that "[wlithout an entry-exit system, tax rules
Singer suggest using the test as "the basic criterion" for determining a citizen's tax
residence. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Blum and Singer consider
some modifications to the substantial presence test, but acknowledge that the
modifications might create additional administrative problems. See supra note 74.
The substantial presence test currently applies to citizens in very limited
circumstances-not to determine their general taxability on worldwide income, but
rather to determine isolated collateral issues. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 877A(g)(1)(B)(i)(II)
(cross-referencing substantial presence test in determining whether a person
renouncing citizenship fits a narrow exception to the exit tax); Reg. § 301.7701(b)-
1(a) (noting that the determination of a citizen's residence under the substantial
presence test "may be relevant, for example, to the application of section 861(a)(1)
which treats income from interest-bearing obligations of residents as income from
sources within the United States").
256. See supra note 69.
257. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B).
258. See generally infra Part 0.
259. Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra note
39, at 720. Blum and Singer acknowledge that a day-counting test for residence "' is
probably enforceable in countries that exercise tight control over their borders,' but
is 'extremely difficult for the tax authorities . . . to enforce . . . when many
individuals are frequently entering and leaving the country without border checks."'
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regarding individuals entering and exiting the United States do not work
well." 260
Blum and Singer, writing in 2008, envisioned that a pending
biometric entry/exit system being developed by the Department of Homeland
Security (primarily to address terrorism concerns) could also be used to track
U.S. citizens' entry and exit, thereby providing data the IRS could use under
a residence-based taxation regime. 2 61 They envisioned that the system's
"information could be transmitted to the IRS .. . [and] the IRS could easily
determine whether a citizen had met the 183-day test." 26 2 That system-the
US-VISIT program263-is now operational. However, contrary to Blum and
Singer's expectations, U.S. citizens are not required to scan their passports or
otherwise participate in the program (which focuses on noncitizens entering
and leaving the country). 264 Thus, the system does not provide to enable the
IRS to easily enforce a residence-based test for citizens.
Enforcement under the Blum and Singer proposal is further
complicated by their three-year residence retention rule, under which a U.S.
citizen would continue to be treated as a tax resident, taxable on worldwide
income, for three years after she triggered the substantial presence test.26 5
Id. at 721 n.63 (alteration in original) (quoting BRIAN J. ARNOLD & MICHAEL J.
MCINTYRE, INTERNATIONAL TAX PRIMER 17 (1995)).
260. Id at 721 n.60. The IRS's experience with "sailing permits" provides a
useful analogy.
261. See id. at 720-21. Although the program had begun tracking entry to
the United States in 2006, it had not yet begun tracking exits when Blum and Singer
wrote their article. See Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-13, HOMELAND
SECURITY: KEY US-VISIT COMPONENTS AT VARYING STAGES OF COMPLETION, BUT
INTEGRATED AND RELIABLE SCHEDULE NEEDED 1 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d 1013 .pdf [hereinafter GAO- 10-13].
262. Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra note
39, at 721.
263. The acronym US-VISIT stands for "U.S. Visitor and Immigration
Status Indicator Technology." See GAO-10-13, supra note 261. In 2013, the
program was renamed the Office of Biometric Identity Management. See OfJfice of
Biometric Identity Management Identification Services, DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, last accessed May 11, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/obim-biometric-
identification-services.
264. See 73 Fed. Reg. 77,473, 77,476 (Dec. 19, 2008) (final rule
implementing US-VISIT, noting that "United States citizens are not subject to US-
VISIT by the terms of this rule").
265. See Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra
note 39, at 724-25. During this period, the deemed-resident taxpayer would be
eligible for an unlimited foreign earned income exclusion, so U.S. taxation would
focus on investment income. See id. Qualification for this proposed unlimited
foreign earned income exclusion would be based on the same qualification standards
as current I.R.C. § 911, including the requirement of a foreign tax home and
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While this three-year retention might be useful in limiting citizens' ability to
manipulate the proposed tax residence test, by continuing to tax foreign-
resident citizens on their income after they no longer are in the United States,
it would undermine some of the purported administrative benefits of
switching away from a citizenship-based system.
Schneider also suggests that the 183-day weighted test (without the
"closer connection" exception) might be applied to determine a citizen's
residence.2 66 As an alternative, he proposes a facts-and-circumstances test to
determine whether the citizen is a "bona fide resident," a standard he
characterizes as falling "between the ordinary definitions of residence and
domicile."2 67 Schneider lists a number of factors that would be used in this
determination.268 Schneider acknowledges that this subjective inquiry might
be "considered impractical," but notes that a similar standard is used under
current law to determine a citizen's eligibility for the foreign earned income
exclusion.269 While it is true that a "bona fide resident" test exists under
current law, because of its vagueness overseas citizens instead try to meet the
330-day alternative test, if possible, to qualify for the foreign earned income
exclusion. Thus, it would be a problematic standard (both from a taxpayer-
compliance and an IRS-enforcement perspective) upon which to base a new
residence-based tax regime for citizens. Indeed, Congress previously
abandoned the use of subjective residence determinations in the context of
aliens, enacting the 183-day weighted test in its place.270
The ACA proposal relies on a self-certification process for
determining a citizen's residence. Under that proposal, once a U.S. citizen
establishes residence abroad, she notifies the IRS and receives a departure
certificate. 271 Apparently, as long as the proper documents are submitted, the
IRS would not conduct an independent inquiry or apply any standard to
determine the citizen's residence, but instead would automatically issue the
certificate, immediately treating the citizen as a nonresident for tax
purposes.272 Perhaps in anticipation of arguments that the proposed regime
satisfaction of either the "bona fide resident" test or 330-day test, thereby adding yet
another layer of complexity. See id. at 725-26 (suggesting that new tests could be
considered based on the anticipated entry/exit system).
266. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
267. Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 69-70.
268. See id. at 69.
269. See id.
270. See Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra
note 39, at 720 n.57 (citing 1984 legislative history, which noted that the then-
existing subjective test for residence "did not provide adequate guidance [and] a
more objective definition of residence" was needed).
271. See supra notes 79-80.
272. See AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note
47, at 8. The citizen would be required to submit proof of foreign residence and
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would encourage tax-motivated changes in residence, the ACA proposal
contains an exception treating U.S. citizens residing in countries deemed by
the IRS to be "tax havens" as U.S. tax residents.273 However, the proposal
defines a tax haven extremely narrowly, thereby making it unlikely that
many, if any, countries would be treated as tax havens or that many, if any,
U.S. citizens would continue to be treated as U.S. residents under this
exception.274
Of the various residence proposals, the ACA's proposed test for
determining residence (apart from the "tax haven" kickout) appears to be the
most objective, at least with respect to the initial establishment of foreign
residence. However, it too raises significant administrative issues. For
example, after receiving a departure certificate, a citizen would be treated as
a U.S. tax resident in the future if she triggers the 183-day weighted test
proof of residence in a foreign tax home, and would be required to pay any income
taxes due for prior periods, along with an exit tax, if applicable. See id.
273. See id. at 9.
274. Indeed, the ACA proposal explicitly asserts that "[c]lassification of
countries as tax havens should be the rare exception." Id. According to the ACA
proposal, "The list of countries so designated should include only those countries
where the tax laws have been designed to attract rich foreigners with fiscal
privileges." Id. The proposal, rather than focusing on factors that would make a
country a tax haven, instead provides a lengthy list of factors that should not be
viewed as creating tax haven status:
Low tax countries, such as countries in the Persian Gulf, where
excise taxes on oil or minerals substitute for income taxes, are not
prima facie tax havens, nor are countries where very high indirect
taxes such as the VAT or high social security taxes or payroll taxes
lead to low income tax rates. Absence of a U.S. tax treaty with a
foreign country should not be, a priori, a criteria for labeling a
country a tax haven.
Id. These factors, by narrowly focusing on the intent of the foreign country and
providing a number of exceptions, offer significant opportunities for a U.S. citizen
to move to a low-income-tax country without the tax haven kickout applying. For
example, a retiree with significant investment income might gain significant tax
savings by going to a country with low income taxes but a high VAT or high social
security or payroll taxes (factors that would not make it a "tax haven")-the high
social security and payroll taxes would largely be irrelevant to a retiree, while the
VAT would only be relevant to the extent the taxpayer spends a portion of large
investment income on consumption in that country. Moreover, prior experience in
labeling countries tax havens suggests that there might be strong U.S. political
opposition to the IRS labeling a country a "tax haven" merely because it has a low
income tax rate. While bank secrecy has often been a more acceptable reason for
labeling a country a "tax haven," the earlier discussion suggests a global shift away
from bank secrecy (and, in any event, under a residence-based regime, a U.S.
citizen would not necessarily be seeking a bank secrecy jurisdiction as his foreign
residence).
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(which presumably would also have a "closer connection" exception),
thereby raising many of the same enforcement problems discussed above.
A further complication arises from the use of departure certificates.
The proposal contemplates that these certificates will be used to ensure that
overseas citizens are not impacted by FATCA-a U.S. citizen who shows the
certificate to an FFI would not be treated as a U.S. person for purposes of
FATCA and would not be subject to the FATCA reporting requirements.2 75
This approach could raise significant enforcement problems for the IRS.
According to the proposal, a citizen would not be required to renew a
departure certificate or otherwise notify the IRS as long as the citizen
remains in the initial foreign country of residence. If the individual moves to
another country, she would be required to inform the IRS of the new address
(presumably, the IRS would want to know about this move in order to ensure
the individual had not moved to a tax haven, thereby becoming a U.S. tax
resident under the proposal's anti-abuse provision). Moreover, if the
individual triggers the 183-day weighted test and again becomes a U.S. tax
resident, the departure certificate is no longer valid.276 In these contexts, an
enforcement problem could arise because the citizen still would have the
departure certificate in her physical possession. Because the certificate has
no expiration date, and the FFI would have no way of knowing whether the
citizen had reestablished U.S. tax resident status, once an initial departure
certificate is issued it could be used indefinitely by a U.S. citizen to avoid
FATCA, even if that citizen had again become subject to U.S. tax.
Regardless of which proposed definition of tax residence is adopted,
the introduction of a residence-based regime for citizens could be further
complicated by tax treaties. Presumably, a shift to residence-based taxation
for citizens would be accompanied by the elimination of the "saving clause"
from future U.S. treaties (or renegotiated treaties).277 If so, a U.S. citizen
275. See id. at 8.
276. See id.
277. Blum and Singer explicitly call for the elimination of treaty saving
clauses in this context. See Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation,
supra note 39, at 722. The saving clause in U.S. tax treaties generally provides that
the treaty will not affect the United States' ability to tax its "residents" (as defined in
the treaty) or its citizens. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL
INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, art. 1, 4 [hereinafter U.S.
MODEL TREATY], http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/gov/press-center/press-releas
es/Documents/hpl6801.pdf. Accordingly, under current treaties the United States is
allowed to enforce its citizenship-based taxation, even if the citizen resides abroad. If
the saving clause is deleted, then a U.S. citizen who is a resident of the other treaty
country could invoke the treaty, thereby significantly limiting the ability of the
United States to tax her. In the absence of this treaty clause, the United States would
be able to exercise residence-based taxation over the citizen only if she were a
"resident" as defined in the treaty. In general, treaty residence is determined by
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residing abroad could be treated as a nonresident for tax purposes even if she
meets the (proposed) statutory test for U.S. tax residence, provided that she is
treated as a resident of the treaty country under a treaty's tie-breaker rules.
This could lead to significant numbers of new claims for treaty benefits that
the IRS would need to administer.
Under the proposals, the determination of an individual's tax
residence has significant collateral consequences. In particular, the proposals
contemplate a mark-to-market "exit tax" when a U.S. citizen's tax status
changes from resident to nonresident.278 A change in status could trigger the
recognition of significant amounts-perhaps millions-of dollars of
previously unrecognized gain.279 Thus, both taxpayers and the IRS have a
strong interest in a residence definition that is both understandable and
enforceable. The administrative problems associated with the proposed
residence tests discussed above could create significant problems in this
context.
In general, the less objective the residence test, the more problematic
is this concern.280 The ACA proposal, with its self-certification regarding
loss of U.S. residence, provides the brightest line in this exit context,
although it is subject to other concerns partially addressed above. 2 8 1 The
problems with IRS enforcement and taxpayer compliance under a 183-day
weighted test could be significant under an exit tax. Given the IRS's lack of
information regarding a taxpayer's physical location, the IRS would not
know when a citizen lost tax residence status and thereby became subject to
the exit tax, other than perhaps when the citizen stops filing U.S. resident tax
returns. This problem is compounded under Blum and Singer's three-year
residence retention rule because by the time the citizen triggers the exit tax,
looking at the tax laws of each treaty country. If the citizen is treated as a resident
under both countries' laws (e.g, the citizen is a U.S. resident under whichever
proposed residence test is implemented and is also a resident of the other treaty
country), the treaty utilizes fact-based tie-breakers to determine the individual's
residence. See id. art. 4, T 3. Accordingly, if the saving clause is removed, it is
possible that the United States would not be able to tax the U.S. citizen, even if she
is a U.S. resident under a proposed statutory residence test.
278. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
279. The proposals could also create administrative problems when a
citizen reestablishes tax residence, given that she would need to reestablish the basis
in her assets based on their value at that time.
280. Of course, a less objective test might have nonadministrative merits,
such as the ability to address special circumstances or limit the ability of a taxpayer
to manipulate residence status.
281: The ACA's proposed exemption from the exit tax for citizens living
abroad for at least two years at the time of enactment certainly provides the easiest
rule in the context of the exit tax (by totally eliminating the tax), but it raises
significant fairness and other concerns.
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she might not have had significant contacts with the United States for several
years and thus might be less likely to comply with U.S. tax obligations. The
concerns in this context might be greatest with Schneider's proposed facts-
and-circumstances test for residence. Given the uncertainty of that standard,
the IRS and citizen might reach different conclusions as to whether, and in
what year, a citizen became a nonresident, thereby triggering the exit tax.
While the change in residence status and triggering of the exit tax might be
either good or bad for a particular taxpayer (depending on their mix of
foreign source income and built-in gain in property), it is disconcerting to
have a system where significant consequences are subject to this type of
uncertainty.
Schneider himself acknowledges the enforcement difficulties that
may arise in this context. He notes the difficulty the United States has had in
enforcing tax laws against departing aliens. Despite the regulatory
requirement that departing aliens file IRS forms and receive a Departing
Alien Clearance (known as a "sailing permit"), "[c]ompliance with this
regime is widely recognized to be poor."28 2 He suggests that "compliance
with a departure tax regime can be expected to be better, after an initial
period of education, because it would be seen as fairer than the current
system," although he ultimately acknowledges that compliance "is likely to
be poor where the individual has few connections or does not expect to
return to the United States."283 He minimizes concern about this latter group
by observing they "are precisely the individuals who see little risk in not
complying with the current regime."284 However, the recent developments in
global international enforcement with respect to U.S. citizens suggest that
there may be reason to believe that these individuals' level of compliance
under a citizenship-based tax regime may be expected to improve.
Admittedly, administrative issues exist even under current law with
respect to the exit tax in section 877A. However, that provision is triggered
by formal, objective events that are unlikely to occur without the taxpayer's
intent and the IRS's reasonable likelihood of being informed. For example,
in the context of loss of citizenship, as a constitutional matter a citizen
generally cannot change this status without a specific intent to do so, 2 85 and
the Code requires the Department of State to inform the IRS of the loss. 2 86 In
282. Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 72-73.
283. Id. at 73.
284. Id.
285. See Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Code as Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J.
LEG. 375, 381-83 (2006) (describing constitutional, statutory, and administrative
procedures for renouncing U.S. citizenship).
286. See I.R.C. § 6039G(d).
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the context of long-term permanent residents, the individuals generally lose
their status for tax purposes only by taking explicit steps to do so.m
The foregoing analysis is not intended as a thorough critique of the
enforcement and compliance issues associated with residence-based taxation
proposals, nor does it imply that the administrative problems associated with
a residence-based system are necessarily greater than those associated with
the current citizenship-based system. Rather, it is merely intended to
emphasize that a shift to a residence-based tax system for citizens would not
be a panacea for the administrative concerns associated with citizenship-
based taxation-instead, it would exchange some administrative concerns for
others. Admittedly, problems with enforcement and compliance under the
proposals are not, by themselves, fatal to the proposals. 288 Indeed, citizens
residing abroad would most likely be willing to live with one of the proposed
regimes, even if created a different set of compliance problems than those
under the current regime. Nonetheless, it is important to take these and other
administrative concerns into account in contemplating a shift to a residence-
based regime.
As a final note, it is important to recognize that abandoning
citizenship-based taxation would not significantly impact the debate over the
advisability of FATCA. FATCA was not primarily driven by concerns over
citizens residing abroad. 28 9 Thus, the elimination of U.S. tax on citizens
residing abroad would not impact the more-significant FATCA-related
concerns concerning U.S.-resident citizens holding assets abroad. At most,
the elimination of citizenship-based taxation might modify certain technical
aspects of FATCA's implementation, such as the due diligence required of
FFIs under FATCA, 290 and might collaterally affect the relationship between
FFIs and U.S. citizens abroad.291 However, for those opposed to FATCA in
287. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(6) (lawful permanent residence status ceases for
tax purposes if the status has been revoked, or administratively or judicially
determined to have been abandoned).
288. However, for the reasons I have previously argued, as well as those set
forth supra, I do not believe an abandonment of citizenship-based taxation is
warranted.
289. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
290. However, the IRS might still require FFIs to perform due diligence as
to the account holder's place of birth, because even in the case of a citizen residing
in the United States, this might be a more reliable indicator of citizenship than the
address that the individual gives to the FFI. The ACA implicitly acknowledges that
place of birth might remain a part of the FATCA inquiry even under a residence-
based regime, given the proposal's attempt to use a departure certificate as a means
for addressing FATCA-related concerns. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
291. However, as discussed above in notes 230-44 and the accompanying
text, the problems initially reported by some overseas citizens in dealing with local
financial institutions can be expected to subside with the implementation of FATCA
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general, the elimination of citizenship-based taxation would not directly
undermine the case for FATCA.
V. SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS WITH RESIDENCE-BASED PROPOSALS
The preceding Part addressed the practical, administrative aspects
associated with citizenship-based taxation-in particular, how the significant
changes in global tax enforcement and information sharing during the past
few years impact the case for citizenship-based taxation. That Part suggested
that these changes generally support and reinforce the viability of
citizenship-based taxation. It also concluded that residence-based taxation
raises many administrative concerns of its own, which have been
underappreciated by its proponents. This Part addresses the substantive
concerns regarding residence-based taxation. In particular, it focuses on
selected arguments that are particularly relevant in comparing a citizenship-
based regime to proposed alternative regimes that would tax citizens only
under residence principles.
A. Neutrality and the Post-Reform World
A significant criticism of citizenship-based taxation is that it
encourages citizens living abroad to surrender their U.S. citizenship in order
to avoid U.S. taxation and reporting requirements, even when the individual
would otherwise prefer to remain a citizen. Critics note that, in contrast, a
residence-based regime would eliminate this incentive-because citizens
living abroad would not be subject to U.S. taxation, there would be no tax-
based incentive to surrender U.S. citizenship. While this argument is correct
as far as it goes, it fails to address (or downplays) an important new incentive
that residence-based taxation would introduce: an incentive for U.S. citizens
to reside abroad in order to escape U.S. taxation.292
In support of their position, critics of citizenship-based taxation point
to the significant increase in citizenship renunciations during the past few
years. Between 1998 and 2005, the number of individuals who surrendered
or otherwise lost their U.S. citizenship gradually increased from
(particularly through the Model 1 IGA) and the more widespread acceptance of a
global information sharing norm.
292. A similar issue arises with arguments that citizenship-based taxation
raises very little tax revenue and thus does not justify the associated administrative
complexity. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (citing ACA arguments).
Such arguments fail to consider the potential revenue loss were there to be




approximately 400 per year to approximately 800 per year.293 Data for earlier
years going back to 1991 reflects a similar number of annual
renunciations.2 94 Because citizens who surrender citizenship are not required
to give a reason, there is no way to know how many of these individuals
surrendered citizenship for tax reasons. While a number of high-profile
individuals who surrendered citizenship in those earlier years apparently did
so for tax purposes, 295 a significant number of individuals did so for nontax
reasons. 2 96
The number of reported citizenship losses dropped significantly in
2006 through 2008.297 The reported number had dwindled to 167 for the 12-
month period ending in the middle of 2009.298 However, beginning with the
report for the third quarter of 2009, the number of reported losses of
citizenship began to increase dramatically, resulting in 742 losses reported in
293. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 51, at 264. These numbers are based on the quarterly reports
of citizenship loss published by the IRS. Under I.R.C. § 6039G(d), each calendar
quarter the IRS is required to publish the names of individuals who have lost U.S.
citizenship (as furnished by the Department of State).
294. See Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax
Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective
Tax Policy, 89 IOwA L. REv. 863, 876 & n.50 (2004) [hereinafter Kirsch, Alternative
Sanctions] (noting that between 1991 and 2001, approximately 600 people per year
lost their U.S. citizenship).
295. See id. at 893 n.142 & 897 n.156 (citing examples of high-profile
renunciations that apparently were tax motivated).
296. See, e.g., id. at 876 n.51 (citing a Joint Committee on Taxation study
suggesting that during the 1990s a significant number of Korean-Americans
returning to Korea upon retirement surrendered their U.S. citizenship due to
restrictions in Korea on holding dual citizenship); cf id. (noting that Valdus
Adamkus surrendered U.S. citizenship upon becoming president of newly
democratic Lithuania).
297. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
supra note 51, at 264.
298. See Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to
Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,911 (July 21, 2009) (15
individuals reported for the quarter ending June 30, 2009); Quarterly Publication of
Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 74
Fed. Reg. 20,105 (Apr. 30, 2009) (67 individuals reported for the quarter ending
March 30, 2009); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to
Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 74 Fed. Reg. 6219 (Feb. 5, 2009) (63
individuals reported for the quarter ending December 31, 2008); Quarterly
Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section
6039G, 73 Fed. Reg. 65,036 (Oct. 31, 2008) (22 individuals reported for the quarter
ending September 30, 2008).
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calendar year 2009,299 1,534 in 2010,300 and 1,781 in 2011.301 After a brief
drop during 2012 (932)302 (which may have been attributable, at least in part,
to anticipation that tax rates might be lowered and that the overseas
enforcement initiatives would be scaled back if Mitt Romney were to be
299. See supra note 298 (citing publications for first and second quarters of
2009); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as
Required by Section 6039G, 75 Fed. Reg. 9028 (Feb. 26, 2010) (502 individuals
reported for the quarter ending December 31, 2009); Quarterly Publication of
Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 74
Fed. Reg. 60,039 (Nov. 19, 2009) (158 individuals reported for the quarter ending
September 30, 2009).
300. See Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to
Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 76 Fed. Reg. 7907 (Feb. 11, 2011) (398
individuals reported for the quarter ending December 31, 2010); Quarterly
Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section
6039G, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,158 (Nov. 10, 2010) (397 individuals reported for the
quarter ending September 30, 2010); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who
Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,160
(Nov. 10, 2010) (560 individuals reported for the quarter ending June 30, 2010);
Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required
by Section 6039G, 75 Fed. Reg. 28,853 (May 24, 2010) (179 individuals reported for
the quarter ending March 31, 2010).
301. See Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to
Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 77 Fed. Reg. 5308 (Feb. 2, 2012) (360
individuals reported for the quarter ending December 31, 2011); Quarterly
Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section
6039G, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,361 (Oct. 26, 2011) (403 individuals reported for the quarter
ending September 30, 2011); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have
Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,898 (Aug. 3,
2011) (519 individuals reported for the quarter ending June 30, 2011); Quarterly
Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section
6039G, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,175 (May 10, 2011) (499 individuals reported for the
quarter ending March 31, 2011).
302. See Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to
Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 78 Fed. Reg. 10,692 (Feb. 14, 2013) (45
individuals reported for the quarter ending December 31, 2012); Quarterly
Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section
6039G, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,084 (Nov. 1, 2012) (238 individuals reported for the quarter
ending September 30, 2012); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have
Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 77 Fed. Reg. 44,310 (July 27,
2012) (189 individuals reported for the quarter ending June 30, 2012); Quarterly
Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section
6039G, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,538 (Apr. 30, 2012) (460 individuals reported for the
quarter ending March 31, 2012).
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elected President),303 the reported losses again increased significantly with
3,000 renunciations reported in 2013.
It is important to note that the quarterly lists of citizenship
renunciations published by the IRS reflects a delay-approximately six
months according to one source-from the time the individual actually lost
citizenship.305 Accordingly, the spike in reported names beginning in the
third quarter of 2009 likely reflects individuals who surrendered citizenship
beginning in early 2009. This timing strongly correlates with the publicity
303. The drop in reported names in 2012 is largely attributable to the very
low number of renunciations (only 45) reported in the fourth quarter. See supra note
302. Given the typical delay in conveying the names between the Department of
State and IRS, this likely reflects individuals who renounced citizenship during the
early summer of 2012. One plausible explanation (although admittedly conjecture)
for this one-time drop is that a number of citizens may have expected Mitt Romney
to win the then-pending Presidential election, which may have raised expectations
that tax burdens on higher-income people (those most likely to renounce citizenship
for tax purposes) would be lowered, and may have also raised expectations that
FATCA and overseas enforcement initiatives might be softened. This explanation is
consistent with the record number of renunciations reported in the second quarter of
2013 (1,130), which would reflect renunciations in late 2012, immediately after
President Obama's reelection in November. An alternative explanation, offered by
an attorney who tracks the citizenship renunciation lists, is that the data for the last
quarter of 2012 is incomplete. See Sapirie & Johnston, Solving the Expatriation
Enigma, supra note 232, at 766 (citing attorney Andrew Mitchel).
304. See Quarterly Publication of Individuals Who Have Chosen to
Expatriate, 79 Fed. Reg. 7504 (Feb. 7, 2014) (631 individuals reported for the
quarter ending December 31, 2013); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have
Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,151 (Nov. 13,
2013) (560 individuals reported for the quarter ending September 30, 2013);
Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required
by Section 6039G, 78 Fed. Reg. 48,773 (Aug. 9, 2013) (1,130 individuals reported
for the quarter ending June 30, 2013); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who
Have Chosen to Expatriate, 78 Fed. Reg. 26,867 (May 8, 2013) (679 individuals
reported for the quarter ending March 31, 2013). Among the most prominent
citizenship renunciations during this recent period was that of Eduardo Saverin, a
Brazilian-born naturalized citizen and cofounder of Facebook, who renounced his
citizenship shortly before Facebook's initial public offering. See Quentin Hardy, A
Facebook Co-Founder Reflects on the Path Forward, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/technology/a-facebook-cofounder-reflects-on-
the-path-forward.html?_r-0 [hereinafter Hardy, Facebook Co-Founder Reflects]
(suggesting that Saverin may have saved $100 million in future taxes by renouncing
citizenship, even after the application of the I.R.C. § 877A exit tax).
305. See Laura Saunders, The Renouncers: Who Gave Up U.S. Citizenship,
and Why?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2012/08/02/
the-renouncers-who-gave-up-u-s-citizenship-and-why/.
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over the UBS deferred prosecution agreement in February 2009306 and the
IRS's announcement of increased enforcement efforts in the context of the
rollout of the OVDP in March 2009.307 The continued increase in 2011
correlates with the publicity regarding FATCA, while the most recent
increase in 2013 might reflect the upcoming (although again delayed)
implementation of FATCA reporting.308
This data strongly supports assertions that the recent increase in
citizenship renunciations is largely driven by tax and related reporting
concerns. 309 While many of these surrenders may reflect individuals who do
306. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
308. See also supra note 302 (suggesting that the most recent spike reported
in Q2 of 2013, for surrenders that most likely occurred in late 2012, may reflect a
response to President Obama's election victory over Mitt Romney).
309. See, e.g., NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 51, at 142 (concluding that "[t]he OVD programs may be
prompting [overseas citizens] to renounce U.S. citizenship," given the significant
recent increase in citizenship losses); Liam Pleven & Laura Saunders, Number of
Americans Renouncing Citizenship Surges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 1000142412788732397730457900278056200
3814 (quoting tax attorneys' observations that "the recent rise is [in citizenship
renunciations] is likely due to tougher laws and enforcement," and "[t]he IRS
crackdown on U.S. taxpayers living abroad seems to be having an effect"). In
contrast, Avi-Yonah suggests that the spike in citizenship renunciations is
attributable to the enactment of the I.R.C. § 877A exit tax in 2008 because after its
enactment "expatriation was no longer a shameful act." Avi-Yonah, And Yet it
Moves, supra note 61, at 31. This focus on the exit tax enactment, rather than the
stepped-up international enforcement efforts and FATCA, seems to be much less
powerful explanation for the increase in renunciations. First, if the enactment of the
exit tax was a principal trigger for expatriation, one might have expected a
significant increase in renunciations shortly after its June 17, 2008, effective date.
However, renunciations in the half year following the exit tax's enactment (as
reflected in the IRS quarterly lists published in the first and second quarter of 2009,
given the typical six-month delay in Department of State reporting to the IRS) were
among the lowest numbers reported since publication began in 1997, with only 67
attributable to renunciations that likely took place in the third quarter of 2008, and a
mere 15 renunciations that likely took place in the fourth quarter of 2008. See
Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required
by Section 6039G, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,911 (July 21, 2009) (names reported during Q2
2009); Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as
Required by Section 6039G, 74 Fed. Reg. 20,105 (Apr. 30, 2009) (names reported
during Q1 2009). As noted above, the timing of the significant increase in
renunciations that likely began in mid-2009 correlates much more closely with the
IRS enforcement efforts and FATCA. In addition, as I have argued elsewhere in a
related context, shaming concerns are unlikely to have much effect on citizens
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not want to be subject to U.S. tax liability, critics of citizenship-based
taxation suggest that some may reflect individuals who may not have had
any U.S. tax liability (e.g., because of the foreign tax credit) but were
concerned about running afoul of the increased reporting requirements and
associated penalties for failure.1 o
The fact that the existing U.S. tax system may create an incentive for
some citizens to surrender their status should not be taken lightly. However,
in and of itself, it is not a reason for abandoning citizenship-based taxation.
While the numbers of renunciations have increased in recent years, in
relative terms they still reflect a very small number-for example, even the
increased number of renunciations reported in 2013 represents only 0.001
percent of the total number of U.S. citizens,1 or one out every 100,000
citizens. As reflected in the recent trend, the number of renunciations might
be expected to remain at the higher-than-average level as FATCA and the
other IRS enforcement efforts continue to be publicized and implemented.
However, it is not unreasonable to assume that at some point, those who are
overseas who renounce citizenship. See Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions, supra note
294, at 908-12.
310. See, e.g., AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra
note 47, at 1 (alleging that "increasing numbers of Americans residing abroad are
being forced to ... renounce their U.S. nationality to be able to lead a normal life").
311. There were 3,000 renunciations reported in 2013. See supra note 304
and accompanying text. According to the U.S. Census Bureau's 2012 American
Community Survey, there are approximately 273.1 million native-bom citizens and
18.6 million naturalized citizens living in the United States. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, Selected Social Characteristics in the United States, 2012 American
Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, tbl. DPO2, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_12_ YR DP02&prodType-ta
ble. In addition, the Department of State estimates that there are approximately 6.8
million citizens living abroad. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE Do: CONSULAR AFFAIRS BY THE NUMBERS
(Jan. 2013), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/cafact sheet.pdf. Based on these
estimates, there are approximately 298.5 million U.S. citizens, with the 3,000
renunciations reported in 2013 representing approximately 0.001 percent. As noted
above, at least a baseline number of these renunciations reflect individuals who
surrendered citizenship for nontax reasons. See supra note 296 (Joint Committee on
Taxation study suggesting that "many" of the approximately 600 annual losses in the
1990s were attributable to nontax factors); see also Andrew Velarde, Increase in
US. Expatriations Unlikely, Says Practitioner, 72 TAX NOTES INT'L 323 (Oct. 28,
2013) [hereinafter Velarde, Expatriations Unlikely] (attomey Michael Pfeifer noting
that the quarterly list of citizenship renunciations reflects a disproportionate number
of Koreans and Indonesians whose countries do not permit dual nationalities).
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most likely to renounce citizenship for tax-related purposes will have done
so, and the numbers may trend down again.3 12
Moreover, many of the individuals who have surrendered their
citizenship in recent years, presumably for tax purposes, already had very
strong connections to a foreign country, in some circumstances holding dual-
citizenship at birth and having spent much of their life abroad. Accordingly,
while tax-related factors may have been the "final straw" that caused them to
renounce their citizenship, these individuals' connections to the United
States may have been tenuous already. Even the most high-profile person to
renounce recently-Facebook cofounder Eduardo Saverin-was born in
Brazil and had held U.S. citizenship for only a decade.3 13
More theoretically, and perhaps more importantly, the possibility
that citizens take tax burdens into account is not inconsistent with the
underlying justifications for imposing citizenship-based taxation. To the
extent that citizenship-based taxation is justified, in part, on the grounds that
an overseas citizen, by retaining U.S. citizenship, voluntarily remains a part
of broader U.S. society for purposes of ability-to-pay equity analysis, 314 it is
not surprising that some individuals would choose to abandon that voluntary
connection. Similarly, to the extent citizenship-based taxation is based, in
part, on the benefits associated with citizenship (even though, admittedly, the
benefits derived by an overseas citizen are not as high as those derived by a
domestic citizen), it is not surprising that an individual who believes that the
benefits of citizenship are too limited in light of potential increases in tax
liability would consider renouncing citizenship.1 Indeed, despite the
political backlash against tax-based renunciations in recent decades,316
individuals who choose to surrender their citizenship are exercising a
"natural and inherent" right that has played an important role in U.S.
history. 317 Thus, while the possibility that citizenship-based taxation may
incentivize a limited number of individuals to renounce citizenship is not a
312. See Velarde, Expatriations Unlikely, supra note 311 (attorney Michael
Pfeifer noting that he would be surprised if there were a further surge in U.S. citizen
renunciations, and that future renunciations will primarily involve "'accidental
citizens' whose lives are overseas and have little connection to the U.S.").
313. See supra note 304.
314. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
315. Cf Alice G. Abreu, Taxing Exits, 29 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1087, 1158
(1996) (in an argument against an exit tax, Abreu observes that "individuals who are
willing to give up the substantive benefits of U.S. citizenship should be allowed to
shed its tax burdens").
316. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at
493-94.
317. See generally Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 294, at 902-03
(describing role of citizenship renunciation in U.S. history).
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desirable outcome, it is not inconsistent with the underlying norms of the
U.S. tax system and must be weighed against other relevant considerations.
In this context, the most important consideration supporting
citizenship-based taxation, and potentially undermining residence-based
taxation, is the impact that a residence-based system would have on future
residency decisions. Critics of citizenship-based taxation often assert that
citizens do not move abroad for tax-motivated reasons. For example, Avi-
Yonah asserts that "in the case of individuals, I believe the decision to move
is usually motivated primarily by nontax considerations."3 18 Similarly,
Schneider concludes that "[i]n most cases . . . individuals choose their
residence on the basis of more than just taxation . . . . The United States
should not assume that a move abroad is motivated by a desire to decrease
U.S. tax liability and therefore should be ignored for tax purposes."
It would not be surprising if these assertions are correct and that,
under current law, U.S. citizens do not move abroad for tax-motivated
reasons. After all, under current law, which generally continues to tax
overseas citizens, the tax savings from moving abroad (apart from potential
- * 320evasion opportunities) are limited.
However, these appeals to the lack of tax motive for citizens living
abroad fail to acknowledge the important role that current citizenship-based
taxation, with its limited potential for tax windfalls by moving abroad, plays
in this result. The situation might change significantly if the United States
were to move to a residence-based tax system for citizens. While many
citizens would continue to live abroad primarily for nontax reasons, a
residence-based tax system might create significant incentives for many
other U.S. citizens to move abroad primarily for tax reasons. After all, under
a residence-based tax system, a U.S. citizen residing abroad (unlike a citizen
residing in the United States) would no longer be taxed on income arising
outside the United States. Indeed, she might not even be taxed on significant
types of income arising within the United States, such as interest on U.S.
318. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, supra note 39, at 390
n.5.
319. Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 53. On
a related note, the ACA report states that "[c]ontrary to myths held by many that
Americans abroad are the privileged wealthy, the community of Americans overseas
is comparable to the community of hard-working average Americans resident in the
United States." AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note
47, at 17. Also, "[m]ost Americans abroad reside in OECD countries with tax rates
higher than U.S. tax rates," so they do not owe any residual U.S. tax after the foreign
tax credit and foreign earned income exclusion. Id. at 4.
320. The only significant tax savings would be for an individual residing in
a relatively low-tax country and who is eligible for the foreign earned income
exclusion.
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bank accounts or gains from the sale of stock in U.S. companies.3 2' In
addition, a U.S. citizen residing abroad could significantly reduce or
eliminate U.S. gift and estate tax liability. 32 2
Of course, not every citizen would be in a position to make such a
move. Moving abroad may involve substantial costs-both up-front financial
costs, as well as psychological costs-and some individuals might not have
locational flexibility, in particular with respect to their job. However, for
citizens who are retired (or otherwise derive most of their income from
investments), or for those whose profession provides geographic flexibility,
the prospect of moving abroad to save significant amounts of income or
estate taxes would be inviting.
Furthermore, a citizen who moves abroad could still spend
significant amounts of time in the United States each year without becoming
323a tax resident. For example, if the current "substantial presence" test
applicable to aliens were extended to citizens, 324 a citizen could spend, on
average, four months per year in the United States without being considered
a tax resident.325
It is difficult to predict how many additional citizens would relocate
abroad if a residence-based tax were adopted.326 A number of factors other
than tax savings would be relevant.327 It should be noted, however, that
modem developments in travel and instantaneous global communication
make moving abroad for tax purposes a much more viable option than it
321. Under current law, a resident alien generally is not taxed on interest
from U.S. bank accounts, see I.R.C. § 871(i)(2)(A), or gain from the sale of stock in
a domestic corporation. See I.R.C. § 865(a)(2) (treating such gains as foreign-source
income).
322. The impact of a residence-based tax system on U.S. estate and gift
taxes is discussed infra Part 0.
323. The individual would still be a U.S. citizen, so there would be no
immigration-related bars to reentry.
324. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text (summarizing proposed
residence tests).
325. See supra note 69. If the citizen were also a resident of a country with
which the United States has a tax treaty, the individual might be able to spend even
more time in the United States, provided she is a resident of the other treaty country
under the treaty's tie-breaker provision. See supra note 277.
326. See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, Do Millionaires Move to Avoid High
Taxes?, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkbl
log/wp/2012/11/28/do-millionaires-move-to-avoid-high-taxes/ [hereinafter Mathews,
Do Millionaires Move] (citing difficulty of making estimates of interstate tax flight).
327. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 489
(noting nontax factors, including "personal and family history, social or cultural
connections, nationality status, economic opportunities, and climate preferences").
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would have been in earlier times.328 While the large majority of U.S. citizens
undoubtedly would "continue residing in the United States, and thereby be
taxed as residents on their worldwide income, many might decide that
significant tax savings justify moving from the United States to a low- or no-
tax jurisdiction."3 29
The experience of other countries, which generally use a residence-
based system, might be instructive. For example, in the 1970s a number of
high-profile musicians, including members of the Rolling Stones and Pink
Floyd, along with David Bowie, abandoned their British residence because
of taxes. 330 More recently, tens of thousands of high-income French and
German citizens have reportedly established residence outside of France and
Germany, respectively, in response to increased home-country taxes.331 A
recent economic study analyzed the French tax system (at a time when its
highest marginal income tax rate was 40 percent) and concluded that a 40
percent marginal income tax rate "might be too high to prevent French top-
328. See id. at 490 (quoting a commentator in 1926 stating that he had "no
fear" of tax-motivated changes in residence because of the difficulty of living
abroad, and a 1975 commentator claiming that such concerns were unwarranted
because "the frequent occurrence of abuse would require a mobility of population
which probably does not exist"); see also id. at 466-67 (describing impact of modern
technology on mobility).
329. Id. at 490.
330. See Matthews, Do Millionaires Move, supra note 326. A recent report
suggested that billionaire Richard Branson moved from the England to the British
Virgin Islands in order to escape high income tax rates. See Roland Gribben, I've
Been a Tax Exile for Seven Years, Says Branson, THE TELEGRAPH, Oct. 13, 2013,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/businessclub/10376341/Ive-been-a-tax-exile-for-
seven-years-says-Branson.html (noting that Branson defended the move based on
lifestyle, rather than tax avoidance).
331. A recent economic study on the propensity of high-income taxpayers
to move to a low-tax country cited claims that 34,000 individuals have left France
each year during the past decade to relocate to lower-tax countries, and that 145,000
taxpayers left Germany in a single year for tax reasons. See Laurent Simula & Alain
Trannoy, Optimal Income Tax Under the Threat of Migration by Top-Income
Earners, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 163, 163 (2010) [hereinafter Simula & Trannoy, Optimal
Income Tax]; see also Randall Jackson, Former President Sarkozy Could be Next
Tax Exile, 69 TAx NOTES INT'L 336 (Jan. 28, 2013) (citing several examples,
including France's richest person who "is thought to be heading to Belgium"); Jean-
Philippe Delsol, Can the Last Taxpayer Leaving France Please Turn Out the
Lights?, FORBES, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/12/18/
can-the-last-taxpayer-leaving-france-please-tum-out-the-lights/ (citing estimates of
5,000 "tax exiles" leaving each year); Taxpayers Fleeing Wealth Tax Seen Costing
France Millions in Lost Revenue, INT'L TAX MONITOR (BNA), May 22, 2008. The
German statistic cited in Simula & Trannoy, supra, was furnished by the German
Chamber of Commerce, which presumably advocates for lower tax rates, so it might
not reflect a disinterested estimate.
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income earners from emigrating to very close tax havens like Monaco,
Andorra, Liechtenstein and the Channel Islands."332 Given that the highest
marginal U.S. tax rate approximates 40 percent,333 this study may have some
relevance.334 Moreover, it suggests that the propensity to move abroad would
depend, in part, on how high future U.S. income tax rates are.
The experience within the United States, with states imposing tax on
a residence basis, also demonstrates that high-income taxpayers can be
sensitive to income tax rates (as well as estate and inheritance taxes). For
example, a disproportionate number of professional golfers reside in Florida
and Texas (as opposed to other warm-weather states, such as California), in
large part because these states do not impose an income tax.3 Studies have
also shown the impact that low state taxes have in attracting other athletes.336
Recently, professional golfer Phil Mickelson caused a furor when he
complained that, due to his high combined federal and state (California) tax
rates, "I'm not going to jump the gun and do it right away, but there are
332. Simula & Trannoy, Optimal Income Tax, supra note 331, at 163.
333. Under I.R.C. § 1(c)-(d) the highest marginal rate is 39.6 percent. In
addition, a 3.8 percent surtax is imposed on a high-income taxpayer's net investment
income. See I.R.C. § 1411.
334. But see James B. Stewart, The Myth of the Rich Who Flee from Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/business/high-
taxes-are-not-a-prime-reason-for-relocation-studies-
say.html?pagewanted=2& r-l&pagewanted=all (citing studies that reports of large
migrations due to taxes are overblown, but noting that "[o]f course, some people do
move for tax reasons, especially wealthy retirees, athletes and other celebrities
without strong ties to high-tax locations, like jobs and families").
335. See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Golfer Phil Mickelson Is Not Alone in
Fleeing Taxes, FORBES, Jan. 21, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/
2013/01/21/phil-mickelson-is-not-alone-in-fleeing-taxes/. Professional golfers are a
particularly ripe group for becoming nonresidents if the U.S. were to start treating
U.S. citizens in the same manner as aliens. Under current law, in determining the
number of days of physical presence under the 183-day weighted test, a
"professional athlete who is temporarily in the United States to compete in a
charitable sports event" need not count those days toward the 183-day test. I.R.C. §
7701(b)(5)(A)(iv). Because PGA Tour events generally are run as charitable events,
noncitizens currently can rely on this exclusion in determining their tax residence
status. If this provision applied to U.S. citizens under the proposed residence-based
regimes, it would enable U.S.-citizen PGA golfers to spend significantly more time
in the United States than would otherwise be allowed without triggering the
substantial presence test.
336. See Victor Fleischer, How Local Tax Rates Affect High-Income





going to be some drastic changes for me . . . . In context, it was not clear
whether he was referring to merely changing his state of residence (from
California to, say, Florida), or whether the "drastic changes" might include a
move abroad with a renunciation of citizenship. However, if the United
States had a residence-based (rather than citizenship-based) tax system, it is
not unreasonable to believe that he and those like him would be much more
likely to move abroad (given that he could retain his citizenship). Ultimately,
Mickelson backed away from his comments, in part because they were
potentially damaging to his reputation, and therefore might impact his
significant endorsement income."'
A prominent practitioner, in response to an economic study
suggesting that tax flight among U.S. states might be a "myth," countered
that "[b]ased on my experience as a practitioner who works with wealthy
individuals and corporations every day, I can assure you that taxes often play
a major role in these decisions and that in many cases, they are the sole
reason for the move."33 9 In highlighting the prevalence of tax-motivated
interstate moves, a recent Wall Street Journal article quoted a number of
other U.S. attorneys who provide detailed advice to taxpayers to ensure that
the residence change is completed correctly.3 4 0 Of course, a change in state
residence is not directly comparable to a change in country residence, given
that the latter may involve more significant cultural and lifestyle changes
than merely moving within the same country.34 '
In addition to professional athletes, other candidates for tax-
motivated migration include wealthy retirees and professionals whose
activities provide geographic flexibility. This latter group might be expected
337. Karen Crouse, Uneasy in the Political Climate, Mickelson Talks Like
Someone Ready to Step Away, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/21/sports/golf/mickelson-citing-taxes-hints-at-step ping-away.html?_r-0.
338. See Karen Crouse, A Mulligan by Mickelson on Tax Talk, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/sports/golf/phil-mickelson-
takes-a-mulligan-on-tax-comments.html.
339. Peter L. Faber, Taxes Play Major Role in Moving Out of States, 69 ST.
TAX NoTEs 243 (July 22, 2013) (citing numerous examples, including situations
where the move of three wealthy individuals could cost New York State between
$70 million and $225 million in lost revenue). A recent conference sponsored by the
American Bar Association's Section of Real Property, Trust, and Estate Law was
titled "Snowbirds Fleeing State Taxing Authorities: Becoming a Resident of Another
State for Estate Tax Benefits," further supporting Faber's assertion that significant
numbers of high-wealth taxpayers may change state residences to avoid tax.
340. See Laura Saunders, States You Shouldn't Be Caught Dead In, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 25, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304682
504579155510034634716.
341. Cf Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 17, at
1320 (noting that, in practice, it is more difficult to move between nations than
between local municipalities).
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to expand significantly in the future as technological developments expand
the range of professions that can be conducted remotely.342 Already a number
of medical fields-such as radiology-can be practiced remotely. It is not
unreasonable to envision such U.S. citizen professionals-including certain
physicians and attorneys already holding U.S. licenses, along with
consultants and others-establishing tax residence outside the United States,
conducting the majority of their activity through videoconferences or other
electronic means, yet still coming to the United States for significant
amounts of time each year.
Of course, a decision to change residences for tax purposes requires
not only a potential destination country that has a favorable tax system, but
also one that has satisfactory cultural, lifestyle, safety, and other features.
While a U.S. citizen might still be able to spend significant time in the
United States each year and still maintain a non-U.S. tax residence under a
proposed residence-based regime, she would still need to reside in the
foreign country (or countries) for much of the year. Some European tax
havens cater to wealthy citizens of high-tax European countries, 343 so those
destinations might be available to at least some wealthy U.S. citizens. Closer
to the United States, a number of countries are often mentioned as safe, tax-
friendly locations for wealthy individuals to retire.344 It is not unreasonable to
assume that if the United States were to adopt a residence-based tax system
for its citizens, strong incentives would exist for additional countries to adopt
favorable special tax regimes to attract high-income U.S. citizens.34 5 Indeed,
Puerto Rico, utilizing its special tax status as a U.S. commonwealth
(whereby U.S. citizens residing there are not subject to U.S. tax), recently
established a special tax regime for wealthy U.S. citizens who relocate there,
342. For a discussion of the tax implications of this new technology-driven
flexibility, particularly with respect to the traditional focus on physical presence as a
touchstone of source-based taxation, see Michael S. Kirsch, The Role of Physical
Presence in the Taxation of Cross-Border Personal Services, 51 B.C. L. REV. 993
(2010).
343. See supra note 332 and accompanying text; see also David Leigh, The
Tax Haven that Today's Super Rich City Commuters Call Home, THE GUARDIAN,
July 9, 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/jul/10/frontpagenews
.uknews (discussing Monaco).
344. A number of websites and advisors provide advice (currently targeted
to non-U.S. citizens, given the U.S. citizenship-based regime) regarding the best tax-
friendly destinations. See, e.g., The Most Tax-Friendly Places to Retire Abroad, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://money.usnews.com/moneylblogs/On-Retirement/
2011/12/05/the-most-tax-friendly-places-to-retire-abroad; LIVE & INVEST OVERSEAS,
last accessed May 11, 2014, http://www.liveandinvestoverseas.com/.
345. Although the ACA proposal suggests that citizens residing in "tax
havens" would still be treated as U.S. tax residents, such a provision is unlikely to
have much, if any, practical effect. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
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reportedly with at least some initial success.346 Moreover, given that a not-
insignificant number of individuals have surrendered citizenship to avoid
U.S. taxes (a factor that some critics use in favor of a move to residence-
based taxation), it is not unreasonable to assume that a (potentially much
greater) number would be willing to move abroad if they could retain their
U.S. citizenship, particularly when they could still spend significant periods
of time in the United States each year under a residence test.
ACA dismisses arguments that a residence-based tax system might
induce U.S. citizens to establish residence abroad. While noting that
population movements are very difficult to project, it suggests that the
United States remains a destination for immigrants, and that "[t]he number of
immigrants moving into the United States each year far exceeds the number
of Americans moving abroad." 34 7 Even if this net inbound migration were to
continue after a switch to residence-based taxation, it is not relevant. The
question is not whether residence-based taxation would impact the total
population of the United States. Rather, the issue is whether it would induce
high-income citizens to move abroad, regardless of the independent question
of how many immigrants, who are often lower-income, move to the United
States.
The proposals to eliminate citizenship-based taxation contemplate a
mark-to-market "exit tax" when a U.S. citizen's tax status changes from
resident to nonresident.348 As discussed above, there might be significant
administrative difficulties in enforcing this provision.34 9 If implemented and
enforced, it might have some limiting effect on the number of citizens who
abandon U.S. residence, although for some individuals it would have little or
no effect. Because it would treat an individual as if she sold all of her assets
at the time U.S. residence is lost, it would only immediately affect those
individuals who have significantly appreciated nonexempt assets. The gain in
those assets typically would be taxed at a 23.8 percent rate to the extent the
deemed gain exceeds the exemption amount.3 5 0 However, to the extent the
346. See Lynnley Browning & Julie Creswell, Puerto Rico Creates Tax
Shelters in Appeal to the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2013, http://dealbook.nytmies.
com/2013/03/25/puerto-rico-creates-tax-shelters-in-appeal-to-the-rich/ (during the
first three months of the regime, "a handful of under-the-radar millionaires" have
relocated, and "Puerto Rican officials say another 40 persons, mostly from the
United States, have applied").
347. AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note 47,
at 19.
348. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 279-87 and accompanying text.
350. Long-term capital gain generally is taxed at a 20 percent maximum
rate. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D). In addition, the recently enacted 3.8 percent surtax
under I.R.C. § 1411 could apply to the deemed gain. That tax is imposed on "net
gain . . . attributable to the disposition of property . . . ." I.R.C. § 141 1(c)(1)(iii).
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individual's assets consist primarily of cash-equivalents or other assets with
minimal built-in gain, the exit tax will have little impact. Also, if there is a
future downturn in the stock market, individuals might take advantage of that
downturn to become a nonresident, due to the (perhaps temporary) reduction
in the deemed gain in their assets. Even if the individual has significant built-
in gain, if she expects to receive significant amounts of future income, or is
primarily concerned about future estate tax liability,35 the imposition of the
mark-to-market tax might not dissuade her from changing residence.
Regardless of the precise number of U.S. citizens who abandon U.S.
residence if the United States eliminates citizenship-based taxation, if any
nontrivial number do so, there could be problematic impacts on both the U.S.
tax system and on U.S. society more generally. Obviously, if a significant
number of high-income individuals did so (or even a smaller number of
extremely high-income individuals did so), there could be some direct
revenue impact.352 More importantly, there could be important indirect
impacts on the tax system. It is very likely that there would be widespread
news reports of wealthy U.S. citizens who establish foreign residence to
escape U.S. taxation, just as there was broad press coverage when U.S.
corporations engaged in inversion transactions to reduce U.S. taxes. 3 53 This
Although the proposed regulations under that section do not explicitly refer to §
877A, they do provide that the tax applies in certain other mark-to-market situations.
See Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-10(c)(3)(ii), 77 Fed. Reg. 72,612, 72,648 (Dec. 5, 2012)
(applying surtax to gains from mark-to-market election under I.R.C. § 1296). In
addition, the Treasury Department explanation accompanying the proposed
regulations states that "[u]nder certain statutory or regulatory provisions, a non-
trader may (or may be required to) mark assets to market. . . . These proposed
regulations treat amounts of gain or loss recognized as a result of marking to market
as net investment income." Id. at 72,620.
351. See infra Part 0.
352. ACA also argues that the amount of tax revenue raised from citizens
abroad is "absolutely insignificant" in the context of the U.S. budget. See AM.
CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note 47, at 3. However, it is
possible that the amount of revenue collected from overseas citizens might increase
with the introduction of enhanced enforcement programs and FATCA. More
importantly, this estimate does not consider the potentially more-significant amount
of income and estate tax revenue that might be lost if the United States were to only
tax U.S.-resident citizens and a number of high-income citizens moved abroad.
353. See generally Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to
Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the
Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475 (2005) [hereinafter
Kirsch, Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations]; see also David Gelles,
New Corporate Tax Shelter: A Merger Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/to-cut-corporate-taxes-a-merger-abroad- and-a-
new-home/ (describing more-recent use of foreign mergers in place of traditional
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activity could receive additional publicity if members of Congress call for
hearings, as occurred in the context of corporate inversions. 354 As I
previously observed, as a result of this publicity, "those at home might
conclude that citizens abroad are 'getting away with something' and
consequently lose confidence in the tax system and the social norm of tax
compliance." 355 While this risk of public loss of confidence could also exist
in a citizenship-based tax system to the extent the IRS is not enforcing the
tax laws against overseas citizens,356 such a risk has probably been reduced
in recent years with the increased overseas enforcement programs and
introduction of FATCA.
More generally, the creation of a system where significant numbers
of U.S. citizens (or even somewhat smaller numbers of athletes, entertainers,
or other high-profile citizens) can voluntarily excuse themselves could
further undermine the cohesion of American society, creating the perception
that some citizens are exempt from a fundamental obligation of citizenship-
the payment of taxes-while others are not.357 This could be particularly
problematic because the individuals avoiding tax would be a self-selecting,
high-income group. While there has been some public concern with
individuals who, under the current regime, abandon their citizenship to avoid
taxes, the public reaction is likely to be much stronger in the case of citizens
who avoid taxes by living abroad under a residence-based regime. In the
former case, while the citizenship-renouncers may be viewed as
"unpatriotic," at least they are exiting the community (and also abandoning
the benefits associated with citizenship),35 1 so they are unlikely to be viewed
as an ongoing source of concern. In contrast, with nonresident citizens
allowed to spend significant time in the United States, yet not be subject to
inversions). Such reports often occur in Europe with respect to high-profile
individuals who establish residence in Monaco or elsewhere.
354. See Kirsch, Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations,
supra note 353 (describing three-year response of Congress to corporate inversions).
355. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 502.
356. See id.
357. Of course, even under current law not all citizens pay federal income
taxes. For example, citizens abroad might not owe U.S. income tax because of the
foreign earned income exclusion and the foreign tax credit. However, at least some
of those individuals may be subject to tax if their income is high enough, and most
citizens could understand the importance of preventing double taxation by allowing
the foreign tax credit. On the low-income side, many citizens' income is below the
threshold at which income tax is due. Such people, however, often pay payroll taxes.
358. Cf infra note 421 and accompanying text (criticizing provisions, such
as the Reed Amendment, that attempt to punish such former citizens).
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U.S. (or perhaps any other) income tax, the perceived abuse might be viewed
as ongoing.3 S9
In the case of the other traditionally important obligation of
citizenship-the obligation to defend the country if called upon-current
U.S. law does not generally relieve citizens living abroad of their obligations.
While the United States does not currently have a military draft, all male
citizens-including those residing outside the United States-are required to
register with the Selective Service upon reaching age 18.360 The
implementation of a residence-based tax system for citizens would move
away from this standard of treating all U.S. citizens, regardless of where they
live, as members of the same community, at least with respect to the
fundamental obligations of citizenship.
Avi-Yonah takes a contrary view of tax-motivated citizens moving
abroad under a residence-based tax system. 6' While acknowledging that
significant numbers of citizens may move abroad under a residence-based
tax system, he defends this result using the Tiebout sorting rationale, which
envisions individuals "voting with their feet" to determine the population's
desired level of tax and expenditures:
We should go back to Charles Tiebout's famous conclusion
from 1956 that if people are mobile, countries should set tax
rates to reflect the taste of their residents, and those residents
that do not like the resulting choice (which is established by
democratic elections) should be free to move to other
countries whose choices they like better. . . . [L]et people
who do not like the result [of quadrennial elections in which
proper tax rates are debated and decided] move overseas,
and stop taxing them there even if they retain US
citizenship.362
359. See also Harvey, A Report from the Front Lines, supra note 230, at 19
(noting that such a situation could result in "a public uproar"). Harvey suggests that,
were Congress to enact residence-based taxation of citizens, it should significantly
tighten the number of days a present can be present in the United States before
becoming a tax resident. See id.
360. See 50 U.S.C. § 453(a) (generally requiring registration by "every
male citizen of the United States"); see also Frequently Asked Questions, SELECTIVE
SERVICE SYs., Apr. 9, 2013, http://www.sss.gov/QA.HTM#quest9 (instructing
citizens living outside the United States to contact an embassy or consulate for
assistance in registering). In addition, many categories of male noncitizens residing
in the United States must register, including lawful permanent residents and
unauthorized immigrants. See 50 U.S.C. § 453(a).
361. See Avi-Yonah, And Yet it Moves, supra note 61, at 10.
362. Id. (citing Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) [hereinafter Tiebout, Theory ofLocal Expenditures]).
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While the Tiebout model may be appealing under certain ideal
assumptions, it has a number of significant shortcomings in the case of
citizens escaping U.S. tax by moving to a foreign country. Tiebout's
analysis, by its own terms, focuses on the level of expenditures for "local
public goods."363 Tiebout explicitly states that his population sorting model
does not apply at the federal level. 36 This focus on the local level is
grounded in a number of necessary assumptions underlying the model. For
example, one of Tiebout's assumptions is that "[tihe public services supplied
exhibit no external economies or diseconomies between communities, 36s In
other words, for his model to work, there can be no spillover benefits or costs
between communities. While this assumption might be fulfilled with the
local public goods that are the focus of Tiebout's hypotheticals, 366 it does not
apply at the international level. A U.S. citizen who moves to another country
might still obtain some indirect benefits from the expenditures occurring
within the United States. For example, he might benefit from military
protection provided by the United States (either indirectly if he resides in an
allied country that comes within the United States' defensive sphere or, less
often, directly if he is in a country where direct U.S. military intervention
might be called on). The citizen abroad (along with nonresident noncitizens)
might also receive a number of other spillover benefits from United States
expenditures, such as technological improvements arising from U.S. research
and development funding, or economic benefits by investing in relatively
stable U.S. banks or financial markets. Given these significant spillover
possibilities, the population sorting envisioned by Tiebout at the local level
would not necessarily provide accurate results regarding the optimal level of
public expenditure at the U.S. federal level.
The application of Tiebout's model in the citizen migration context
also suffers from a more general flaw. Under the model, an individual
"votes" by "picking that community which best satisfies his preference
363. Tiebout, Theory ofLocal Expenditures, supra note 362, at 416.
364. Id. Tiebout acknowledges that other economists' conclusion that "no
'market type' solution exists to determine the level of expenditures on public goods"
is "valid for federal expenditures." Id. He then offers his model to show that this
limitation "need not apply to local expenditures." Id. Later in the paper, he reiterates
that his model and its assumptions applies to local governments, but acknowledges
that it might apply, "with less force," to state governments. Id. at 418.
365. Id. at 419.
366. Tiebout acknowledges that even some apparently local public goods-
such as police protection and pesticide programs aimed at invasive insect species-
do not satisfy his model's no-spillover requirement. See id. at 423. He suggests that
this concern might be mitigated by some form of integration between adjacent
communities to address these specific concerns. See id. Such an approach is not
applicable to spillover issues described above among nations.
198 [Vol. 16:3
Revisiting the Taxation of Citizens Abroad
pattern for public goods."36' An implicit assumption is that the individual can
pick only a single community at any given time. Living in that community
will subject him to the benefits of the community, including the right to vote
and the ability to benefit from the local public goods, and will subject him to
the obligations of that community (namely, taxes). This single-community
assumption breaks down in a fundamental way in the context of citizens
moving abroad in a residence-taxation system. As described by Avi-Yonah, a
quadrennial U.S. election would decide the proper rate for taxing all
income, 368 and those citizens who do not like the resulting level of tax could
move abroad to avoid taxation. Under such a system, the nonresident
citizens, after "voting with their feet" to move abroad, would not bear the
burden of tax. However, not only would they still receive some spillover
benefits (described above), but more importantly they would still, it is
assumed, have the right to vote in the United States.i6 They could continue
to vote for relatively high taxes and federal expenditures (from which they
would derive at least some benefits), while not being subject to the tax cost,
thereby bypassing a fundamental check inherent in Tiebout's model.37 o
A final difference between the Tiebout model and the citizen
migration context concerns the role of citizenship. In Tiebout's model,
individuals have no allegiance to a particular community,371 nor do members
367. Id. at 418.
368. This approach seems to reflect another difference from Tiebout's
model, which relies on local governments predetermining the level of public
expenditure, then allowing individuals to choose which of the various communities
(with different levels) they prefer. According to Tiebout, "In this model there is no
attempt on the part of local governments to 'adapt to' the preferences of consumer-
voters. Instead, those local governments that attract the optimum number of residents
may be viewed as being 'adopted by' the economic system." Id. at 420. In contrast,
the above-described proposal (consistent with Tiebout's description of a central
government for which the model does not apply) relies on the voters expressing their
preferences every four years, with the government trying to adjust to the pattern of
these preferences. See id.
369. None of the proposals for residence-based taxation of citizens
explicitly proposed eliminating the voting rights of overseas citizens. However, Avi-
Yonah suggests that "it would be legitimate" for the United States to prevent
overseas citizens from voting if they no longer were subject to tax. See Avi-Yonah,
The Case Against Taxing Citizens, supra note 39, at 392.
370. At least in this limited context, the current citizenship-based tax
system seems closer to Tiebout's model, given that an individual can escape the tax
imposed by the U.S. community only by fully removing himself (i.e., both
physically and with respect to citizenship, with its voting and other benefits); cf
Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 17, at 1347 (arguing that
citizenship-based taxation does not fit within the Tiebout model).
371. Tiebout's first assumption is that "[c]onsumer-voters are fully mobile
and will move to that community where their preference patters, which are set, are
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of a community have particular allegiance to an individual. Accordingly,
there is no psychic or similar cost to either the individual or a particular
community when the individual makes his residence decision based purely
on where his expenditure preference patterns are best satisfied. In contrast,
the proposals to adopt residence-based taxation involve individuals with U.S.
citizenship. As discussed above,372 if citizens were able to avoid U.S. tax
liability by moving abroad, there could be significant tax compliance issues
and nontax social costs. These costs do not appear to fit squarely within
Tiebout's model.373
B. Reform Proposals and the Estate Tax
The criticism of citizenship-based taxation and proposals for
residence-based taxation generally focuses on the income tax consequences
of each regime. However, it is important to consider the impact of proposals
on the estate and gift tax. A significant number of the high-profile citizenship
renunciations in recent decades, both under the pre-2008 expatriation regime
and the current exit-tax-based expatriation regime, reportedly were driven by
U.S. estate tax concerns. For example, U.S. estate tax concerns were said to
be the principal motivation for citizenship renunciations for J. Paul Getty's
grandson, Jacob Stolt-Nielsen Jr. (the son of a shipping magnate), and Joseph
J. Bogdonavich Jr., heir to the StarKist tuna fortune, among others.374
Similarly, some tax lawyers suggested that the recent citizenship
renunciation by Facebook cofounder Eduardo Saverin may have been driven
primarily by future estate and gift tax concerns, despite his relatively young
age.375
Under current citizenship-based law, a citizen living abroad
generally is subject to the same estate tax rules that apply to a domestic
citizen and generally is taxable at a 40 percent rate on worldwide assets in
excess of the $5.25 million exemption amount.376 In contrast, a noncitizen
nonresident is subject to the U.S. estate and gift tax only with respect to
best satisfied." Tiebout, Theory of Local Expenditures, supra note 362,
419.
372. See supra notes 352-60 and accompanying text.
373. As a final observation regarding the Tiebout model in this context,
even in a hypothetical world where all the assumptions could be satisfied, it is not
clear that the model would be appropriate for purposes of guiding U.S. tax policy.
The goal of the model is to create a "market type" solution for a collection of
communities to determine the optimal level of expenditures on public goods. It is not
clear that this is, or should be, the goal of a particular nation's tax policy.
374. See Sapirie & Johnston, Solving the Expatriation Enigma, supra note
232, at 768.
375. See Hardy, Facebook Co-Founder Reflects, supra note 304.
376. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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U.S.-situs assets, although he only receives a $60,000 exemption. 377 For
estate tax purposes, stock in a domestic corporation is treated as U.S.-situs,
and is therefore subject to tax.378 However, for gift tax purposes, a noncitizen
nonresident is not taxed on the transfer of intangibles (including stock in a
domestic corporation). 379 A number of planning opportunities are available to
help noncitizen nonresidents minimize their U.S. transfer tax exposure under
these rules.38 o
A shift to residence-based taxation for citizens could provide
significant transfer tax benefits, thereby adding to the above-discussed
income tax incentives. Given that a number of high-profile U.S. citizens have
been willing to go so far as renounce citizenship for these estate tax benefits,
it is reasonable to assume that an even greater number will be willing to take
the less drastic step of establishing a foreign tax residence while retaining
U.S. citizenship and the ability to return to spend significant amount of time
in the United States each year. Again, while a change in state residence is a
less drastic step than a change in country residence, the willingness of high-
wealth individuals to relocate to states without estate or inheritance taxes
supports the idea that high-wealth individuals are sensitive to significant tax
liability and are willing to undertake some changes in their personal
circumstances to minimize taxes.
The extent of the estate-tax-driven incentive will depend, in part, on
the particular mix of assets that the departing individual owns.382 An
individual who primarily holds cash-equivalents or other assets with minimal
built-in gain will be able to eventually save a tax on 40 percent on her total
net worth, while incurring little if any exit tax upon her change of
residence. 383 Even an individual with significant built-in gains could benefit
by changing residence, given that a 23.8 percent exit tax on the built-in gain
would be much less than a 40 percent tax on her net worth.384
377. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
378. See I.R.C. § 2104(a).
379. See id. § 2501(a)(2).
380. See Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 29-
30.
381. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
382. There would be no benefit for an individual whose taxable estate is
below the exclusion amount ($5.34 million in 2014).
383. The nonresident citizen would avoid U.S. estate tax only to the extent
she holds non-U.S.-situs assets. To the extent she holds U.S.-situs assets
immediately after the residence change, she could sell them without any U.S. income
tax liability (although she would already have recognized any built-in gain as a result
of the exit tax).
384. Again, the individual would need to ensure she held no U.S.-situs
assets after her departure.
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The ACA proposal regarding transfer tax implicitly acknowledges
this potential for large estate tax savings but suggests only a modest anti-
abuse provision. Under the proposal, a departing citizen would be treated as
a nonresident for estate tax purposes only if her death occurs more than two
years after her overseas resident status was established.8 While this would
eliminate the most blatant abuses (e.g., a terminally ill individual moving
outside the United States just a few weeks before her death), it still provides
significant opportunities for individuals who survive the two-year waiting
period. While most high-wealth individuals would probably conclude that
the disruption to their personal life would not justify the tax savings, it is
reasonable to assume that a significant number of people would consider
(and perhaps act on) the option. Moreover, the personal cost to relocating
abroad would be softened if the substantial presence test, or some variant
thereof, were used to determine a citizen's residence for transfer tax
purposes. As discussed above, under that test an individual could spend a
significant amount of time in the United States each year while still
remaining a tax nonresident (i.e., four months per year if the existing 183-
day weighted test is extended to residents).
The tax incentives might be even greater when the gift tax is
considered. Under current law, a special transfer tax rule applies in the case
of an individual who surrenders citizenship. Under Code section 2801, if a
"covered expatriate" makes a gift or bequest to a U.S. citizen or resident, that
U.S. recipient is liable for a 40 percent tax (assuming the gift or bequest is
not otherwise subject to U.S. estate or gift tax).8 This provision is intended
to eliminate any estate or gift tax advantages in a circumstance where the
renouncing citizen retains a particular tie to the United States-in other
words, a U.S. child or other beneficiary who will receive her assets.
The residence-based taxation proposals generally do not suggest
retaining the special rule of Code section 2801. While most of the above-
discussed proposals are silent on this issue, ACA explicitly addresses it,
calling section 2801 a "punitive provision" that "will not apply in any way
whatsoever" to U.S. citizens under a residence-based system.38 ' Another
more recent proposal by Avi-Yonah suggests that a modified version of
section 2801 would be retained, although that revised version would still
enable individuals to engage in the type of planning discussed above,
385. See AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note
47, at 11. The Code contains other provisions that impose waiting periods to ensure
that individuals do not reap tax benefits by making transfers shortly before a
person's death. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1014(e) (one year look-back period denying basis
step-up in certain appreciated property acquired by decedent by gift); I.R.C. § 2035
(three-year estate tax look-back for certain property interests transferred by gift).
386. See I.R.C. § 2801.
387. AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note 47,
at 10 & n.35.
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provided the donee was willing to also establish foreign residence for a brief
period of time. Given that the other proposals generally advocate treating
nonresident citizens in the same way that other nonresidents currently are
treated, those other proposals would probably agree that section 2801 would
not apply to nonresident-citizen transferors under a residence-based system.
In the absence of section 2801, residence-based taxation could open
the spigot for U.S. citizens to avoid the U.S. transfer tax system. In the
simplest scenario, an individual could establish nonresident status, convert
U.S.-situs assets to foreign assets or cash (to the extent they weren't already
foreign situs or cash), 38 9 and make a substantial gift of those assets to her
children (who might still be U.S.-resident citizens). 39 0 The nonresident
citizen could even give stock in a domestic corporation directly to the U.S.
donee, given that a nonresident noncitizen's gift of intangibles is not
currently subject to U.S. gift tax.39' This gift-tax approach has a significant
388. Avi-Yonah's more-recent residence-based taxation proposal,
coauthored on behalf of the International Committee of the State Bar of California's
Taxation Section, recommends extending section 2801 so it would apply not only to
long-term lawful permanent residents who lose that status (as under the current
version), but also to all other former long-term residents as well as all nonresident
citizens. See AVI-YONAH & MARTIN, TAX SIMPLIFICATION, supra note 54, at 1-2. If
this were the only change to section 2801, it might limit the potential avoidance
opportunities described infra in the text. However, Avi-Yonah further observes:
"Importantly, the current provisions of Section 2801 which taxes gifts and bequests
to any U.S. citizens and U.S. residents would need to be modified to impose such
taxation only upon any U.S. residents (which would exclude U.S. citizens residing
overseas)." Id. at 9. This proposed modification, by calling off section 2801 when
the donee is a nonresident (even if he is a U.S. citizen), would preserve the ability of
high-wealth individuals to avoid U.S. transfer taxes in the manner described infra in
the text-it would merely add an additional hurdle. In order to avoid section 2801,
not only would the U.S. citizen donor need to move abroad temporarily, but the U.S.
citizen donee would also need to do so. While this might discourage many families
from engaging in this approach (because, for example, the donee might still be
working in the United States and be unable to put his career on hold for a year or
two), for situations where the amounts were large enough (e.g., the potential to save
tens or hundreds of millions or more of U.S. transfer taxes), there probably would be
at least some donees willing to join their donor parents abroad temporarily. After
receiving the gift tax-free, these donees could return to the United States.
389. Given that certain assets (e.g., United States real property) are exempt
from the exit tax under the proposals, and instead are taxed upon disposition by the
nonresident (as under current law), the individual would probably not want to use
those assets in this context.
390. As noted supra, Avi-Yonah and Martin's proposal would require the
U.S. citizen donee to also (perhaps temporarily) become a nonresident in order to
avoid U.S. tax on the gift. See AVI-YONAH & MARTIN, TAX SIMPLIFICATION, supra
note 54, at 9.
391. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
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benefit over the estate-tax approach-a U.S. citizen would only have to live
abroad for a limited amount of time and could then return to the United
States, rather than needing to spend the rest of her life as a nonresident.
Various anti-abuse provisions could be envisioned to limit this
approach. For example, although the ACA proposal is silent regarding a gift-
tax waiting period, its proposed two-year estate tax taint could be extended to
the gift tax.392 However, if sufficient amounts were involved, many high-
wealth individuals would probably we willing to leave the United States for
this period before making gifts. Indeed, one can envision a retired high-
wealth couple undertaking an extended around-the-world trip for a few years
(with the ability to spend significant time back in the United States after the
first year of nonresidence) 393 in order to satisfy an anti-abuse waiting period.
Other anti-abuse provisions could also be considered. For example,
the gift tax could be imposed on gifts of domestic stock by nonresident
citizens. However, anti-abuse provisions might raise additional
administrative problems, thereby undermining one of the principal arguments
for moving to a residence-based system.394 Indeed, the taxation of gifts of
domestic stock by nonresident noncitizens was previously abandoned
because of the enforcement difficulties it entailed.
392. A somewhat analogous provision currently exists in the income tax
area for certain noncitizens who lose their tax-resident status but then reestablish it
within three years. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(10) (subjecting such individuals to taxation
under I.R.C. § 877(b) to the extent it would increase their tax liability).
393. If the current "substantial presence" test for noncitizens is extended to
citizens, a citizen who previously lived exclusively in the United States might have
to limit her physical presence in the United States to no more than 31 days during the
first year of desired nonresidence (because she will have difficulty avoiding the 183-
day weighted aspect if she spent 365 days in the United States during each of the
prior two years before departure). See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (an alien is a tax resident
only if she is both physically present for 31 days in the current year and triggers the
183-day weighted test ). Thereafter, she could spend significant time in the United
States (particularly because the small number of days of physical presence in the first
year would be useful in lowering the weighted total the next year).
394. See supra notes 255-76 and accompanying text (discussing
enforcement difficulties associated with proposed residence tests).
395. Prior to the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 ("FITA"), Pub. L. No.
89-809, 80 Stat. 1539, nonresident noncitizens engaged in business in the United
States were subject to gift tax on the transfer of intangible property. See Pub. L. No.
89-809, § 109(a), 80 Stat. at 1574-75 (I.R.C. § 2501(a) prior to amendment by
FITA). Congress concluded that "this rule has proved to be impossible to enforce,
since there is no practical way for the Internal Revenue Service to find out when
these gifts are made. Moreover, it does not occur to many nonresident aliens that
these transfers are subject to U.S. gift tax." S. REP. No. 89-1707, at 57 (1966). As a
result of the FITA amendment, present law provides that the gift tax generally "shall
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Another possibility would be to use a more subjective test of
residence for transfer tax purposes, rather than a test based on day counting.
For example, the domicile-based test currently used to determine an alien's
transfer tax residence could be extended to citizens in a residence-based
396system. However, given the difficulty of determining an individual's
intentions, and an individual's control over objective indicators of intent
(e.g., location of bank accounts, driver's license, etc.), such an approach
might open further avenues for tax planning under a residence-based transfer
tax system for citizens.
A final transfer tax concern involves analogies that some residence-
based proponents have made between the proposed exit tax and Canada's
departure tax. For example, Blum and Singer note that "[a]n 'exit tax' on
departing residents has long been employed in Canada,"3 97 while Schneider
asserts that "[t]he best, and conceptually cleanest, approach is to follow
broadly the [exit tax] approach of Canada."39 8
These analogies to Canada's exit tax omit an important
consideration-the absence of a Canadian estate tax. The proposed exit tax,
like current Code section 877A in the context of individuals surrendering
citizenship, focuses on protecting the U.S. income tax base (at least with
respect to accumulated gains from property that have not yet been taxed).
However, it would not protect the estate tax. This lack of attention to the
estate tax is not a problem in Canada-in 1972 Canada eliminated its estate
tax, substituting in its place a mark-to-market tax at death, whereby a
decedent is treated as if he sold all of his capital property at death and must
recognize any deemed gains (subject to various exceptions). Under the
Canadian system, where the income tax and the deemed-disposition-at-death
tax both focus on the same thing (i.e., gain from property), a mark-to-market
departure tax protects both. However, a U.S. exit tax under the proposals
would only backstop the U.S. income tax, potentially leaving the U.S. estate
tax exposed.
not apply to the transfer of intangible property by a nonresident not a citizen of the
United States." I.R.C. § 2501(a)(2).
396. See Reg. § 20.0-1(b)(2) (defining "nonresident" as a noncitizen "who,
at the time of his death, had his domicile outside the United States"). Under the
regulations, which are based on the common law test, "[a] person acquires a
domicile in a place by living there, for even a brief period of time, with no definite
present intention of later removing therefrom." Id. § 20.0-1(b)(1).
397. Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra note
39, at 732.
398. Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 75.
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C The Relevance of the United States' Outlier Status
Almost every critic of citizenship-based taxation emphasizes that the
United States stands almost alone in taxing its nonresident citizens. 99 While
this is true as a formal matter,4 0 0 it is only partially true in practice, given that
many countries define tax residence in broad terms that often result in taxing
their nationals living abroad for extended period.4 01 As Zelinsky observed, at
least for those countries that use "domicile" as the test for tax residence, "the
outcome in many cases is the same whether the criterion for taxation is
residence defined as domicile or citizenship."402
Moreover, the mere fact that the United States exercises broader
taxing rights than most other countries does not, of itself, justify a move to
residence-based taxation of citizens. Countries implement tax policies based
on a broad range of considerations, including cultural, political, historical,
institutional, and economic factors. As discussed extensively supra (and
elsewhere),403 I believe there are significant justifications for the United
399. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, supra note
39, at 389; AVI-YONAH & MARTIN, TAX SIMPLIFICATION, supra note 54, at 4; Blum
& Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra note 39, at 706 n.3;
Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 3. Schneider objects
to citizenship-based taxation by asking, "[W]hat is the justification for U.S.
exceptionalism on this point? Why should political allegiance to the United States be
any more demanding and costly than to any other country?" Schneider, The End of
Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 51; see also Avi-Yonah, The Case Against
Taxing Citizens, supra note 39, at 392 ("If the other democracies do not impose
worldwide taxation on their nonresident citizens because of the benefits they
provide, it is unclear why we should exact such a high price for our benefits.").
These are legitimate questions. However, whereas Schneider asks them rhetorically
in criticism of the U.S. policy, my discussion in the text suggests that the mere fact
that the United States is an outlier is not dispositive, particularly when, as I believe,
the U.S. tax policy reasons for imposing the tax outweigh the instrumental or other
downsides to doing so. I also address these questions from the opposite direction,
suggesting that some countries might reconsider their residence-based taxation of
citizens as a result of the new global information sharing norm.
400. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
401. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 449
n.15 (listing several countries that use expansive definitions of "resident" in this
context). Moreover, given the availability of the foreign tax credit and the foreign
earned income exclusion, the United States does not exercise these taxing rights to
their full possible extent.
402. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 17, at 1325.
403. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1; see
also Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 17, at 1325
(justifying citizenship-based taxation as an administrative proxy for domicile-based
taxation).
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States to utilize citizenship-based taxation rather than residence-based
taxation of citizens. In light of these justifications, the United States' (partial)
outlier status is relevant only to the extent it creates problems whose costs (in
connection with other potential problems raised by citizenship-based
taxation) outweigh the benefits.
One potential problem with the United States' approach is that, by
using a system that is different than that of most other countries, it might
undermine the goal of harmonizing the manner in which countries' tax
regimes interact with each other. While this may be a laudable goal, this area
would hardly be the only area in which countries take different approaches.
Moreover, even those countries that use residence-based (rather than
citizenship-based) taxation do not use a uniform definition of tax residence,
thereby creating the possibility that an individual could be treated as a tax
resident of two or more countries.404
A related concern is that this lack of coordination among countries,
potentially aggravated by the United States' use of citizenship-based
taxation, will adversely impact U.S. citizens-for example, causing double
taxation of some income and creating excessive compliance burdens. This is
a legitimate concern, although the potential for double-taxation is
ameliorated by the availability of the foreign tax credit and the foreign
income exclusion. Of course, while these provisions may alleviate the
double-taxation concern, they may aggravate the administrative concerns,
particularly by imposing compliance burdens on overseas citizens. This
concern, and the importance of addressing it, are discussed further infra in
Part VI.
It is also worth contemplating that, rather than the United States
moving to a residence-based regime for its citizens, other countries might
move toward a citizenship-based regime in the future (although I am not
currently aware of any movement in this direction). One of the principal
problems with the taxation of citizens abroad relates to enforcement
difficulties-indeed, the Philippines abandoned citizenship-based taxation in
1997 primarily because of enforcement concerns. 4 0 5 However, as discussed
extensively above, global norms are shifting toward more widespread
automatic information sharing, which might enable countries to collect more
information on at least certain types of income received by their citizens
404. Zelinsky, looking at the definitions of residence used by just three
English-speaking nations, identified four alternative forms of the definition:
objective counting of days of physical presence, subjective inquiry into various
factors that might augment less physical presence, inquiry into "ordinary" residence,
and inquiry into a person's domicile, or permanent home. See Zelinsky, Citizenship
and Worldwide Taxation, supra note 17, at 1324.
405. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 47-
48.
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abroad.406 Also, as populations become more mobile, if news reports of
citizens establishing foreign residency in order to avoid taxation become
more prevalent, some countries may be tempted to act in order to address
concerns that high-income citizens were abusing the system. Of course, some
countries, due to differing views of citizenship or other historical, social, and
cultural factors,4 0 7 might refrain from adopting citizenship-based taxation
even if enforcement were more practicable. Yet, even these factors might
change. For example, in the past, some other countries might have viewed
themselves as countries of emigration, where once citizens emigrated they
generally did not return. However, in a modem global economy, it might
become more common even in these countries for citizens to move abroad
for extended periods, yet eventually return. Under such circumstances, the
country might be more willing to continue viewing that nonresident citizen
as an ongoing member of society (who should pay taxes to support the
society). Of course, moving to a citizenship-based system under any of these
scenarios would run the risk that the individual might surrender her
citizenship if she decided the taxes were no longer worth the benefits. But
such a result would be consistent with the general rationale underlying
citizenship-based taxation.
A final observation in the context of the United States' (partial)
outlier status concerns a particular country. Eritrea is often identified as one
of the only other countries that taxes its citizens living abroad.408 In late
2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution condemning
the "diaspora tax" imposed by Eritrea on its nationals living outside the
country. Some critics of U.S. citizenship-based taxation have seized upon
this Security Council resolution to taint the U.S. citizenship-based taxation
system. For example, the ACA report, after mentioning the Security
Council's condemnation of Eritrea's diaspora tax, asserted that the United
States' "[c]itizenship-based taxation is nothing more than a tax on the
American diaspora under a different name."409 Similarly, a Wall Street
Journal commentator noted that "[i]ronically, then-U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N. Susan Rice condemned this practice by Eritrea in 2011 as 'the extortion
406. Of course, there still could be problems converting this information
into actual collection of taxes. While the United States is attempting to use FATCA
to leverage its unique role in financial markets, other countries might not be able
implement enforcement tools, such as withholding taxes on foreign financial
institutions, without risking the loss of significant foreign investment.
407. Cf Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 37
(discussing historical and cultural factors that might make the United States more
willing to tax its citizens abroad).
408. See supra note 4 (also mentioning North Korea and Vietnam).
409. AM. CITIZENs ABROAD, RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION, supra note 47,
at 28 n.22.
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of a diaspora tax from people of Eritrean descent living overseas."A10 The
commentator then quipped that "[m]any would describe U.S. practice in
similar terms."
As described by these critics, one might think that the U.N. Security
Council (with the United States' backing) had taken it upon itself to make
pronouncements upon general international tax policy matters. However, this
was not the goal of the Security Council, and seen in context, it is clear that
the resolution was concerned with unique facts specific to Eritrea, which
have no applicability to the United States tax system. In the years leading up
to the U.N. resolution, the Security Council had adopted a number of other
resolutions concerning violence and political instability in Somalia, Eritrea,
and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa.4 12 Eritrea had continued to supply
weapons and financial support to opposition groups, including al-Shabaab, in
defiance of these resolutions.4 13 Eritrea financed these activities, in part, by
collecting "diaspora taxes" from nationals living abroad. These collections
were not conducted through ordinary international-law-compliant channels,
which restrict the ability of one country to perform collection activity in the
territory of another. Rather, Eritrea had its overseas consular officials use
"extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means to collect taxes
outside of Eritrea."4 14 These methods included threats to harm relatives still
living in Eritrea if the overseas national did not pay.415 Eventually, Canada
expelled an Eritrean diplomat because of these illicit activities in demanding
416
money from expatriates in Canada. A recent U.N. Security Council
committee report states that Eritrean consular officials abroad are still using
410. Graffy, How to Lose Friends, supra note 244.
411. See id.
412. See S.C. Res. 2023, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2023 (Dec. 5, 2011) (citing
prior resolutions); Gianluca Mezzofiore, Eritrea Extorts UK Refugees to Fund
Somalia's al-Shabaab Islamist Fighters, INT'L Bus. TIMES, July 29, 2013,
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/495268/20130729/eritrea-shabaab-somalia-diadias
pora-tax-hom-islam.htm [hereinafter Mezzofiore, Eritrea Extorts UK Refugees].
413. See Mezzofiore, Eritrea Extorts UK Refugees, supra note 412.
414. Id.
415. Id. (Eritrean national in London stating that she was forced to pay after
authorities threatened her parents living in Eritrea); BBC, Canada Expels Eritrean
Envoy Over Diaspora "Tax, " AFRICA REV., May 30, 2013, http://www.africareview.
com/News/Canada-kicks-out-Eritrea-envoy/-/979180/1866812/-/p76vn3z/-/index.ht
ml (Eritrean national living in Canada describing the collection methods and noting,
"[T]hey don't give you a reason. You have to pay the money. My family [in Eritrea]
would get in trouble if I don't pay." (second alteration in original)).
416. See BBC, Canada Expels Eritrean Envoy, supra note 415; see also
Mezzofiore, Eritrea Extorts UK Refugees, supra note 412 (stating that Eritrean
diplomats in London continued their collection activities even after U.K. officials
warned them to stop).
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illicit means to collect the "diaspora tax" for purposes of funding banned
activities.4 17
The U.N. Security Council resolution cited by critics of citizenship-
based taxation was carefully worded to condemn the two specific aspects of
the Eritrean "tax" that the Council found objectionable: (i) the use of the
proceeds "to destabilize the Horn of Africa region or violate relevant
resolutions,"418 and (ii) the use of "extortion, threats of violence, fraud and
other illicit means to collect taxes outside of Eritrea from its nationals or
other individuals of Eritrean descent."419 Thus, Ambassador Rice's
condemnation of Eritrea's "extortion" of its nationals abroad was a reference
to actual extortion, including physical threats to the individuals and their
relatives, rather than a metaphorical reference to the general imposition of
tax. Accordingly, the Security Council's resolution regarding Eritrea has no
relevance to the analysis of U.S. citizenship-based taxation.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGING PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHILE
MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPLES
The above analysis suggests that recent developments in global tax
enforcement and information sharing generally support and reinforce the
viability of citizenship-based taxation. Moreover, proposals to tax citizens
only under a residence-based system raise a number of significant concerns.
Accordingly, I believe that citizenship-based taxation will, and should,
remain the general rule for the United States.
However, it is important to acknowledge the practical impact that the
U.S. tax regime has on overseas citizens. While the complexity of the U.S.
income tax system imposes some degree of compliance costs and
annoyances on all taxpayers, whether residing domestically or abroad,
overseas citizens often face unique circumstances. But just as we do not
eliminate the entire tax code because some domestic citizens face significant
burdens from tax complexity (although some suggest we should), these
problems faced by overseas citizens do not, of themselves, justify
eliminating citizenship-based taxation. Rather, if there are significant other
reasons for retaining this system (which I believe there are for reasons
discussed above), we should attempt to fix the administrative problems to the
417. See S.C. Res. 2060 Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council (2012): Eritrea, Doc. S/2013/440, at 34-35
(Jul. 25, 2013) (documenting that this activity continues to occur in numerous
countries, including Canada, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The report
"recommends that Member States exercise police powers to implement their
obligations under the 2011 Security Council resolution." See id. at 35.
418. S.C. Res. 2023, supra note 412, 1 10.
419. Id. 11.
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extent possible.42 0 Congress, the IRS, and other relevant parts of the U.S.
government should keep these administrative problems in mind when
developing and enforcing U.S. law, and should be willing to mitigate these
problems to the extent consistent with the policies underlying citizenship-
based taxation.
I have already written at length proposing the repeal of certain
"alternative sanctions" whose principal purposes is to punish, shame, or
otherwise burden former citizens who surrender their citizenship, at least in
part, for tax purposes. 42 ' The following subparts highlight a few additional
areas where practical problems could be addressed to help those who retain
their citizenship while overseas, without harming the principles underlying
citizenship-based taxation. There are certain to be other examples not listed.
Advocates for overseas citizens are well-positioned to identify other potential
areas for improvement. While such groups undoubtedly will continue to
advocate for a residence-based tax system, they should also continue to
420. A recent article by Dick Harvey reached a similar conclusion that
recent developments do not justify the abandonment of citizenship-based taxation,
but that the U.S. should take steps to simplify the compliance burden on overseas
taxpayers. See Harvey, A Report from the Front Lines, supra note 230, at 14-19.
421. My previous work suggested that Congress should eliminate
"alternative sanctions" whose principal purpose is to punish, shame, or otherwise
burden former citizens. For example, I have previously proposed the repeal of the
Reed Amendment, which provides that "[a]ny alien who is a former citizen of the
United States who officially renounces United States citizenship . . . for the purpose
of avoiding taxation by the United States" is inadmissible to the country. See Kirsch,
Alternative Sanctions, supra note 294. In response to the renunciation of citizenship
by Facebook cofounder Eduardo Saverin, and given the impracticability of the
Department of Homeland Security ever applying the Reed Amendment, Senator
Charles Schumer proposed a bill known as the "Ex-PATRIOT Act," which was
intended to address some of the administrative shortcomings of the Reed
Amendment. See S. 3205, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012). Given that citizenship-based
taxation is justified, at least in part, on the idea that an individual can surrender
citizenship if she believes that the benefits do not justify the costs, the existence of
the exit tax to address any gains that have accumulated while an individual was a
citizen, and the historical importance of the right to surrender citizenship, I would
oppose the enactment of the Ex-PATRIOT Act and other alternative sanctions
similar to the Reed Amendment.
In my earlier work I also proposed the repeal of the quarterly publication
requirement regarding individuals who have surrendered citizenship. See Kirsch,
Alternative Sanctions, supra note 294. In place of this requirement, however, it
might be useful for the Department of State (or IRS) to continue to publish the
aggregate numbers of individuals who surrender citizenship, so that general
inferences might be drawn regarding the impact of citizenship-based taxation under
the new global enforcement and FATCA regimes.
2014] 211
Florida Tax Review
identify ways to improve the circumstances of overseas citizens in the
context of a continuing citizenship-based tax regime.4 22
A. Continue Efforts to Simplify Reporting and Compliance
Simplified reporting and compliance efforts may be the ripest area
for addressing the practical issues faced by overseas citizens. The recent IRS
enforcement and FATCA developments have brought increased attention to
this area. Prior to these developments, the IRS might not have placed
significant emphasis on these practical issues-many overseas citizens either
were not aware of their obligations or may have underestimated their
importance,423 while the IRS had only limited enforcement tools. However,
in an era of heightened enforcement tools, decreased bank secrecy, and
FATCA, and the resulting publicity they have generated overseas, the
circumstances have changed for both parties.
In this context, the IRS apparently has started to realize that one size
might not fit all, and that overseas citizens are impacted by these
developments in a way that domestic citizens are not, particularly in the
context of having a foreign financial account,424 as well as the possibility that
a failure to file a particular form or return does not necessarily indicate a
failure to pay required taxes.425 The IRS has begun to show some sensitivity
to this situation. For example, the new streamlined filing compliance
program allows certain "low risk" overseas citizens-generally, those who
underpaid their U.S. tax liabilities by less than $1,500 in each relevant
year-to come into compliance with tax returns and FBARs without any
FBAR-related penalties.426 In addition, the IRS has raised the FATCA-
422. Cf ACA Proposal for a Comprehensive Compliance Program to
Enable Tax Compliance by Americans Resident Overseas, Letter from American
Citizens Abroad to Hon. Jack Lew, Treas. Sec., et al., Jul. 19, 2013,
http://americansabroad.org/files/7513/7452/3519/FinalLetterto Treasury-IRS July
19_2013 copy.pdf (while noting that ACA continues to lobby Congress for a
residence-based taxation system, "in the interim" providing suggestions for changes
to the IRS compliance programs that will better serve overseas citizens attempting to
become compliant).
423. Of course, those overseas citizens who attempted to comply were
faced with these practical problems even before the recent increase in enforcement
activity. See, e.g., Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra
note 39, at 711-12 (discussing practical problems faced by overseas citizens even
before the current developments).
424. See supra notes 203-209 and accompanying text.
425. In particular, the individual's tax liability may have been significantly
reduced or eliminated by a foreign tax credit or foreign earned income exclusion,
had the returns been filed.
426. See supra notes 218-225 and accompanying text.
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related reporting thresholds for individuals residing abroad,4 27 and it has
announced certain forms of compliance relief for U.S. citizens (both resident
domestically and abroad) who failed to report or make deferral elections with
respect to Canadian retirement plans.42 8 The IRS has also provided some
relief for overseas citizens in areas outside of the recent enforcement
initiatives. For example, the IRS announced that citizens satisfying the
nonresidence tests under Code section 911 are not subject to the individual
mandate of the Affordable Care Act.429
In this context, overseas citizens have a high-profile advocate. In her
annual reports to Congress, Nina Olson, the IRS National Taxpayer
Advocate, has stressed the importance of addressing the practical problems
overseas citizens face in their efforts to comply. 43 0 In addition, several others,
including Dick Harvey, have suggested ways in which to eliminate or
simplify certain filing obligations for these citizens. 431 Among the more
427. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
428. See generally Hale E. Sheppard, IRS Introduces Two Unique Remedies
for U.S. Persons with Unreported Canadian Retirement Plans and Accounts, INT'L
TAX J., Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 13 [hereinafter Sheppard, IRS Remedies for Canadian
Retirement Plans].
429. See Q&A 12, Questions and Answers on the Individual Shared
Responsibility Provision, IRS, last accessed May, 11, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/
uac/Questions-and-Answers-on-the-Individual-Shared-Responsibility-Provision.
430. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, VOL. 1, at 228-48 (listing "The IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure
Program Disproportionately Burdens Those Who Make Honest Mistakes" and
"[FATCA] has the Potential to be Burdensome, Overly Broad, and Detrimental to
Taxpayer Rights" as two of the "Most Serious Problems" facing the IRS, and
including a list of recommendations); NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 51, at 262-80 (listing "Challenges Persist for
International Taxpayers as the IRS Moves Slowly to Address Their Needs" as one of
the "Most Serious Problems" facing the IRS, and including a list of
recommendations); NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2013 OBJECTIVES
REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 21-31 (noting that the National Taxpayer Advocate
intends to continue her focus on compliance problems faced by overseas citizens,
particularly those involving excessive FBAR and other international penalties);
Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 65 ("[I]ncreasingly
harsh enforcement of tax and reporting compliance against expatriates has led to
great distress, anger and alienation among expatriates.").
431. See Harvey, A Report from the Front Lines, supra note 230, at 716.
Harvey also suggests substantive changes that could reduce compliance burdens,
such as an increase in the foreign earned income exclusion and providing a de
minimis exemption for passive income. See id While I have criticized the normative
underpinnings of the foreign earned income exclusion elsewhere, I have
acknowledged that enforcement and compliance benefits are the strongest case for
the exclusion. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also Sharp,
Navigating Offshore Tax Hazards, supra note 199, at 706.
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frequently suggested changes is the combination of the FBAR form and the
new FATCA-imposed Form 8938. Congress and the IRS should continue to
consider these and other ways to simplify the compliance burdens on
overseas citizens. The IRS should continue to move toward (and publicize)
positions that recognize that many past compliance failures by overseas
citizens do not necessarily reflect bad faith. Such an approach would not only
provide fair treatment, but would also encourage more overseas citizens to
voluntarily return to return to the system (or enter it for the first time),
thereby furthering the goals of the enforcement initiatives and FATCA.432
While the recent IRS efforts to address compliance concerns of
overseas citizens are welcome, the form of some recent guidance raises
concerns. Much of the guidance has been issued in very informal ways, such
as press releases or pages on the IRS website.433 The distribution of
information through the IRS website-including the website's efforts to
aggregate links to relevant information on a single page 4 34-can be a very
useful resource for overseas citizens, particularly given complaints in the
past that overseas citizens were isolated from sources of information.
However, while the website can be a useful delivery vehicle (e.g., linking to,
or repeating verbatim, more authoritative sources of guidance), the use of
web pages themselves as a source of authority (e.g., where the guidance only
appears in the text of a web page) is problematic. Taxpayers and practitioners
may be wary of relying on them, as a website can be revised or deleted at any
time.435 This is particularly problematic given that some topics covered by
FAQs on the website (e.g., OVDI-related guidance) may have potential
criminal law implications for taxpayers. Moreover, a web page, although
432. Cf Sapirie, Personal Impact of Offshore Enforcement, supra note 218,
at 202 ("[E]veryone interviewed for this story thought the compliance effort should
focus on giving taxpayers three things: certainty, an equitable resolution, and an
opportunity to explain and be heard.").
433. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Officials Discuss Streamlined
Voluntary Compliance, 69 TAX NOTEs INT'L 252 (Jan. 21, 2013) (noting that the
informal instructions for the streamlined compliance program had not yet been
issued as a revenue procedure or other more formal guidance); Sheppard, IRS
Remedies for Canadian Retirement Plans, supra note 428, at 20 (describing taxpayer
confusion with IRS guidance issued via fact sheets and news releases regarding
Canadian retirement plans); see also supra note 429 (website information for
overseas citizens regarding Affordable Care Act individual mandate).
434. See International Taxpayer, IRS, Apr. 29, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/
Individuals/International-Taxpayers.
435. See also NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 2013
OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS 22 (expressing concern "that the fact sheet does
not have the same level of authority as changes made to the IRM itself or items of
guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin-and the IRS itself would be
the first to point out that taxpayers generally cannot rely on fact sheets and press
releases").
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giving the appearance of being current, may be out of date and not reflect
subsequent developments. Accordingly, the IRS should provide guidance
through more formal means that are less ephemeral than a web page, and it
should use the website as a delivery vehicle for that guidance.
B. Consider Lenient Treatment for Certain Unknowing Citizens
Another common complaint concerns U.S. citizens whose
connection to the United States is tenuous, such that they may not be aware
of their status or obligations. A broad spectrum of individuals is often placed
within this umbrella of "unknowing citizens." The most sympathetic group
are those individuals who had not realized they are U.S. citizens until
recently-for example, those who were born in the United States to
noncitizen parents (e.g., a parent was temporary studying at a U.S. school),
but who moved back to the parents' home country while still an infant and
had no connection to the United States until recently discovering their
citizenship status (perhaps because "place of birth" is now relevant under
FATCA).436 These individuals are sometimes referred to as "accidental"
citizens, although not all accidental citizens present sympathetic cases (e.g.,
an accidental citizen who was born while her parents were temporarily in the
United States, but who was aware of her U.S. citizenship status and took
advantage of it). A related group might be individuals who derived
citizenship by descent upon birth abroad to a U.S.-citizen parent, but had
never acquired a U.S. passport and may not have ever visited the United
States. These individuals are sometimes referred to as "nominal" citizens or,
if they were not even aware of their U.S. status, "unaware" citizens.437 At the
other end of the spectrum are individuals who are fully aware of their U.S.
citizenship status-indeed, they may have been born in the United States to
U.S. citizen parents, spent most of their life in the United States, and are
travelling abroad on a U.S. passport-but they claim to have been unaware
of their U.S. tax obligations while living abroad. While it is possible that
individuals in this latter group may warrant some kind of relief in particular
cases (and, in any event, this latter group might be shrinking, given the
increased publicity surrounding the OVDPs and FATCA), they raise a
different set of issues.4 38 This subpart is more concerned with individuals in
436. See Blum & Singer, Proposal for Residence-Based Taxation, supra
note 39, at 713 (accidental citizens are a "particularly striking example of overseas
U.S. citizens facing considerable burdens in becoming tax compliant"); see also
Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39, at 7.
437. See, e.g., Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39,
at 7-8.
438. The IRS, in providing a cap for certain "unaware" citizens under
OVDP, explicitly provided that this latter group of citizens is not eligible for this
blanket relief. See supra note 177.
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the former groups. Of course, some individuals might fall somewhere in
between the two extremes.
Some critics cite the circumstances of accidental and unaware
citizens as justification for the repeal of all citizenship-based taxation.43 9
However, the fact that a certain subgroup of overseas citizens has special
facts that may warrant relief does not justify eliminating citizenship-based
taxation on all overseas citizens, particularly given the potential problems
with residence-based taxation discussed above. Instead, as with the more
targeted response to administrative problems described in the preceding
subpart, a better approach is to implement rules that provide relief to
particular groups, where warranted.
The Code already provides relief from the exit tax for a narrow
group of individuals surrendering their citizenship." 0 More recently, in the
context of enhanced IRS enforcement efforts, the IRS has provided limited
relief under the OVDP to certain categories of "unaware" citizens. 44 1
However, this relief is only partial (a five-percent cap on the FBAR-related
penalty), so an unaware citizen might need to take the risk of seeking more
fact-specific relief by opting out of the OVDP (unless she qualifies for full
reporting-penalty relief under the streamlined procedures).
The IRS should continue to consider whether additional forms of
penalty relief are warranted for certain categories of unaware citizens. Given
the fact-dependent nature (i.e., based on subjective representations regarding
an individual's awareness), it is understandable that blanket relief on a
groupwide level might be difficult. Nonetheless, in an effort to encourage
these individuals to enter the system, the IRS should consider whether there
439. See, e.g., Schneider, The End of Taxation without End, supra note 39,
at 45, 75. Schneider rejects the argument that overseas citizens are members of U.S.
society because the "argument for comparison falls apart completely in connection
with accidental, nominal, and unaware citizens, whose connection to the United
States is typically minimal to nonexistent." Id.
440. The exit tax does not apply to an individual who surrenders citizenship
in two contexts: (i) the individual was, at birth, a dual citizen of the United States
and another country, continues to be a citizen and to be taxed by that other country,
and was a resident of the United States in no more than ten of the past 15 taxable
years, or (ii) the individual relinquished citizenship before age 18 2 and was a
resident of the United States for not more than ten taxable years before the
relinquishment. See I.R.C. § 877A(g)(1)(B).
441. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. The IRS website guidance
gives an example of an "accidental" citizen who had not been aware of her U.S.
citizenship status until recently when she obtained a copy of her birth certificate in
order to acquire a passport in her home country. Although the website does not
explicitly address the unknowing citizen who acquired citizenship by descent, the
website's general reference to "[tiaxpayers who are foreign residents and who were
unaware they were U.S. citizens" presumably would apply to her. See IRS, OVDP
Q&A, supra note 167, Q&A 52.
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are certain objective factors442 that could perhaps justify the waiver of
reporting-related penalties, rather than just capping them at five percent, in
order to have the individual pay back taxes and interest and enter the U.S. tax
system. Of course, as FATCA is implemented, particularly given the
relevance of "place of birth" in an FFI's due diligence, the scope of
accidental citizens who might be eligible to claim relief based on being
unaware of their citizenship status might shrink. Congress could also
consider providing statutory relief from tax liability for narrowly defined
categories of unaware citizens. A 1998 report by the Department of
Treasury's Office of Tax Policy raised this possibility and included a list of
factors that might be relevant in order to prevent abuse.443
C. Mitigate Perception ofSecond-Class Status
Some arguments raised by overseas citizens against U.S. taxation
relate to a perception that they are subject to indignities or otherwise are
treated as second-class citizens. A long-standing complaint in this area
related to the inability to vote in federal elections.444 This concern was
mitigated, at least in part, by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act,445 which allows a citizen abroad to cast an absentee ballot in the
state in which he last resided prior to moving outside the United States.446
Another perception-related concern arises in the context of a
frequently cited benefit of U.S. citizenship-the availability of consular and
military protection in times of crises outside the United States. While some
have questioned the relevance of this protection in the 21st century,447 it
442. Possible objective factors could include, for example, the individual
never had a U.S. passport or otherwise referred to U.S. status on any documents,
including foreign tax returns; if the individual is an "accidental" citizen; she left at a
very young age, etc.
443. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE BY U.S. CITIZENS AND U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS RESIDING
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND RELATED ISSUES 38-40 (1998). In the interest of
disclosure, it should be noted that the author participated in the drafting of the
previously cited study while working at the IRS and later at the Treasury
Department. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 484
n.171.
444. See Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at
474.
445. Pub. L. No. 99-4 10, 100 Stat. 924 (1986).
446. Some citizen advocacy groups argue that practical limits on the voting
right undermines its value for purposes of benefits-based taxing jurisdiction. But see
Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 1, at 474 (responding to
these arguments).




sometimes is called upon. For example, in response to conflict in Lebanon in
2006, the United States helped thousands of U.S. citizens evacuate the
country.448 More recently, in 2011 the State Department chartered flights to
evacuate U.S. citizens from Egypt in response to unsafe conditions that arose
there and the absence of sufficient commercial flights. 4 49
This crisis support is generally consistent with the underlying
rationale for taxing citizens abroad. However, one aspect of this support is
problematic. Pursuant to Federal law,450 these emergency evacuations are
provided "on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent practicable."4 In
other words, while there is no up-front charge to the evacuated citizens, they
are expected to reimburse the United States for the cost of their evacuation
travel, although the statute caps the reimbursement at the "reasonable
commercial air fare immediately prior to the events giving rise to the
evacuation." 4 52 The Department of State has an official form (structured as a
"promissory note and loan agreement") that the evacuating citizen is
expected to complete during the evacuation process and has issued detailed
instructions to Department of State personnel to ensure that the forms are
completed properly.453
448. See id. at 472; see generally GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, THE
JULY 2006 EVACUATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM LEBANON, GAO-07-893R
(Jun. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, JULY 2006
EVACUATION] (GAO review and analysis of the evacuation).
449. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Status of U.S. Citizen
Evacuations from Egypt, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/
02/155819.htm. These evacuations are consistent with guidance posted on the
Department of State website, which provides that "[iln more serious situations, we
may recommend that U.S. citizens leave the foreign country, and, if commercial
transportation is not available, provide departure assistance, as our resources
permit." What the Department of State Can and Can't Do in a Crisis, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, last accessed May 12, 2014, http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/
emergencies/emergencies 1212.html.
450. See 22 U.S.C. § 2671(b)(2)(ii).
451. Id.
452. Id. United States government employees and their dependents are not
required to personally reimburse the cost of their evacuation. See id. § 2671 (b)(2)(i).
453. See Crisis Evacuation Loans and Evacuation Documentation, 7 FOR.
AFFAIRS MAN. 1800 Appx. D (Aug. 27, 2013). The guidance provides that "if
feasible, each adult private U.S. citizen evacuated on United States Government
funded transportation, whether embassy commercial charter or military transport,
must execute the promissory note and loan agreement on Form DS-5528 prescribed
by the Department to cover the cost of transportation." Id. at 1830(a) Appx. D. In
this context, minor children do not "fly free," but instead are added to the primary
adult's promissory note and loan agreement. See id. U.S. citizens are also entitled to
receive an evacuation loan under certain circumstances. See id. at 1840(a) Appx. D.
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This issue received media attention in 2006 with the evacuation from
Lebanon. Press reports highlighted that the United States was charging its
citizens for the evacuation, while other countries-such as the United
Kingdom-were not, and that "Americans in Beirut are complaining that
they have been asked to sign forms agreeing in advance to pay unspecified
sums to cover the cost of their evacuation.'454 After five days, the
Department of State announced that it was suspending the policy of
collecting promissory notes from evacuees because it was "impracticable to
charge reimbursement" from evacuees "in this exceptional case.'A" The
Department of State officials acknowledged that the promissory note policy
had imposed instrumental costs on the evacuation process-it was viewed as
having interfered with the process, and its removal may have "increased the
numbers of American citizens seeking to leave."4 56
More importantly, for purposes of the citizenship-based taxation
analysis, the reimbursement policy imposes important symbolic costs. At
some level, the statute's reimbursement requirement might be
understandable-after all, a U.S. citizen abroad might have planned to
eventually leave that country in any event, at which time she would have
paid her own transportation costs. However, in the context of a crisis where
lives are endangered, the government is undertaking its fundamental role to
protect its citizens, and the citizens are receiving one of the fundamental
benefits of citizenship. The provision of transportation is merely the most
effective way to protect the citizens from danger. In analogous domestic
circumstances the United States generally does not treat emergency disaster
relief-for example, FEMA assistance during a hurricane-as a fee-for-
service benefit. Indeed, in some circumstances FEMA reimburses individuals
for certain expenses, such as short-term lodging, as a result of disasters. 4 57
Another possible rationale for the reimbursement requirement is that
the U.S. citizen, by travelling abroad, assumed unwarranted risks and
therefore should be obligated to pay the related costs. Such a view, however,
does not seem warranted in a modem global economy. International travel
and extended residence abroad is no longer an unusual or exotic occurrence,
454. See, e.g., Brian Whitaker, Mass Evacuation from Beirut Underway,
THE GUARDIAN, July 18, 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jul/18/
syria.israelandthepalestinians2 (the article also alleged that some citizens "had been
told they would not be allowed to use their passports again until they paid").
455. See Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, JULY 2006 EVACUATION, supra
note 448, Slide #25; see also id. at 7.
456. Id. at 6.
457. See, e.g., FEMA May Reimburse Short-Term Lodging Expenses,
FEMA, July 8, 2011, http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2011/07/08/fema-may-
reimburse-short-term-lodging-expenses (describing reimbursement for certain hotel
costs after severe storms and tornadoes damaged individuals' houses).
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so the mere fact that a U.S. citizen is in a foreign country does not
automatically suggest that she has assumed unwarranted risks.
The treatment of search and rescue operations in the United States
provides an analogy in the context of risk-taking. The National Park Service
does not charge for search and rescue operations,45 8 although proposals have
been made to charge a "special use" fee for particularly hazardous
activities.459 Park authorities cite utilitarian concerns similar to those
observed by Department of State officials during the Lebanon evacuation-a
rescue charge might discourage people in need from coming forward.46 0
Most U.S. states also avoid seeking reimbursement of search and rescue
costs from those who are helped. Only a few states, including Idaho, Oregon,
and Maine, have laws authorizing agencies to bill for rescues, and they only
allow it "when factors such as recklessness, illegal activity or false
information led to the predicament."461 New Hampshire has perhaps the
broadest reimbursement provision, allowing the imposition of search and
rescue costs if the individual "acted negligently."462
In this context, given that international travel should not be viewed
as inherently risk-taking, Federal law should be amended so that a
reimbursement requirement is not the default approach when citizens must
be evacuated from a foreign country. Instead, the reimbursement requirement
should either be eliminated or should be confined to those circumstances
where the U.S. citizen's presence in the foreign country might be viewed as
involving recklessness or some other elevated level of risk-taking. In order to
make such an approach practicable, the standard should be tied to an
objective measure. For example, the reimbursement requirement could be
limited to those citizens who remain in (or enter) a country on nonofficial
458. See Steve Fagin, Lessons of the Mount Hood Tragedy: Who Pays for
Search and Rescue?, THE DAY (New London, CT), Dec. 19, 2009,
http://www.theday.com/article/20091219/INTERACT010102/912199999/0/SHANE
(noting that the costs are covered by National Park entrance fees).
459. See Rone Tempest Wyofile, Who Should Pay for Rescues in National
Parks?, ADVENTURE J., May 25, 2011, http://www.adventure-joumal.com/2011/05/
who-should-pay-for-rescues-in-national-parks/.
460. See id. ("[I]f we start charging for search and rescue, people would not
ask for help or would delay asking for help. We could see that it would easily drive
up the cost."); see also Laura Zuckerman, For Some Stranded US. Adventurers,
Rescues Come at a Cost, REUTERS, Feb. 18, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/02/18/usa-rescues-costs-idUSLINOATIOE20130218 [hereinafter Zuckerman,
Rescues Come at a Cost] (citing "objections by national search and rescue groups,
who say the prospect of payment could prompt people to delay seeking needed aid,
possibly making a dangerous situation worse"); see also supra note 455-456 and
accompanying text (assertions that the evacuation fee initially inhibited some U.S.
citizens in Lebanon from coming forward).
461. See Zuckerman, Rescues Come at a Cost, supra note 460.
462. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 206:26-bb.
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business beyond a reasonable period of time after the Department of State
has ordered the departure from its embassy of nonessential personnel,46 3 or
some other objective threat level indicating a particularly high level of risk.
It is difficult to gauge how important these "second-class"
citizenship concerns are to overseas citizens' advocates-whether they are a
significant reason for opposing citizenship-based taxation, or whether they
are merely an add-on argument to their more fundamental disagreement with
the system. Nonetheless, given that citizenship-based taxation is justified, at
least in part, on the benefits of citizenship, and given that overseas citizens
do not receive immediate benefits from many federal expenditures,4 64
Congress should take seriously these concerns that may be of particular
interest to overseas citizens.
VII. CONCLUSION
The recent developments in global tax enforcement and information
sharing have drawn increased attention to citizenship-based taxation under
U.S. tax law. While this topic had been of growing importance over the past
few decades due to the increased cross-border mobility of individuals, the
recent administrative developments have ratcheted up the attention even
more. In an era where the IRS has new tools for collecting information,
which are backed by significant penalties for noncompliance, overseas
citizens must now take the tax and reporting requirements very seriously.
This Article concludes that the administrative developments mitigate
one of the principle concerns undermining citizenship-based taxation-the
ability of the IRS to enforce the law. At the same time, it suggests that
proposals to shift to residence-based taxation of citizens raise significant
administrative problems of their own. In addition, residence-based proposals
raise more substantive concerns, particularly with respect to incentives to
move abroad and the resulting impact on society's perception of the income
tax and the continuing viability of the estate and gift tax.
Ultimately, the Article concludes that these administrative and
substantive issues, on balance, favor the continued application of citizenship-
based taxation. However, with the IRS's greater powers come greater
responsibilities. The Article acknowledges that citizenship-based taxation
imposes unique challenges for overseas citizens-both with respect to tax
463. Lesser threat levels, such as "Travel Warnings," might be too broad,
given that they sometimes encompass countries to which a significant number of
Americans frequently travel, such as Mexico and Israel. See Alerts and Warnings,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, last accessed May 12, 2014, http://travel.state.gov/travel/
cispa tw/tw/tw1764.html (listing countries).
464. While overseas citizens may not receive the immediate benefits of
many federal expenditures (e.g., federal highways, etc.), they will benefit from the
prior expenditure on these long-lived expenditures if they return to the United States.
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compliance and other areas-and it encourages the IRS to show more
sensitivity to these concerns, consistent with the policies underlying
citizenship-based taxation.
